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PREFACE
p RIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE WILLIAMS ACT, contests for control
of public companies in the United States generally involved com-
peting solicitations of proxies conducted within the limits of the require-
ments of the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Tender
offers became almost as prevalent in this country, with the conglomera-
tion movement in the 1960's, as they had been in England immediately
following World War II.
During this period, most bidders were perceived as corporate
"raiders" intent on unfairly pressuring shareholders into selling their
shares in "proud old companies" pursuant to short-fuse, "Saturday
Night Specials" at unfair prices. The pre-Williams Act raider disclosed
little about itself, its source of funds or its plans, including plans to fund
its acquisition by draining liquid assets from the target company or liq-
uidating various assets. Thus, initially proposed federal legislation was
designed to close the gap between proxy and tender offer regulation
and was clearly intended to protect target company management and to
inhibit tender offers generally.' However, this one-sided approach was
ultimately rejected in favor of a legislative scheme that did not "tip...
* B.A., Cornell University, J.D., New York University; Partner in the Dallas
office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
See, e.g., S. 2731, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (including, among other things,
a 20-day pre-commencement filing requirement); S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) (including, among other things, a confidential 5-day pre-commencement fil-
ing requirement). See generally Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids:
Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499 (1967).
1982]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making a takeover bid" because of a congressional percep-
tion, fomented primarily by the professional investment community,
that neither the bidder nor the target company needed additional
weapons.' Thus, as the Supreme Court would later hold, the "sole pur-
pose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors."'
In the vast majority of the contested tender offers after the Williams
Act was enacted in 1968, target companies commenced defensive litiga-
tion, frequently alleging violations of that Act. However, the emerging
body of federal decisional law was, in significant part, adverse to target
company interests. It soon became clear, moreover, that the disclosure
requirements and minimum substantive fairness provisions of the
Williams Act had neither eliminated the "Saturday Night Special" (an
"any and all" offer could be completed in a week under the Williams
Act) nor dissuaded the true raider from entering the fray. Given the
SEC's unwaivering commitment to abstract neutrality in the tender of-
fer context (manifest at least until the promulgation of the rules which
took effect in 1980 and in large part still evident today), potential target
companies and their advisors turned to the legislatures of the various
states, almost forty of which responded with legislation designed in part
to string out the tender offer process.
Thereafter and until the avalanche of cases successfully challenging
the state takeover laws,' tender offers evolved into a less impulsive,
more sophisticated acquisition technique. The totally unforeseen "Satur-
day Night Special" was replaced by the "bear hug" and its variants as
the preferred tactic of lawyers and investment bankers advising acquisi-
2 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
' Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
' The constitutional status of most state takeover laws was uncertain, e.g.,
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue
grounds, 443 U.S. 1973 (1979), particularly since the SEC's promulgation of Rule
14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (creating a direct conflict with the pre-
commencement waiting period requirements contained in many of the state
takeover statutes), until the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). In MITE, a majority of the Supreme Court
held that the Illinois takeover statute imposed an impermissible burden on in-
terstate commerce. While there are certain features of the Illinois statute which
distinguish it from other state takeover laws (e.g., the Illinois statute provided
for administrative regulation of substantive fairness), it appears likely that
MITE sounds a death knell for virtually all state takeover legislation, at least as
presently constituted. See generally Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy
Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (holding that the so-called
"penalty box" provision of the Ohio Takeover Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1981), imposed an unconstitutional burden on in-
terstate commerce). However, in some part due to Justice Powell's concurrence
in MITE (joining with the Commerce Clause ruling so as to permit the states
some room to legislate in the area), efforts are underway in a number of states to
enact legislation which will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
[Vol. 31:175
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/3
WILLIAMS A CT DECISIONS
tion-minded clients. These tactical changes were in part a result of the
adjustment to the state takeover statutes. They also reflected efforts to
deal with the potentially more troublesome defensive techniques often
employed by target companies; e.g., litigation, protracted state ad-
ministrative hearings and the placement of stock in friendly hands.
More importantly, the tender offer-once thought to be a tool solely
of corporate raiders- came to be perceived by many persons in the busi-
ness and financial communities as an acceptable and preferred acquisi-
tion device. At the same time, the category of typical target companies
changed dramatically. While hard data are not available, it is commonly
believed that typical target companies in the current environment are
successful, often multi-billion dollar participants in their particular in-
dustries, and are managed by capable personnel; however, they are in-
adequately valued by the United States securities markets. Further-
more, with the apparent demise of state takeover legislation, at least as
originally formulated, and the SEC's five-day "commence or withdraw"
requirement in Rule 14d-2(b), lightning strikes without prior warning
have again become the preferred approach of prospective bidders and
their professional advisors.
The legal requirements relating to tender offers have thus become a
subject of great interest to a broad spectrum of corporate America.
Given the frequency of litigation in this context, and the fact that the
Williams Act itself and the SEC's rules provide clear answers to only
the most basic of questions, analysis and understanding of the federal
decisional law relating to tender offers-the principal focus of this
Article-is of obvious significance.
This Article does not purport to deal globally with the field of tender
offer regulation; rather, it constitutes an effort to analyze generally the
principal issues raised in the many tender offer cases decided since the
enactment of the Williams Act as well as a few earlier cases which may
be of continuing relevance. As such, reference must be made elsewhere
for discussion of issues such as the operation and validity of state take-
over legislation, the effect of state law fiduciary obligations and general
offensive and defensive planning and similar matters.'
1. THE BASIC DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction
The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
5 A number of efforts have been undertaken to deal globally with the subject
of tender offers, including, among other things, identification of potential target
companies, general offensive and defensive planning, fiduciary obligations and
state takeover legislation. See, e.g., M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS
AND FREEZEOUTS (1978); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN,
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977); E. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN. TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973).
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1934, and rules thereunder,7 primarily create a disclosure system ap-
plicable to purchases of, and certain offers to purchase, shares of public
companies. The various substantive requirements and broad antifraud
proscriptions under the Williams Act are, of course, important con-
siderations in the structuring of any tender offer subject to the Act.8
However, most of the litigation under the Williams Act has involved
questions of whether particular filings were required in connection with
the commencement or the consummation of certain transactions, the
making of a particular communication or, if a prescribed filing or com-
munication was made, whether the disclosures therein were adequate.
These basic issues are the primary avenues for litigation, however, a
number of subsidiary questions frequently arise in Williams Act cases;
for example, questions as to standing, proper parties and remedies.
Questions relating to whether a particular filing was required in connec-
tion with the commencement or consummation of a particular transac-
tion or communication will be considered first.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk, (1976) (the "Exchange Act"). The Williams Act amended
sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)
(the "Williams Act"). Hereinafter, references are generally to the Public Law sec-
tion numbers of the Exchange Act rather than to the section numbers as codified
in the United States Code.
' These rules are codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-.14f (1982). They are general-
ly referred to throughout this Article by the SEC's rule number (e.g., Rule 14d-7)
rather than to the rule numbers as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.
8 The substantive requirements under the Williams Act are as follows:
(i) Section 14(d)(5); Rule 14d-7 (providing withdrawal rights);
(ii) Rule 14d-5 (providing the bidder a right to a subject
company's shareholder list and security position listings);
(iii) Section 14(d)(6) (providing for pro rata acceptance with respect
to tender offers for less than all shares of an outstanding
class);
(iv) Section 14(d)(7) (providing for increases in consideration to all
tendering shareholders where terms of a tender offer are
varied);
(v) Rule 14e-1 (providing for a 20 business day minimum offering
period and certain other matters);
(vi) Rule 14e-2 (requiring the subject company to disclose its posi-
tion with respect to a tender offer); and
(vii) Rule 14e-3 (prohibiting certain trading based upon inside infor-
mation regarding a tender offer).
The SEC's substantive rules are discussed herein in their appropriate contexts.
For an important recent development relating to the scope of the term
"manipulation" under the Williams Act (which is not moored to questions of the
adequacy of disclosure), see, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D.
Ohio June 11, 1982); Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation: Tactics and Strategies
After Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J. 975 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 140-68.
[Vol. 31:175
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B. Filing Requirements
1. Section 13(d)
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires any "person" who directly
or indirectly acquires beneficial ownership9 of more than 5% of any
class of a registered equity security to file an information statement
with the issuer, the SEC and the exchanges upon which the security is
traded, within ten calendar days of such acquisition. The filing person
must disclose, among other things: 1) the background and identity of all
persons by whom or on whose behalf beneficial ownership was obtained;
2) the source and amount of funds for past and future purchases, in-
cluding the identity of any lender unless such lender is a United States
bank lending in- the ordinary course of business; 3) any plans for major
changes in the business or structure of the issuer; 4) the number of
shares beneficially owned by the person and each associate of such per-
son; and 5) any contracts, arrangements or understandings with respect
to the disposition or acquisition of shares, the giving of proxies or the
division of profits."0 Section 13(d)(3) defines the term "person" for pur-
poses of section 13(d) as follows: "When two or more persons act as a
partnership, limited partnership, syndicate or other group for the pur-
pose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer, such
syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person.'"
' Beneficial ownership is defined very broadly for purposes of the Williams
Act. Rule 13d-3 provides that any person is deemed the beneficial owner of a
security to the extent that (among other things) such person "directly or indirectly,
through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise
has or shares:
1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the
voting of, such security; and/or
2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to
direct the disposition of, such security."
Because of the emphasis in Rule 13d-3 upon voting or investment power rather
than traditional voting or investment rights, the determination of beneficial
ownership is frequently very difficult.
0 Section 13(d)(6) states, however, that the provisions of section 13 do not
apply to any acquisition of or offer to acquire securities registered under the
Securities Act; "any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which,
together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same
class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that
class; any acquisition by the issuer of its own securities; or any acquisition which
the SEC exempts by rules, regulations or order." The two-percent exclusion is ef-
fectively eliminated under the terms of the Domestic and Foreign Investment Im-
proved Disclosure Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (1977 Supp.). See S. 305, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., Tit. 11 (1977). Acquisitions or dispositions of 1% or more of a par-
ticular class of equity securities are now deemed "material" under Rule 13d-2(a),
thus requiring an amendment to any prior Schedule 13D filing. Also, the SEC has
promulgated rules designated to regulate issuer tender offers. See Rule 13d-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-4 (1982).
1982]
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2. Section 14(d)
Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any person to
make a "tender offer" for any class of registered equity securities if,
after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly,
be the beneficial owner of more than 5% of such class, unless the person
has filed an information statement with the SEC on Schedule 14D-1."
Section 14(d) contains a definition of the term "person" which parallels
the language quoted above from section 13(d)(3).
The disclosure requirements of Schedule 14D-1 in significant part
repeat those contained in Schedule 13D. In addition to those re-
quirements, the bidder must disclose 1) past contacts, transactions or
negotiations between the bidder and the subject company; 2) persons
retained, employed or to be compensated by the bidder; 3) the financial
statements of certain bidders;'2 and 4) other material information. The
information required to be disclosed to subject company security
holders is identified in Rule 14d-6(e).
Pursuant to Rule 14e-2 (which, like all the rules under Regulation 14E,
applies to all tender offers in interstate commerce, not just those for
securities of reporting companies), within 10 business days after a
tender offer is first published, sent or given to security holders the sub-
ject company must issue a statement disclosing whether the subject
company: 1) recommends acceptance or rejection of the tender offer; 2)
expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral with respect to the
tender offer; or 3) is unable to take a position with respect to the tender
offer. This statement must also include disclosure of the reasons given
for the position or inability to take a position, and the subject company
must file a Schedule 14D-9 with the SEC on the date of publication of
any solicitation or recommendation (including a statement required by
Rule 14e-2).13
Schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure of 1) the security and subject com-
pany; 2) the tender offer at issue; 3) the identity and background of the
filing person; 4) the nature of the solicitation or recommendation and the
reasons therefor; 14 5) persons retained, employed or to be compensated
" The scope of the term "tender offer" for Williams Act purposes is discussed
infra in Section I(B)(5).
2 The requirement of financial statement disclosure by the bidder has been
the subject of significant litigation. See infra Section III(C)(5).
" A subject company must also hand deliver a copy of its Schedule 14D-9 to
the bidder on that date and at least telephonically notify each national securities
exchange on which its stock is traded (or the NASDAQ if quoted over the
counter) of the filing and certain of the terms thereof. Rule 14d-9(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-9(a)(2)(1982).
'4 The Instruction to Item 4(b) of Schedule 14D-9 provides that "[clonclusory
statements such as 'The tender offer is in the best interest of shareholders' will
not be considered sufficient disclosure in response to Item 4(b)." 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-101 (1982). Since the effective date of this requirement, subject company
[Vol. 31:175
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by the reporting person; 6) transactions effected by the reporting per-
son in securities of the subject company within the preceding sixty
days; and 7) certain negotiations and transactions (largely of a defensive
nature) undertaken by the subject company in response to the tender
offer. Most of the foregoing information (or a "fair and adequate sum-
mary thereof') is required to be furnished to security holders pursuant
to Rule 14d-9(c).1 5
Contestants in unfriendly tender offers often allege violations of sec-
tions 13(d) and 14(d) in efforts to obtain injunctive relief. In view of the
short time periods normally involved in this context, it is important to
determine precisely when and to whom these requirements apply.
However, the statutes provide little guidance, the SEC's rules provide
less and the federal courts have not been consistent in their treatment
of these important issues.
3. Williams Act "Groups"
As indicated above, the statutory definition of the term "person" in
both section 13(d) and section 14(d) includes persons "act[ing] as a part-
nership, limited partnership, syndicate or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer." Given that the
Williams Act itself and many of the obligations under the SEC's rules
speak in terms of particular "persons," the importance of a clear
understanding of the statutory definition of that term is obvious. The
most difficult issues arise with respect to the "group" concept under the
Williams Act.
a. Groups in General
In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the question of when a number of separate shareholders of
an issuer became a "group" subject to the reporting requirements of
section 13(d). On the basis of the legislative history of the Williams Act,
the Bath Industries court held that section 13(d) becomes operative only
when a configuration of shareholders owns more than 10% of the equity
securities of a reporting company (changed by amendment in 1970 to
5%) and agrees to act in concert to acquire additional shares. The plain-
tiffs contention that section 13(d) becomes operative whenever any
group of shareholders holding ten (five) or more percent of such
disclosures of reasons for particular decisions (and actions) in response to a
tender offer have generally become quite detailed.
"s Due to the difficulty in determining what constitutes a "fair and adequate
summary" of the information required to be furnished to subject company secur-
ity holders pursuant to Rule 14d-9(c), many subject companies send a verbatim
(except for some exhibits) printed copy of at least their initial Schedule 14D-9 fil-
ings to security holders.
'6 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
19821
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securities agrees to act in concert toward a specific goal, regardless of
whether additional shares are to be purchased, was rejected on the
ground that such a construction would enable the issuer's management
to use section 13(d) for self-preservation, whereas the congressional pur-
pose underlying the Williams Act was merely the protection of in-
vestors. Under Bath Industries, a group of shareholders that collectively
holds the triggering percentage of equity securities can assert its deter-
mination to take control of the corporation, and act in concert toward
that goal, without becoming subject to section 13(d), so long as the
"group" does not agree to acquire additional shares.
The Bath Industries court recognized that requiring proof of an ex-
press agreement to acquire additional shares could easily frustrate
private enforcement of section 13(d)."7 Therefore, that court held that if
it can be shown that a group has agreed to pursue a common objective
and that a member of the group thereafter purchased additional shares,
a presumption would arise that the group had agreed to purchase addi-
tional stock. In such a case, compliance with section 13(d) would be re-
quired within ten days of the triggering purchase. However, even under
this rationale a group member's purchases, made in the regular course
of business without the knowledge of the other group members, will not
trigger the presumption. 8
Bath Industries appears to be unduly restrictive given the statutory
language and apparent intent of section 13(d). In GAF Corp. V. Milstein,"9
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Bath Industries and held
that the provisions of section 13(d) become operative merely upon the
formation of a "group" which holds over 5% of any covered class of equity
securities. The Milstein court viewed a "group" as an entity separate
and distinct from its composite members, which entity "acquires" its
shares within the meaning of the Williams Act upon its formation. A
"group" is defined in section 13(d)(3) as any aggregation of individuals
who have formed a common intent to acquire, hold or dispose of
securities, and the statute appears to be primarily concerned with the
disclosure of potential changes in control resulting from new aggrega-
tions of shareholders. Since a group holding over 5% could gain control
of many public companies without additional purchases, it would appear
that the requirement in Bath Industries frustrates one of the congres-
sional purposes of the Williams Act.
Other courts have favored Milstein over Bath Industries.2 For exam-
ple, in Water & Wall Assocs. v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,"
"7 See infra Section II(A)(2)(a) (discussing standing requirements under Sec-
tion 13(d)).
"S See, e.g., Calumet Indus. v. MacClure, [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,434 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
" 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
See, e.g., Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
21 [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
[Vol. 31:175
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the District Court for New Jersey held that the combination of the re-
quisite percentage of shares with the intention of gaining control was
alone sufficient to trigger the filing requirements of section 13(d). The
Water & Wall court further held that the "agreement" between the
group members should not be construed in accordance with strict con-
tract law principles." Rather, any understanding, relationship, agree-
ment or other arrangement should be, in normal circumstances, suffi-
cient to trigger the reporting requirements.
Likewise, in Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp.,23 the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas followed Milstein
without even mentioning Bath Industries:
It takes more than the arithmetic of adding up shares to deter-
mine that a statutory group exists and that a filing must be
made. Two criteria must be met: (1) The members must agree to
act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing
of securities; and (2) once the members agree to act, they must
own beneficially or acquire beneficially in excess of 5% of a class
of equity security. Mere relationship, among persons or entities,
whether family, personal, or business, is insufficient to create a
group which is deemed to be a statutory person. There must be
agreement to act in concert.24
Texasgulf was followed in Universal Container Corp. v. Horwitz,25 and,
together with Milstein, seems to constitute the prevailing view.26
The Milstein/Texasgulf test tracks the statutory language of "acquir-
ing, holding or disposing of securities," whereas the Bath Industries
court's analysis effectively eliminated the words "holding or disposing
of" from the Williams Act "group" concept. Moreover, the manifest pur-
22 Id. at 93,756-57.
23 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
14 Id. at 403.
21 [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,161 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
26 See General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977); Corenco
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 488 F.2d 207, 217-18 (2d Cir.), aff'g in part and reman-
ding in part, 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lane Bryant, Inc. v. Hatleigh Corp., [1980 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that a "group"
was formed when defendants banded together to dispose of their stock on the
ground that "[t]he critical ingredient is whether the agreement to dispose of the
shares will effectuate a shift in corporate control"); Financial Gen. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978). But see
Calumet Indus. v. MacClure, [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,434, at
93,568 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (following Bath, but noting that a group could acquire stock
through an agreement "to hold or dispose of shares in furtherance of a common
goal of gaining control"); SEC v. Savoy Indus., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,497, at 93,869-70 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that Bath encompasses "pool-
ing arrangements ... irrespective of whether they be formal or informal, written
or unwritten").
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pose of the Williams Act, particularly section 13(d), is to ensure ade-
quate disclosure of potential changes in control. Bath Industries,
however, by not requiring a filing by groups formed to hold or dispose
of securities, removed two important circumstances which signal poten-
tial changes in control from the statutory coverage.
A third interpretation of section 13(d), differing from Milstein/
Texasgulf and Bath Industries, was set forth in Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v.
Cox." The Ozark Air Lines court purported to follow Bath Industries,
but actually added a third element to the test set forth therein. Not only
must there be a group holding over 5% of the shares with an intent to
acquire more shares for the section 13(d) filing requirement to be trig-
gered, as in Bath Industries, but the group according to Ozark Air Lines
must then acquire within one year more than 20/o of the class over and
above its original holdings. Not surprisingly, this restrictive reading of
the statutory filing requirement has not been followed.28 The 2% exemp-
tion in section 13(d)(6)(B) seems to have been aimed primarily at the
open market purchaser who has no immediate plans to gain control of
the issuer and not at new aggregations of shareholders who might affect
control of a reporting company.
b. Particular Individuals as Group Members
Frequently, there will be some question as to whether a particular in-
dividual is a member of a Williams Act group. Usually, such a deter-
mination is a question of fact that must be answered in light of the in-
dividual's connection with the group and its activities. However, the
cases have identified a number of principles which are relevant to these
issues.
In Transcon Lines v. A. G. Becker, Inc.,' the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that, in light of the purpose of sec-
tion 13(d) as evidenced by the legislative history and as interpreted by
other courts in analogous cases, one who is not the beneficial owner of
any shares of the subject company is not a member of a group within
the meaning of section 13(d)(3).3 ° The Transcon Lines court added that
disclosure of the identity and relationship to the group of non-owners
was sufficient, although it was unable to find authority for its holding
other than the fact that Schedule 13D distinguishes between owners
and non-owners. In Cook United, Inc. v. Stockholders Protective Com-
mittee,3' the Transcon Lines holding was taken one step further. The
Cook United court refused to include as a group member an advisor who
326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
28 See supra note 26.
[1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
30 Id. at 95,163.
[1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,875 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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also held a power of attorney over the group's stock, justifying its
holding by noting that the advisor's duties were merely "ministerial." 2
The result in both Transcon Lines and Cook United may, at least in
some circumstances, be questioned. Section 13(d) is designed to inform
shareholders of potential changes in control, and it could be generally
argued that an important advisor or other participant might have a
great impact in this respect even though he or she beneficially owns no
stock in the issuer. The Transcon Lines court recognized this fact and
attempted to distinguish between owners and non-owners notwith-
standing, but its argument may not be persuasive in all instances, e.g.,
where a director of the issuer who is not a substantial shareholder ad-
vises a shareholder group even where he or she declines to join the
group. Since section 13(d) and, to a lesser extent, section 14(d) are
designed to disclose potential changes in control, it arguably makes
sense to require anyone connected with a group who might have a
substantial impact upon it to provide the same information as is cur-
rently required of beneficial owners. However, the cases do not and
perhaps should not support this argument.
c. The Significance of Intent
Apart from consideration of when a "group" is formed, for section
13(d) purposes the intent of the party who acquires 5% or more of the
outstanding equity securities of an issuer is irrelevant to the question of
whether a Schedule 13D filing must be made (although disclosure of cer-
tain plans and proposals must be made in Schedule 13D). Thus, in
Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau,33 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a contention by the defendant that his failure to file a timely
Schedule 13D was irrelevant because he did not intend to seek control
of the issuer at the time he purchased over 5% of the issuer's stock:
[T]he reporting requirements of Section 13(d) apply regardless of
the purchaser's purpose in acquiring the shares. The sweep of
Section 13(d) goes beyond the circumstances where the pur-
chaser has formulated an intent to control, but also reaches that
point when because of the size of the purchaser's holdings (hav-
ing attained five percent beneficial ownership of a class of stock)
and the fact that he acquired such holdings in a short amount of
time, the purchaser portends the potential to effectuate a
change in control."
The converse of the situation in Rondeau was considered by the
Rhode Island District Court in Nicholson File Co. v. H. K. Porter Co.35
32 Id. at 95,579.
3 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
34 Id. at 1016.
" 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972).
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The Nicholson File plaintiff contended that the filing requirements of
section 13(d) were triggered by the formation of an intent to acquire
control in a "group" which already controlled over 5% of the issuer's
stock. However, the Nicholson File court rejected this contention and
held that the statute applies only to new aggregations of shares, not to
changes in intent. Therefore, the fact that one individual decides to ac-
quire control and pools the interests, aggregating over 15% in
Nicholson File, of several jurisdictional personalities (such as trusts,
estates and foundations, all of which had acquired the shares before the
Williams Act was passed) that he already controls is not enough under
Nicholson File to invoke the filing requirements of section 13(d)."
In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the formation of an intent to
control by a 5% shareholder triggers section 13(d), the Nicholson File
court examined the interrelationship of section 13(d) and section 14(d).
Section 13(d) requires disclosure after the acquisition of more than 5%
of a class of equity securities which suggests that Congress only intended
to require disclosure of information bearing upon the potential effect on
investment of major changes in holdings. In contrast, section 14(d) re-
quires disclosure before any attempted tender offer. With respect to the
latter provision, the Nicholson File court observed:
Unless management is considered the sole beneficiary of this
disclosure, a proposition vehemently denied after S. 510 was in-
troduced, those reviewing the information have no effective
means at their disposal to prevent the assertion of control.
Rather, they are being supplied with information necessary to
adjust for that possibility in their valuation of the corporation
for investment purposes. 7
The conclusion that Congress intended to benefit investors rather than
incumbent management, bolsters the holding that section 13(d) applies
only to persons who acquire substantial holdings in a short time period,
but not to persons with long-standing (ie., pre-Williams Act) holdings
who decide to seek control.
Another variation upon this theme was presented in Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Development Corp.8 and Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons. 9
In those cases, the potential bidder had acquired a large number of
shares in anticipation of a later takeover bid, but had scrupulously
" Of course, a change in intent would, if material, require an amendment to a
prior Williams Act filing. See infra Section I(C); Law, Weathers, Richardson &
Dutcher (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 13, 1976). Schedule 13D filings are now required
of pre-Williams Act beneficial owners of more than 5% of a reporting company.
See supra note 10.
" 341 F. Supp. at 518 (quoting Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Cor-
porate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853, 865-66 (1971)).
366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
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avoided going over the 5% benchmark of section 13(d). Both courts held
that undisclosed purchases made in conscious avoidance of the filing re-
quirements were perfectly permissible, even if the purchaser had formed
a specific intent to seek control later. The result appears to be correct,
or at least in accord with the SEC's current thinking. °
d. Application of Section 13(d) to Management of the Issuer
The filing requirements of section 13(d) are usually thought of in
terms of bidder-outsiders. However, at least in some cases they may ap-
ply to management of the issuer. In Tony Lama Co.,41 for example, a
"group" of officer-directors of a corporation acquired over 2% of the
issuer's shares in a twelve month period. The officer-director "group"
requested a .no-action letter from the SEC staff on the ground that it
was exempt from the filing requirements of section 13(d) by virtue of
the fact that the participants collectively owned 56% of the stock before
the purchases and thus were already in substantial control of the cor-
poration. Therefore, the group argued, there would be no purpose in re-
quiring a Schedule 13D filing. The SEC staff rejected this contention,
concluding that the management constituted a "group" within the mean-
ing of section 13(d)(3), and:
Once a person (defined to include a group such as the Lama
group) has acquired more than 5% of the outstanding equity
securities of a class within the scope of Section 13(d)(1), then
such person must report every acquisition-even if only a single
share-which together with all other acquisitions by the same
person of the same class during the preceding twelve months ex-
ceeds . .. 2% of that class .... These provisions are applicable
irrespective of how the acquisitions are made . . . . [N]or are
these provisions affected in the situation . . . describe[d] where
the Lama group already controls and will remain in control of
the subject company following the acquisition in question. 2
Tony Lama was followed in Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman." There, Judge
Stewart rejected the defendants' argument that existing management
could not constitute a section 13(d)(3) "group" when it was formed to
resist an outside attempt to gain control. However, the precedential
value of Jewelcor may be limited since the plaintiff had alleged that
40 Cf. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (imposing a "disclosure or abstain" rule
relating to tender offers on persons other than "any person [who] has taken a
substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer"). But
see infra Section V(C)(2).
41 [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,901 (SEC Staff Reply May 14,
1974).
42 Id. at 84,311.
" 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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various non-management persons had joined the group and the Jewelcor
court seemed to indicate that Tony Lama would control only when
there was no public tender offer. The latter limitation seems reasonable
since, as is discussed below, where a tender offer is made, management
of the subject company is subject to the filing requirements of section
14(d)(4) in any event. Still, Jewelcor used broader language than was
necessary to reach this result,"' and thus may ultimately be read more
expansively.45
A management group which decides to pool its efforts and shares in
an attempt to resist a hostile tender offer which has actually been com-
menced has been held not to be subject to section 13(d).4" Moreover, if in-
dividual officers and directors cause an issuer to repurchase its stock, it
has been held that no filing is required where the individuals are not
personally acquiring any shares." Of course, if management decides to
communicate its opposition to the shareholders, it must make a separate
Schedule 14D-9 filing. However, the cases have recognized that section
13(d) should not be deemed to require subject company management to
make duplicate and arguably redundant filings.
Particularly in light of the requirement of Rule 14e-2 that the subject
company disclose its position, and therefore make a Schedule 14D-9 fil-
ing, the judicial tendency to ignore section 13(d) arguments relating to
the issuer's management where a tender offer has actually commenced
seems sound and harmonizes the disclosure requirements of sections
13(d) and 14(d).48 In this setting, a Schedule 13D filing would add nothing
of significance to the filing and disclosure requirements of Rule 14d-9.
The difficult questions in this context arise with respect to unconven-
tional tender offers and situations in which only a threatening substan-
tial investment has been made. In the latter context, unless the support
of substantial shareholders outside management is solicited, it appears
unlikely that any purpose would be served by requiring a Schedule 13D
filing by the issuer's management.
,4 "[W]e do not agree with Lafayette that § 13(d) does not apply to manage-
ment groups." Id. at 243.
41 See Podesta v. Calumet Indus., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,433, at 93,560 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that a management group is subject to
the requirements of 13(d) "at least where no outside tender offer is involved").
4' E.g., Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973); Scott
v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974) (alternative holding).
47 See Wilfred P. Cohen Foundation v. Prevor, [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). However, Rule 13e-1 requires that certain
disclosures be made in this context.
48 See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[Bjecause [the subject company] and its management are subject
to Section 14(d), the provisions of Section 13(d) are inapplicable to them." Id. at
1161).
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4. "Bidders" Under Regulation 14D
The new definitions adopted in 1979 by the SEC under Regulation
14D discard the prior terms "offeror" and "target company," for the less
inflammatory concepts "bidder" and "subject company."49 Rule 14d-1(b)(1)
defines the term "bidder" as including "any person who makes a tender
offer or on whose behalf a tender offer is made." The person who
"makes" a tender offer should be relatively easy to identify-that per-
son presumably is the one who becomes contractually obligated to pur-
chase tendered shares. However, the concept that the bidder includes
any person on whose behalf a tender offer "is made" is not so clear.
General Instruction C to Schedule 14D-1 requires certain disclosures
relating to "controlling persons" of the reporting person." As such, it
would appear that mere "control" of the person or entity making a con-
tractually binding tender offer should not be enough to include the con-
trolling person within the meaning of a "bidder" under Rule 14d-l(b)(1).
The two cases decided thus far in this area have only implicitly
recognized this analysis." Instead, those cases have each stressed, in
finding that particular entities or persons were not within the scope of
the term "bidder," that the questioned entity or person either did not
provide financing for the tender offer or would not likely receive stock
in the subject company if the bid were successful.
It is not presently possible to determine what ultimate meaning will
be given to the language "on whose behalf a tender offer is made"
under Rule 14d-l(b)(1). However, several conclusions should be relatively
obvious. First, as indicated above, mere control of the contractual
offeror should not be enough, although disclosure of the existence of
such control is separately required. Likewise, the mere provision of
financing for a tender offer (e.g., by a bank in the ordinary course of its
business) clearly should not be enough to include the lender within the
"bidder" concept. However, if the person in question either provides
financing to an affiliate or might reasonably be expected to receive the
economic benefits of stock ownership if the tender offer is successful,
such a person may be included within Rule 14d-l(b)(1)'s concept of "bid-
der" for Williams Act purposes.
'9 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(b)(1) & (2).
Determining the precise meaning of the "controlling persons" concept
under the federal securities laws is not always an easy task. E.g., Sommer, Who's
"in Control"?-SEC, 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966); Note, The Burden of Control
Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1019 (1973). But see Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy
Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (finding various defendants to
be "controlling persons" under 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) in a Williams Act context).
"I Gray Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simmons, [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,305 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 1981); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbritton, [1981 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,899 (D.D.C. 1981).
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5. Definition of Williams Act "Tender Offers"
a. Application of the Tender Offer Concept to Various Transactions
Congress did not define the term "tender offer" in the Williams Act,
and the SEC has in the past declined to adopt a rule defining the term
on the ground that "a definition of the term 'tender offer' is neither ap-
propriate nor necessary" given the dynamic nature of tender offers and
the need for flexibility in the implementation of the Williams Act.52 Ac-
cordingly, it has fallen upon the courts to establish guidelines for deter-
mining whether a transaction or series of transactions constitutes a
tender offer. The effort has only been partially successful.
The courts have had little difficulty fashioning a definition of a so-
called "conventional" tender offer:
The offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to
buy shares of a company-usually at a price above the current
market price. Those accepting the offer are said to tender their
shares for purchase. The person making the offer obligates
himself to purchase all or a portion of the tendered shares if cer-
tain specified conditions are met.53
Most courts agree, however, that a "tender offer" need not follow the
conventional pattern.' "Several courts . . . have taken the position ...
that other unique methods of stock acquisition which exert pressure on
stockholders to make uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell, as is
possible in the case of tender offers, should be treated as tender offers
for purposes of the [Williams Act].""5
52 SEC Rel. No. 34-15548 (Feb. 5, 1979), [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 81,935, at 81,213.
" Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1978) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1171, 90th Congress, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811). See also Water & Wall Assocs. v.
American Consumer Indus., [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 193,943 (D.N.J.
1973). See generally S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967); H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 597 n.22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
' Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974), specifically rejected the contention that a "tender offer" must be
a hostile bid opposed by incumbent management.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1978). See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); S-G Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114
(D. Mass. 1978); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973). But see generally
Freedom Nat'l Bank v. Daniels & Nell, Inc., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,439 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1982) (purchase program including solicitations
by mail had some characteristics of a tender offer but irreparable harm not
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This issue will most likely arise when an entity or group accumulates
a large number of shares through ordinary market transactions con-
ducted over an exchange or in the over-the-counter market, or through
privately negotiated purchases. Since each situation raises slightly dif-
ferent questions, each will be discussed separately below. 6
(i) Open Market Purchases
There have been a number of cases in which open market purchases
have been challenged on the ground that they constituted tender offers.
The most significant cases in this regard are discussed below seriatim:
1. In Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc.,57 the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that a 30% shareholder had not made
a tender offer when he purchased an additional block of shares from a
broker who had put the block together by buying shares on the Midwest
Stock Exchange as they became available:
The market transactions of [the broker] on behalf of [the
buyer] do not constitute a tender offer. The sellers of those
shares decided to sell on their own without any pressure from
[the buyer]; there is no evidence that the market purchases were
preceded by any public announcement which might have caused
them to be a tender offer .... Although [the broker] presumably
offered the shareholders . . . a premium over the market price,
the Court does not deem this alone, especially in light of the
small number of shareholders apparently so solicited .... suffi-
cient to make these dealings a tender offer.58
The Nachman court also held that the buyer's partially successful at-
tempt to purchase the stock of several directors and large shareholders
did not constitute a tender offer either by itself or in connection with
the open market purchases, primarily because individuals were thought
shown); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981) (target's pur-
chase of its own shares at a premium from arbitrageurs was not a tender offer);
E.H.I. of Fla., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. [1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,686 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (letter to bondholder-trustees requesting approval of sale
of assets serving as part of the bonds' collateral was not a tender offer, as bonds
are not equity securities); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980)
(offer to purchase shares at fixed price pursuant to a court-supervised settlement
agreement not a tender offer).
56 A proxy solicitation will not be converted into a tender offer by a state
statute that gives dissenting shareholders (in a merger or other transaction of
similar consequence) the right to surrender their shares and receive an amount
equal to fair market value as determined by a court. In situations of this type, the
corporation is required to purchase the shares once the statutory prerequisites
are satisfied; it is not offering to purchase the shares. E.g., Leighton v. AT&T,
397 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" [1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,455 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
58 Id. at 95,592.
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to be "powerful enough not to be pressured by [the buyer] into making
uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell." 9 Accordingly, the Nachman
court concluded that no tender offer had been made since "[t]o
characterize ... negotiations with a relatively small and powerful group
of shareholders as a tender offer or tender offers would not serve the
purposes of §§ 14(d) and (e)."'
2. In Water & Wall Assocs. v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,6"
the plaintiff contended that the defendant had made a tender offer by
contacting a market maker for the purpose of acquiring an interest in
the subject company and later purchasing shares through the market
maker pursuant to an open purchase order. The Water & Wall court re-
jected this argument, concluding that "the action taken by [the defen-
dant] may have had some effect on the price of the stock, but it does not
amount to a tender offer."62
3. In D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway,63 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected the issuer's argument that the
defendant had made a tender offer when it purchased 5.37% of the
stock of NJB Prime Investors in open market transactions on the
American Stock Exchange and another 7.59% in four privately
negotiated transactions with four highly sophisticated financial institu-
tions. The Holloway court flatly rejected the plaintiffs contention that
the open market purchases amounted to a tender offer, stating that "[i]t
seems clear ... that open market purchases cannot be a tender offer,"64
and that the purchaser's "telephone calls to 'sophisticated persons,'...
some 'two dozen' in all, and the four actual purchases from financial in-
stitutions" did not constitute a tender offer. 5
4. In Calumet Industries, Inc. v. MacClure,66 the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a series of open market
transactions did not constitute a so-called creeping tender offer within
the meaning of section 14(d): "[C]ourts have repeatedly held that the re-
quirements of that section are not triggered by regular purchases in the
open market."67
5. In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,"6 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Curtiss-Wright's open market pur-
chases of Kennecott stock over various national securities exchanges
Id. at 95,590.
60 Id. at 95,592.
61 [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
62 Id. at 93,759.
63 [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
64 Id. at 96,562.
61 Id. at 56,563.
66 [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,434 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
67 Id. at 93,567.
08 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
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did not constitute a tender offer,69 reasoning that Congress could not
have intended such purchases to be included in the definition of "tender
offers" since such a definition would be inconsistent with other pro-
visions of the Williams Act:
Although broad and remedial interpretations of the [Williams]
Act may create no problems insofar as the antifraud provisions
of subsection (e) of section 14 are concerned, this may not be
true with regard to subsections (d)(5)-(d)(7). Subsection (d)(5) pro-
vides that securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer may
be withdrawn within seven days of the publication or delivery to
shareholders of the tender offer or at any time after sixty days
from the date of the original tender offer. Subsection (d)(6) re-
quires offerors to purchase securities on a pro rata basis where
more are tendered than the offeror is bound or willing to take.
Subsection (d)(7) provides that where the offeror increases the
offering price before the expiration of his tender offer, those
tenderers whose stock has already been taken up are entitled to
be paid the higher price. It seems unlikely that Congress intended
"tender offer" to be so broadly interpreted as to make these pro-
visions unworkable....
Kennecott's interpretation would . . . require courts to apply
the withdrawal, pro rata and increased price provisions of sec-
tion [14](d)(5)-(7) to ordinary stock purchases, a difficult if not im-
possible task ....
If this court is to opt for an interpretation of "tender offer"
that differs from its conventional meaning, this is not the case in
which to do it.0
The final comment is at least somewhat unsettling. Although the Ken-
necott court found that Curtiss-Wright's purchases had not amounted to
a tender offer, its suggestion that it might extend the definition of
"tender offer" indicates that the decision could have gone the other way
if the facts had been slightly different. At the same time, however, it
must be recognized that Kennecott was the first case in which the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals had been asked to plumb the meaning of
the tender offer concept. Accordingly, the Kennecott court's comment
69 White, Weld & Co. solicited approximately 50 Kennecott stockholders on
behalf of Curtiss-Wright and later purchased the shares held by those individuals
in transactions consummated on an exchange. In addition, another Curtiss-Wright
broker purchased an undetermined number of Kennecott shares from a dozen in-
stitutional stockholders in transactions that did not cross an exchange. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not consider these purchases to be signifi-
cant, however. In reaching its decision the court ignored White, Weld's actions,
and held that "[tihe fact that several of Curtiss-Wright's purchases were
negotiated directly with financial institutions lends no force to Kennecott's con-
tentions." Id. at 1207.
70 Id. (citations omitted).
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should probably be taken to mean that the court did not intend to limit
itself to the conventional definition of "tender offers" in the future. It
does not necessarily mean, however, that that court will go so far as ex-
panding the definition of "tender offers" to include open market pur-
chases.71
In sum, there appears to be a consensus among the courts that open
market purchases do not, by themselves, constitute tender offers. This
position seems sound. First, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit pointed out in Kennecott, a definition of "tender offer" that includes
open market purchases would be inconsistent with other provisions of
the Williams Act. Sections 14(d)(5)-(7), are particularly troublesome, but
section 14(d)(1), which requires an offeror to file a Schedule 14D-1 before
it publishes a tender offer, and Rule 10b-13, which prohibits an offeror
from purchasing the target's stock other than pursuant to the tender
offer while the offer is open, are also problematic. The application of
these provisions to open market purchases would make such purchases
a practical impossibility -a result which Congress clearly did not intend
when it enacted the Williams Act."
The second reason open market purchases should not be included in
the definition of "tender offer" is that such an expansive definition of
the term is neither warranted nor necessary given the purpose of the
Williams Act. Sections 14(d) and 14(e), the principal statutory provisions
applicable to tender offers, were designed to protect investors from
pressured solicitations in which they might be forced to choose whether
to sell their stock without the information necessary for a reasoned deci-
sion as a result of fear that if they failed to act quickly their shares
would not be taken up at all. 3 Open market purchases hardly fit within
this framework since, in those situations, the sellers will have entered
the market on their own, content to take the then prevailing price.
Moreover, there is no need to extend the protections of the Williams
Act to situations where the purchaser does not publicize his intentions.'
71 See also Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.
Mo. 1979) (a series of open-market purchases plus one block purchase was not a
tender offer); Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978) (discussed infra in connection with privately
negotiated purchases).
72 Wellman v. Dickinson, 11979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,918, at
95,840 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), citing, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
" See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1275-76 (1973) (concluding that the
term "tender offer" should not include open-market purchases since such transac-
tions are not "capable of exerting the same sort of pressure on shareholders to
make uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell which Congress found the con-
ventional tender offer was capable of exerting").
" In SEC Rel. No. 34-8392 (1968), [1969-70 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,715, the SEC took the position that a special bid constitutes a tender offer.
The special bid does have many of the attributes of a tender offer (e.g., public
[Vol. 31:175
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/3
WILLIAMS A CT DECISIONS
It should be noted, however, that certain segments of the SEC have
not formally conceded this point. In the past, at least some members of
the SEC staff advocated a definition of the term "tender offer" that
would include open market purchases."5 These arguments seem to be
based upon the assumption that the tender offer provisions of the
Williams Act should extend to all transactions that "may have as great
an effect on the market for an issuer's shares and may readily affect a
change in the control of the issuer, as does a conventional tender
offer."76 However, Senator Williams specifically rejected this interpreta-
tion of the Williams Act:
Substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases of
shares may . . .relate to shifts in control of which investors
should. be aware. While some people might say that this informa-
tion should be filed before the securities are acquired, disclosure
after the transactions avoids upsetting the free and open auc-
tion market where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the
extent of their interest and avoid prematurely disclosing the
terms of privately negotiated transactions."
Accordingly, there is little support for the expansive definition pro-
posed by some members of the SEC staff.
(ii) Privately Negotiated Purchases
The courts have not reached a clear resolution of the question
whether privately negotiated purchases can constitute a "tender offer."
Clearly, a single negotiated purchase of stock should not amount to a
tender offer regardless of the number of shares that are traded. As the
following cases indicate, however, at some point the private solicitation
of stockholders may become a statutory tender offer. The cases are
again presented seriatim.
1. In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,"8 the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma held that the defendant had made a
tender offer in the following circumstances:
[TJhe activities of the defendant in making contact with
solicitation, fixed price, fixed number of shares and a premium over market price)
and seems distinguishable from a normal market purchase. As a result of the
SEC's position, the special bid has been used sparingly.
75 See, e.g., Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing
Pains? Some Interpretations With Respect to the Williams Act, 16 HOW. L.J. 626
(1971).
76 Id. at 634. The SEC proposed a largely mechanical definition of the tender
offer concept in 1979. SEC Rel. No. 34-16385, [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,374 (1979). It is highly unlikely that this proposal will be adopted.
77 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967).
78 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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plaintiff's shareholders by the use of the mails, telephone calls,
and personal visits, for the purpose of purchasing their shares,
constitute "tender offers for, or a request or invitation for
tender offers of" their stock within the meaning of the statute. 9
The Fears court noted that it had no hesitancy in reaching this conclu-
sion since "the contacts utilized by the defendant seem even more
designed than a general newspaper advertisement, the more conven-
tional type of 'tender offer,' to force a shareholder into making a hurried
investment decision without access to information, in circumvention of
the statutory purpose. ' °
2. In Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance,8' the District
Court for the District of Columbia identified five characteristics that it
believed to be indicative of a Williams Act tender offer:
(i) [S]olicitation made to a substantial number of share-
holders and for a substantial percentage of the target cor-
poration's stock;
(ii) [Offer at a premium over current market price;
(iii) [P]ressure exerted on the shareholders of the target cor-
poration by the purchasing program; ...
(iv) [L]imited information available to shareholders ... [of the
target;] and
(v) [L]imited time for deciding whether to sell.2
Based on these criteria, the Lance court found that the defendants had
not made a tender offer:
Plaintiff has ... failed to show the widespread solicitation that is
characteristic of a tender offer. The evidence indicates that at
most ten FG shareholders were solicited by defendants. While
these shareholders held a substantial percentage of FG stock,
they were sophisticated investors who had decided to sell
because they were dissatisfied with FG management. Yet,
because these shareholders received above-market prices for
their stock, plaintiff argues that the series of private transac-
tions in which they sold their stock amounted to a tender offer.
Plaintiff offers no support for this contention, and it is clear that
privately negotiated transactions at premium prices, without
more, are not a tender offer."
The Lance court also found that the defendants' purchases of stock on
" Id. at 1252.
80 Id.
" [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978).
8 Id. at 93,429.
83 Id.
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the open market, approximately one-fourth of the total acquired, did not
constitute a tender offer since "there [was] no evidence that these trans-
actions were in any way out of the ordinary." 4
3. In S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., 5 the Massa-
chusetts District Court undertook a thorough analysis of privately
negotiated purchases. The Fuqua court said that it was "persuaded...
that methods of stock acquisition other than the conventional tender
offer fall within the purview of the tender offer provisions of the
Williams Act,"8 " and that "[tihe question in [determining whether a
given transaction should be included] is whether [the] method of acquisi-
tion . . . creates the same pressures and dangers . .. that the Williams
Act was designed to prevent."" The Fuqua court noted that open
market and privately negotiated purchases ordinarily do not constitute
tender offers, but that this rule does not necessarily hold true when the
purchases are preceded by extensive publicity:
Defendant's purchases, in the case at bar, were preceded by
two and, in part, by three widely publicized press releases
issued by defendants that outlined with some specificity the
details of the proposed buying program....
This publicity created a risk of the pressure on sellers that
the disclosure and remedial tender offer provisions of the
Williams Act were designed to prevent . . . . The conditional
language in which defendants' proposals were couched does not
obviate the public shareholders' need for the protection of the
tender offer provisions of the Williams Act once such proposals
have been made public with the specificity and apparent gen-
uineness evident in this case. 8
Accordingly, the Fuqua court "conclude[d] that where there is:
(1) a publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire
a substantial block of the stock of the target company for pur-
poses of acquiring control thereof; and
(2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large
blocks of stock through open market and privately negotiated
purchases;
" Id See also Stromfeld v. Great Atl. & P. Tea Co., [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,287 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (privately and secretly negotiated pur-
chase of stock involving only seven stockholders was not a tender offer even
though the price was at a premium and the purchase was contingent on the
acquisition of a large number of shares because the terms were negotiated and
the offer remained open for a long time).
[1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978).
86 Id. at 94,935.
87 Id.
"8 Id. at 94,936.
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such actions constitute a tender offer for purposes of § 14(d) of
the statute."89
4. In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., ° the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that Curtiss-Wright's
acquisition of over three million shares of Kennecott stock did not con-
stitute a tender offer. Curtiss-Wright had accumulated most of the
shares through open market purchases, but at least fifty Kennecott
stockholders were solicited off the floor of the exchange, and Salomon
Brothers, a Curtiss-Wright broker, purchased an undetermined number
of shares from four sophisticated institutional stockholders in privately
negotiated transactions.
As indicated above, the Kennecott court dismissed Curtiss-Wright's
open market purchases, noting that it is "well settled that market pur-
chases of stock, however aggressive, do not constitute a tender offer."9'
The court then discussed the privately negotiated purchases (in which it
apparently included the purchases from individual shareholders who
were solicited off the floor but involved transactions completed on an
exchange):
Nor do the off-market solicitations and purchases . . .con-
stitute a tender offer in the circumstances of this case. The most
liberal definition of a tender offer is:
"any offer to purchase securities likely to pressure
shareholders into making uninformed, ill-considered
decisions to sell." Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer", 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1281 (1973).
In this case, the potential sellers of Kennecott stock were
merely asked whether they wanted to sell their shares. They
were offered no premium over market price. They were never
given a deadline by which to decide whether to sell or not sell....
These sellers, moreover, were largely institutions who were
unlikely to be forced into uninformed, ill-considered decisions....
These sophisticated investors have at hand large reservoirs of
financial knowledge and capable staffs able to evaluate the pros
and cons of a particular sale. In short, they are hardly the unin-
formed security holder unable to fend for himself, who needs the
protection of the Williams Act. Given the lack of pressure and
the absence of any likelihood of hasty, uninformed selling, we
19 Id. citing H. ARANOw, E. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 7-8, 14-17 (1977).
90 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978).
' Id. at 961.
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refuse to extend the concept of tender offer to reach the pur-
chasing activities challenged here.2
The Kennecott court did not indicate whether it considered the absence
of pressure or the sophistication of the sellers to be more significant. It
is reasonable to conclude, however, that both these factors played a
substantial part in the Kennecott court's decision, and that the absence
of either might have led to a different result.
5. In Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.,3 Brascan Ltd. brought
suit against Edper Equities Ltd. after Edper purchased 3.2 million
Brascan shares in a series of open market and privately negotiated
transactions. The purchases followed weeks of heavily publicized
negotiations between the two companies concerning Edper's future rela-
tionship with Brascan. Of the total number of shares acquired, approx-
imately one-half were purchased from Gordon Securities Ltd., Edper's
regular broker, which had accumulated the shares by soliciting large
stockholders. The remaining shares were purchased in ordinary market
transactions. All of the transactions, including the purchases from Gor-
don Securities, were made on Edper's behalf by Balfour Securities Co., a
broker-dealer that Edper had retained specifically for the purpose.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
Edper's purchases did not amount to a tender offer as Brascan had con-
tended. This finding was based on a two-pronged analysis of the transac-
tions. First, Edper's open market purchases were held to have very
little similarity to a conventional tender offer: "What Edper did was to
acquire a large amount of stock in open market purchases, bidding
cautiously so as to avoid bidding up the price of the stock to excessive
levels unless there was large volume available at such price. This is not
a tender offer .... "" The Brascan court also concluded that an expan-
sive definition of the term "tender offer" -at least a definition that was
broad enough to include Edper's purchases of Brascan shares-was in-
consistent with the Williams Act. The Brascan court specifically re-
jected the argument that the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act
should apply to all major acquisitions, reasoning that "the provisions of
the Williams Act itself acknowledge ... distinctions since it provides for
different consequences where an initial accumulation is acquired by
tender offer as opposed to where it is acquired by other methods."95
Moreover, the Brascan court concluded that Congress could not have in-
tended the concept "tender offer" to include privately negotiated pur-
chases since the application of sections 14(d)(5)-(7) and Rule 10b-13 to
92 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 96,631 (emphasis added).
Id. at 95,632.
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such provisions would, as a practical matter, limit large scale acquisition
programs to conventional tender offers. 6
The Brascan court then turned to the transactions in which Gordon
Securities had participated, and concluded that Gordon had not acted as
Edper's agent. The Brascan court was not influenced by the fact that
Gordon Securities was Edper's regular broker, or by the fact that the
firm had helped Edper plan the purchases and accordingly had received
advance knowledge that Edper would purchase a substantial number
of shares. Instead, the Brascan court concluded that Gordon Securities
was acting as an agent of the sellers, and that its solicitation was not
made on behalf of Edper. More importantly, the Brascan court went on
to say:
Even if [Gordon Securities] were deemed to have been Edper's
agent in the solicitation of shares for sale, still the transaction
would not constitute a tender offer within the meaning of the
Williams Act. All that [the] firm did was to scout between 30 and
50 large institutional holders of Brascan stock, plus about a
dozen large individual investors, to collect a large block for
Edper to purchase at a price agreeable to both sides of the
transaction.... Such privately negotiated block trading is done
on a daily basis in the U.S. securities markets without anyone's
[sic] ever suspecting that what is being practiced might be a
tender offer. 7
This language might be taken to mean that shareholder solicitations will
not constitute a tender offer if the solicitation is carried on by a broker,
even a broker who is acting as an agent for the purchaser, rather than
the sellers. A more reasonable interpretation, however, is that the
solicitation of shares will not amount to a tender offer if the
solicitor- either the purchaser or his broker-limits his efforts to
sophisticated investors. Of the two, the latter interpretation is clearly
more consistent with the Williams Act's goal of protecting shareholders
from being forced to make uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell or
not to sell their shares.
6. In Macke Co. v. Allegheny Beverage Corp.,8 the District Court
for the District of Columbia entered a three-day temporary restraining
order against the acquirer on preliminary findings that its substantial
purchases, in open market and block transactions, managed by a large
investment firm, at premium prices and with attendant pressure on
target shareholders to sell, constituted a tender offer. At the expiration
of the temporary restraining order, the Macke court denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based upon its finding that no
9 Id.
Id. at 95,631.
98 [1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,576 (D.D.C. 1980).
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purchases were made above the market price, no offer was contingent
upon the purchase of a fixed number of shares, no time limit was placed
on any offer and no pressure to sell was placed on any shareholder.
7. SEC Position: The SEC has filed amicus curiae briefs that typical-
ly list eight criteria which it apparently considers to be indicative of a
"tender offer":
(i) An active and widespread solicitation of public share-
holders;
(ii) The solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of
the issuer's stock;
(iii) A premium over the prevailing market price;
(iv) The terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
(v) The offer is contingent upon a fixed number of shares;
(vi) The offer is open only for a limited period of time;
(vii) The offerees are subject to pressure to sell their
shares; and
(viii) Public announcement of the purchase program pre-
cedes or accompanies a rapid accumulation of shares.
This position has received a mixed response from the courts.99 However,
in Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc.,'00 the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that an offer to purchase from more than
one hundred family members holding more than 41% of the subject com-
pany's stock was a tender offer, making explicit reference to the SEC's
eight-point test.
8. Wellman v. Dickinson"' is perhaps the most significant recent
case in this context. In Wellman, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York broke new ground by holding that a purchaser's
privately negotiated purchases from a select group of financially
sophisticated individuals and institutions constituted a tender offer
within the meaning of the Williams Act. The Wellman court's holding is
not surprising given the facts of the case. The purchaser's solicitation
" Compare Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("I have doubts as to whether the Commission's
view constitutes either a permissible or a desirable interpretation of the
statute." Id. at 95,632), with Wellman v. Dickinson, [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[Ilt seems to me that the list of characteristics
stressed by the Commission are the qualities that set a tender offer apart from
open market purchases, privately negotiated transactions or other kinds of public
solicitations." Id. at 95,842). The eighth criterion was omitted by the SEC in a
brief filed in Wellman. As the Wellman court pointed out: "The reason this last
characteristic was left out undoubtedly was because publicity was not a feature
of [the] transaction [at issue there]." Id. Compare Wellman v. Dickinson with
Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D.
Ohio 1979).
00 [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
[1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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was a systematic, well-planned effort designed to secure over one-third
of the outstanding stock of the target company with great speed and a
minimum of legal maneuvering. It was accomplished through a series of
simultaneous phone calls made by the purchaser's brokers, the
substance of which the Welman court described as follows:
There were slight variations, but each solicitee was told that a
non-disclosed purchaser ... was looking for 20% of [the subject
company's] stock; that no transaction would be final unless 20%
of the shares were acquired; that $45 option was a top final price
and $40 option could be accepted with protection in the event
shares were later bought at a higher figure; and that the desired
20% goal was within reach or that the order was filling up fast
and a hurried response was essential. Each solicitee was asked
to respond within one hour or less, although some were given
until the next day."2
The Wellman proposal therefore included many characteristics that are
indicative of a conventional tender offer.
Since the Wellman court concluded that "[Tihere can be no disagree-
ment that a purely private transaction is not subject to the pre-filing
strictures under Section 14," it began its analysis by examining
"whether this was a privately negotiated transaction or a series of tran-
sactions or a public offering."'' 3 The Wellman court approached this
question in a novel, and seemingly questionable, fashion, using the
private offering exemption provided by section 4(2) of the Securities Act
as a guideline.'! 4 Reasoning by analogy to SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,° 5
the Welman court concluded that the principal basis for distinguishing
private from "public" transactions was "whether the particular class of
persons affected needed the protection of the Act," regardless of the
business or legal sophistication possessed by those individuals."' It added
that "[t]he number and relationship of the offers and the size and man-
ner of the offering" were additional factors to be considered, 7 and that
the purchaser had the burden of proving that the transactions were
private. The Wellman court then concluded that the offerees were in
need of the protection of the Williams Act since they had not been given
enough information (even as sophisticated investors) to enable them to
make intelligent decisions, and the purchaser had applied pressure to
force quick decisions. These factors, combined with the lack of "common
,02 Id. at 95,830.
Id. at 95,836.
"'4 The actual reference in the Wellman court's opinion is to § 4(1) of the
Securities Act. It seems clear that the Wellman court meant to refer to § 4(2).
105 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
106 [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. Rep. (CCH) 96, 918, at 95,837.
Id. at 95,837.
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characteristic[s] binding upon the solicitees together," led the Wellman
court to hold that the purchaser had "failed to carry [the] burden of
showing that [its] acquisition was 'privately negotiated.' "10
The Wellman court concluded, however, that a solicitation will not be
turned into a tender offer merely because it is "public." Accordingly,
the Wellman court proceeded to consider whether the purchaser's ac-
quisitions had constituted a Williams Act tender offer. In this regard,
the Wellman court observed that many of the elements of a conven-
tional tender offer-for example, a firm bid at a premium price and an
obligation to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares if
certain conditions were met-were present in the case before it. The
court specifically rejected defendant's contention that publicity,
widespread solicitation of the general body of stockholders and the
placement of shares in a depository were essential elements of a tender
offer, holding instead that a transaction need not have "all the defini-
tional features that courts have traditionally used to describe a tender
offer" in order to fall within the purview of the Williams Act.0 9 The
Wellman court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the
transaction had been "a swift, masked maneuver," a characteristic
which it considered to be the "basic evil which Congress sought to cure
by enacting the [Williams Act]."'".. It summed up by noting that
"[slophistication serves no purpose" in such transactions, and concluded
that the purchaser's actions had clearly amounted to a tender offer."'
Overall, this conclusion seems sound; given the facts of the case it
would appear that the Wellman purchaser had made a "tender offer."
There are, however, certain aspects of the Wellman court's opinion that
are troublesome. First, the Wellman court's short shrift to the
sophistication of the parties constitutes a fundamental departure from
prior authority. Equally disturbing is the Wellman court's reliance on
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.," 2 as a guideline for distinguishing public
from private transactions. The application of Ralston Purina would
more than likely stifle the use of privately negotiated stock acquisi-
tions-a result obviously not intended by Congress"3-just as it
threatened to stifle the use of section 4(2) exemptions prior to, and at
least in several contexts even after, the SEC's promulgation of Rule 146
(now Regulation D).' 4 Finally, the Wellman court all but ignored the
legislative history of the Williams Act, except to the extent that it could
be relied upon to bolster its decision. At several points throughout its
10' Id. at 95,838-39.
... Id. at 95,844 (emphasis in original).
HO Id. at 95,841.
Id. at 95,841-44.
' 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
113 See 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
14 See generally SEC Rel. No. 33-5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974).
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opinion the Welman court reasoned that the purchaser's actions must
have been a tender offer because they were a "swift, masked maneuver"
designed to achieve a shift in corporate control-according to the
Wellman court, transactions of the type that Congress intended to
regulate by enacting the Williams Act. Congress, however, specifically
divided its regulatory effort into two parts: One to cover transactions in
which post-acquisition disclosure was deemed necessary (section 13), and
one to cover tender offers (section 14). The fact that a transaction
presents a potential for a shift in corporate control, therefore, should
not necessarily constitute it a "tender offer."
(iii) Integration
There are only a few cases in which the courts have been asked to
decide whether open market or privately negotiated purchases, that do
not themselves constitute a tender offer, must be integrated with a
subsequent conventional tender offer. In Gulf & Western Industries,
Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,"' the District Court for the
Southern District of New York flatly rejected the argument that open
market purchases should be integrated with a subsequent tender offer.
The Gulf Western decision is somewhat confusing, however, since the
court therein made its comment in response to the plaintiff's contention
that the bidder should have filed a Schedule 13D (formerly required for
both section 13 and section 14 purposes) at the time it began acquiring
shares with the intention of ultimately making a tender offer. Another
significant case is ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust,"6
in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that allegedly misleading statements made in connection with pre-
tender offer purchases were made "in connection with" a tender offer,
but implied that the purchases were not part of the tender offer itself.
Finally, in Heine v. Signal Cos.,"7 the same court flatly stated that there
was no justification for integrating the purchaser's privately negotiated
purchases with a subsequent tender offer.
It is significant to note that in all of these cases the courts also refused
to hold (or were not asked to hold) that the private purchases alone con-
stituted a tender offer. Consequently, it is not possible to say that open
market or privately negotiated purchases could never be integrated
with a subsequent tender offer. On the basis of the cases discussed
above, however, it would seem that private transactions will not be in-
tegrated with a subsequent tender offer in most cases.
[1972-73 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,765 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d
687 (2d Cir. 1973).
"' 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
117 [1976-77 Decs.) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,898, at 91,320 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"I SEC Rel. No. 34-16623, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,2841 (Mar. 5, 1980).
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b. The "Commencement" Concept
Rule 14d-2 described the various bases under which tender offers may
be deemed to "commence" as, among others, 1) a long-form publication
of the tender offer pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(1); 2) a summary advertise-
ment pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(2); and 3) a public announcement of (A)
the identity of the bidder, (B) the identity of the target company, (C) the
amount and class of securities sought, and (D) the price or range of
prices being offered thereof.
The most difficult interpretive issues under Rule 14d-2 have arisen
with respect to public announcements. For example, the SEC has taken
the position that only public announcements by the bidder (not a public
statement by the subject company or an unaffiliated person unless con-
firmed by the bidder) trigger the five day "commence or withdraw" re-
quirement of Rule 14d-2(b) notwithstanding the fact that the identity of
the person making the announcement is irrelevant for shareholder-
protection purposes."8 The SEC also takes the position that, while a bid-
der may condition acceptance of tendered shares upon external events
(such as regulatory approvals), it may not delay the dissemination of its
offer once it has made public disclosure of the information specified in
Rule 14d-2(b)." 9 Finally, as discussed below,"' it appears to be the SEC's
view that any tender offer must remain open continuously for the twenty
business day period of Rule 14e-1 and the bidder must be willing to accept
for deposit any shares tendered during that time.
C. Amendments
1. The Timing Requirement
Section 13(d)(2) requires that an amendment to a Schedule 13D filing
be made promptly whenever any material change occurs in the facts
previously disclosed therein. 21 A similar requirement exists pursuant to
Rule 14d-9(b), and Rule 14d-l(b) requires an amendment to any Schedule
14D-1 filing "promptly but not later than the date.., additional tender
offer material is first published, sent or given to security holders."
In D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway,1" a subject company sought to en-
join a tender offer on the ground that the bidder had not amended his
Schedule 13D "promptly." The bidder had crossed the 5% line on April
119 Id.
12 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
Rule 13d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1981), provides further elucidation of
this requirement:
An acquisition or disposition of beneficial ownership of securities in an
amount equal to one percent or more of the class of securities shall be
deemed "material" . . .; acquisitions or dispositions of less than such
amounts may be material, depending upon the facts and circumstances.
in [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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23, 1974 and filed three days later. Its later purchases through May 16
were reported on May 21; purchases through May 28 were reported on
June 3; and purchases through July 3 were reported by July 9. While
refusing to define the outer limits of the term "promptly," the Holloway
court held that the bidder's amendments fit easily within the definition
and rejected the subject company's claims.
Moreover, in Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp.,12 it was held that even though
the amendment-triggering event seemingly had occurred by July 10,
1974, a filing on September 5, 1974 met the requirements of section
13(d)(2). In reaching this conclusion, the Scott court emphasized the
following factors: 1) the proposed purchaser (of assets of the issuer) was
not even incorporated as of September 5; 2) there was a lingering uncer-
tainty as to whether there was any need to file at all; and 3) the price for
the acquisition had not been set until July 29.14
A similar result obtained in Cook United, Inc., v. Stockholders Protec-
tive Committee.125 In Cook United, the defendants held a meeting on
March 21, 1979 at which they decided to wage a proxy fight for control
of the plaintiff corporation. The actual agreements which committed the
defendants to this course of action were not signed until early in the
next month. The plaintiff contended that a Schedule 13D should have
been filed after the March 12 meeting, but the Cook United court re-
jected this contention, holding that the defendants had made a timely
filing on April 12, 1979.126
Although neither the courts nor the SEC have analyzed the issue in
precisely these terms, the question of whether a Schedule 13D amend-
ment is sufficiently "prompt" should depend upon the relative degree of
importance of the fact or facts giving rise to the amendment. For exam-
ple, an amendment disclosing that a filing person had changed his inten-
tion in tolding securities of the issuer from "investment" to a purpose
to obtain actual control pursuant to a tender offer should be filed almost
immediately after the latter decision has been made since such informa-
tion is of obvious significance to the issuer's shareholders and the in-
vesting public. On the other hand, the fact that a filing person which had
previously purchased slightly more than 5% of an issuer's securities in
open market purchases over an extended period had acquired an addi-
tional 1% over several months and had not changed its intent would be
of less significance. Most practitioners in the area would counsel for an
almost immediate amendment in the first case (although pinpointing a
change in intent is admittedly difficult), but would not be uncomfortable
with some delay (as long as it was not unreasonable) in the second."'
123 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
124 Id. at 61.
125 [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,875 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
126 Id. at 95,578.
" The SEC has provided virtually no guidance in this area. But see generally
[Vol. 31:175
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/3
WILLIAMS A CT DECISIONS
2. Amendment Versus New Offer
The point of time at which changes in or modifications of an existing
tender offer become so significant as to constitute a "new offer" trigger-
ing the fifteen business day withdrawal rights period provided in Rule
14d-7 and the twenty business day minimum offering period provided in
Rule 14e-1 has not yet been clearly identified by the SEC's rules or
judicial authority.
In Pullman, Inc. v. McDermott, Inc.,1"8 the District Court for the Nor-
thern District of Illinois held that an announcement by a bidder of 1) a
change in the tender offer price, 2) the number of shares sought, 3) the
statement of intention to effect a clean-up merger, 4) the minimum
number of shares sought, and 5) the conditions to the offer constituted a
new tender offer, thus triggering the twenty business-day minimum of-
fering period. However, the announcement of only an increase in the
number of shares sought was held not to constitute a new offer by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelaborator-
Frye, Inc." The result obtaining when changes in magnitude are be-
tween these two extremes is not predictable. In general, the courts
should proceed cautiously in expanding the holding in Pullman since an
overly broad approach to this issue might inhibit the competitive bid-
ding process. 30
3. The Effect of Injunctions Against Bidders
A related issue (and one which might properly be dealt with under
the "commencement" rubric) involves the effect of an injunction against
the bidder upon the various minimum periods prescribed by the
Williams Act rules. The cases decided thus far have held that the twenty
business-day minimum offering period and fifteen business-day
withdrawal period are not tolled or retriggered because of injunctions
or temporary restraining orders entered against the bidder.' However,
particularly in a situation like Mobil Corporation's October 30, 1981 in-
In re United States Filter Corp., SEC Rel. No. 34-17425, [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,803 (1981) (amendment one day after signing of an acquisition
agreement but some three weeks after a change in intent deemed not "prompt");
Law, Weathers, Richardson & Dutcher (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 13, 1976).
.2 No. 3555 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1980).
[1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,687 (7th Cir. 1980).
130 Application of the SEC's new minimum periods arguably should not be used
to the advantage of any competitive bidder in light of Congress' overall neutral
stance.
"' Crouse Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,840 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., [1981 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,806 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Ken-
necott Corp., [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,803 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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itial offer for shares of Marathon Oil Company (where the bidder had
not complied fully with the dissemination requirements of Rule 14d-3
when injunctive relief was entered), 132 it could be that the offer has not
actually "commenced" or, alternatively, that the minimum periods
should be tolled because of the dissemination requirements of Rule
14d-3 when an injunction is entered. 13
D. Section 14(e)
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act1 34 proscribes fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender offer. Sec-
tion 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 '35 are substantively identical, except with
regard to their respective "in connection with" clauses. 3 ' As the Rule
132 Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1981, at 14, col. 1.
33 If the bidder does not publish a long-form offer or mail its offer to all
shareholders, the only alternative left to it under Rule 14d-4(a) is the publication
of a summary advertisement relating to the offer and furnishing "with
reasonable promptness . . . tender offer materials to any security holder who re-
quests such tender offer materials pursuant to the summary advertisement or
otherwise." Since "the date of commencement and the date of first publication,
sending or giving are synonymous" under the SEC's tender offer rules, SEC Rel.
No. 34-16623, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,2841, at 17,759 (Mar. 5, 1980), it could
be argued that an injunction which precludes adequate dissemination by one of
the prescribed means precludes actual "commencement". The tolling argument is
based solely upon equitable considerations since, at last in a partial tender offer,
all shareholders may not be equally treated (due to proration) where only par-
ticular classes of shareholders have actually received the bidder's tender offer
materials (arbitrageurs and professional investors frequently receive those
materials in advance of other classes of security holders). The issue was rendered
moot in the Mobil-Marathon decision by an order of the trial court in pending
antitrust litigation resetting the initial proration, withdrawal and expiration
dates of Mobil's tender offer. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., No. 2193 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 10, 1981) (interim order).
'u Section 14(e) of the Williams Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation. The Commission shall, for the purpose of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative.
.35 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
136 E.g., Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,142, at
96,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig. [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,217, at 96,635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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10b-5 of tender offer regulation,"7 it is not surprising that the vast ma-
jority of tender offer cases have been brought and decided under sec-
tion 14(e).
The various disclosure issues which have arisen under section 14(e)
are discussed elsewhere in this Article. 3 s However, the proper scope of
section 14(e), a topic of much recent tender offer litigation,'39 warrants
comment here.
1. The "In Connection With" Requirement
The requirements of section 14(e) extend not only to the statutory fil-
ing and tender offer materials and recommendations, but to all conduct
"in connection with" a tender offer. It has been held that alleged
fraudulent conduct made for the purpose of warding off a possible
tender offer does not satisfy the "in connection with" and causation re-
quirements of section 14(e), at least where no tender offer is ever actually
commenced.14 However, in ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land
Trust... a potential target company was successful in obtaining an in-
junction against a proposed tender offer on the ground that the poten-
tial bidder had made material misstatements to five banks with which
the bidder had contracted for the purchase of blocks of the target's
shares. The ICM Realty court held that the acquisition of these blocks
was part of the potential bidder's overall plan to make a tender offer
and that section 14(e) therefore applied to all representations which the
potential bidder had made to the banks. The potential bidder had made
no representations to the public or even to the subject company, but only
to the five banks, which did not join as plaintiffs to the action. The
defendant argued that later statements to the public in its forthcoming
offer to purchase would cure any alleged misrepresentation to the
banks, but the ICM Realty court rejected that contention.142
The approach adopted in ICM Realty, utilized by other courts in
Williams Act litigation,'43 was at the heart of the District Court for the
... See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
138 See infra Section III.
139 E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). See
generally Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation Tactics and Strategies After
Maratho4 36 Sw. L.J. 975 (1982).
40 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
141 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"I Id. at 926-27.
143 See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Lewis v. McGraw, [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "It is well settled that statements made
by either the offeror or the target company prior to the actual effective date of a
tender offer but after the announcement of the offer and preliminary filings fall
19821
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
Southern District of New York's reasoning in O'Connor & Assocs. v.
Dean Witter Reynolds.' There, the restrictive argument that the scope
of section 14(e) could not apply until after the public announcement of a
tender offer was explicitly rejected under the SEC's Rule 14e-3:
It is true that here the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred
prior to the announcement of the tender offer proposal.
However, this circumstance does not change the fact that the
alleged failure to disclose the impending announcement of the
tender offer proposal worked to deny the target investor] the
relevant information on which to decide whether to sell his
shares in the same manner as fraudulent conduct operates when
an offer has already been publicly announced.'
The O'Connor court concluded that any other reading would present
"the risk of defeating in substantial part the very purpose of the Act."'46
Cases such as ICM Realty and O'Connor seem correct-false or
misleading statements made in advance of public announcement of a
tender offer have an obvious potential to undercut stockholder protec-
tions, at least as significant as those made following the public an-
nouncement of the offer. Yet, some factual nexus to the offer does seem
to be necessary. Thus, if no tender offer was distinctly on the horizon, it
would appear that no section 14(e) claim could be made out.
2. Whether Section 14(e) Proscribes Unfair Conduct Absent
Fraud or Deception
A number of early cases found conduct violative of section 14(e)
without respect to whether such conduct involved a misstatement or
failure to state material facts or traditional manipulation. 47 In Applied
within the purview of § 14(e)." Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310,
1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
425 F. Supp. 1145, 1152, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). False and misleading statements
made "on the eve of a tender offer" have been held to be subject to the Williams
Act as being made "in connection with a tender offer." Lewis v. McGraw, 619
F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
It has, however, also been said to be "questionable" whether § 14(e) has any
application to the mechanics of a tender offer during the period after the
shareholders' investment decisions have been made. Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil
Oil Corp., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,483, at 93,783 n.10 (7th Cir.
1978).
144 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 1191.
146 Id. (quoting Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 951 (1981)).
14' E.g., Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (refusal of subject company to provide
stockholders list to bidder).
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Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp.,148 for example, an
issuance of stock designed to thwart a tender offer was deemed
violative of section 14(e). The same court subsequently determined that
an offeror had a right to the target company's shareholder list, without
respect to whether the latter utilized such list to communicate with its
shareholders in a manner which violated sections 14(d) or 14(e).' 9
More recently, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,'5' the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that a stock option and an asset option
obtained by a competing bidder (USS Inc., a subsidiary of United States
Steel Corporation) as a condition to its making a competing tender offer
constituted a "manipulative" act or practice under section 14(e) notwith-
standing the trial court's express holding, left undisturbed by the ap-
pellate court, that the subject company's directors had acted for a good
faith corporate purpose and that the terms of both options were fair and
reasonable and had been fully disclosed:
The [asset] option and the stock option, both individually and
in combination, have the effect of circumventing the natural
forces of market demand in this tender offer contest. Were this
contest a straight price-per-share auction, tender offers well in
excess of the USS offer of $125 per share may have been forth-
coming. Of course, Mobil itself has offered $126 per share, condi-
tional on the judicial removal of the options. Our task under the
Williams Act is not to speculate about what price the Marathon
shareholders might have been offered if the natural market
forces existed in this tender offer contest, but rather to enforce
the mandate of section 14(e) against manipulation of the market.
The purpose of the Williams Act, protection of the target share-
holders, requires that Mobil and any other interested bidder be
permitted an equal opportunity to compete in the marketplace
and persuade the Marathon shareholders to sell their shares to
them."'
In so holding, the Marathon court explicitly rejected the argument that
nondisclosure was a sine qua non of "manipulation" under the federal
securities laws: "In short, to find compliance with Section 14(e) solely by
the full disclosure of a manipulative device as a fait accompli would be
to read the 'manipulative acts and practices' language completely out of
425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"1 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be
noted that Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue acted as attorneys for the subject com-
pany in this action.
"' Id. at 376.
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the Williams Act."'' 2 Instead, under Marathon, the critical inquiry is
whether the challenged act or transaction prohibits others from "com-
peting on a par" for control.1
3
Arguably decisions such as Marathon and Applied Digital Data
Systems represent an impermissible extension of the Williams Act. In
introducing such legislation, the sponsor stated: "This legislation will
close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal
Securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to
stockholders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a
cash tender offer or through open market or privately negotiated pur-
chases of securities."'54 That is, the Williams Act is primarily a
disclosure statute enacted for the benefit of the holders of equity
securities in a subject company, and was not intended to provide new
rights to either the takeover bidder or management of the subject com-
pany: "The two major protagonists-the bidder and defending
management-do not need any additional protection.... [Tihey have the
resources and the arsenal [and the] moves and countermoves which can
adequately protect their interests."'5 5
It was principally this factor which led to the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 5 1 that a defeated bidder
lacked standing to sue for damages under section 14(e): "[Tjender of-
ferors were not the intended beneficiaries" of the Williams Act.' 5 While
the Piper Court was acutely aware that Congress did not intend to tip
the balance in favor of the subject company or the bidder, 50 it reasoned
that "[tihis express policy of neutrality scarcely suggests an intent to
confer highly important, new rights upon the class of participants whose
activities prompted the legislation in the first instance.'5.9
The Piper Court utilized the four-pronged test articulated in Cort v.
Ash, '6 to analyze whether the inference of a private damage remedy
under section 14(e) was appropriate. While not literally applicable to
questions whether, for example, a "lock-up" option or a defensive
merger violates section 14(e), this analysis is nonetheless relevant. The
Piper Court readily concluded that the first two Cort factors-whether
the plaintiff was a member of the "especial class" that the legislation
was designed to protect and whether congressional intent to confer a
152 Id. at 377.
15 Id. at 376.
15 133 CONG. REc. 854 (Jan. 18, 1967).
"' Hearings Before S. Subcomm. on Secs. of S. Comm. on Banking & Cur-
rency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1967).
5 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
's' Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
159 Id. at 30.
160 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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right existed-militated against the inference of an action for damages
since, as discussed above, bidders were not the intended beneficiaries of
the Williams Act.161 This reasoning would, of course, equally apply to a
lock-up option, a defensive merger or a request for the subject
company's shareholder list. The third Cort factor is whether the in-
ference of such a right would be consistent with the federal statutory
scheme. Here the Piper Court concluded that "the Williams Act cannot
consistently be interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon
regulated parties, particularly where the reward would not redound to
the direct benefit of the protected class." '162 However, it could be argued
that any defensive tactic (other than disclosure) undertaken solely to
block an offer (which was not the case in Marathon since the options
were a condition to obtaining a higher bid) is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Williams Act since, if effective, it might perforce prevent
the consummation of a tender offer.
The fourth factor under Cort is whether the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law. Both in the Piper situation and the
context at issue in Marathon, state law has traditionally controlled. Ac-
cordingly, deference to state law was the principal policy consideration
underlying the Supreme Court's refusal in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,63 to extend Rule 10b-5 to cover corporate conduct touching upon
securities transactions which did not involve deception or manipulation:
"Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state
policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."' " Instead, in
Green the Supreme Court held that the word "manipulation" in Rule
10b-5 is a term of art which "refers generally to practices such as wash
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead in-
vestors by artificially affecting market activity.""
Of course, a target company may have to disclose accurately the ob-
jective facts relating to a defensive act, such as a merger. " However,
given that section 14(e) merely makes Rule 10b-5 applicable to tender of-
fers, it would appear the former should have no application in the
161 430 U.S. at 32.
162 Id. at 39.
1 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
' Id. at 479.
16 Id. at 476. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976), the
Supreme Court held:
Use of the word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and was
virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets.
It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.
166 See, e.g., SEC v. Thermal Power Co., [1975-76 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,265 (D.D.C. 1975).
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absence of misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts, or
"manipulation" within the meaning of Green. Judge Moore's dissent to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Green'67 seems equally
applicable in the tender offer context:
The [Second Circuit] majority's insistence on extending
federal securities anti-fraud provision beyond the bounds of
fraud and into the realms of fiduciary duty is disturbing enough.
Accompanied, as it is, by their erroneous finding of a breach of
such duty, and by the astonishing and impermissible establish-
ment of a federal common law of corporations-as ill-founded as
it is improper-disconcertion must give way to alarm.6 '
First and foremost, however, the point must be made that, in
taking cognizance of plaintiff's claim, the majority has not pro-
vided a remedy to correct a fraud; rather it has extended to
these plaintiffs an independent, substantive right totally
unrelated to the anti-fraud scheme of the federal securities laws
and in complete derogation of a valid state rule regulating cor-
porate activity. Indeed, the majority appears to have ignored
the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1939), which put an end to
federal common law and forbade the federal courts from for-
mulating their own "better rule."'66
As is discussed below, in contrast to Marathon and Applied Digital
Data Systems, most other courts have held that nothing in the Williams
Act precludes a subject company from, for example, seeking a "friendly
merger" to counter a hostile tender offer, granting "lock-up" options or
taking other similar defensive actions. 17' Given Green and the fact that
such "defensive" activity usually redounds to the shareholders' benefit,
the result reached in these cases seems correct.
Presumably, these perceptions led to Marathon's lukewarm reception
167 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304-07 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
166 Id. at 1304.
169 Id. at 1307.
17o E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir. 1981); In re
Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Altman v.
Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Seaboard World Airlines v.
Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310, 1318, 1321 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Bucher v. Schumway, [1979-80 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th
Cir. 1978); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976) (a pre-Santa Fe
Rule 10b-5 decision); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 205, nn.41 & 46 (1979); McIntyre,
Shareholders'Recourse Under Federal Securities Law Against Management for
Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAW. 1283, 1293-94 (1978).
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by other courts. For example, in the Whittaker/Brunswick tender offer,
the bidder, Whittaker, sought to enjoin an asset sales agreement
entered into by the subject company, Brunswick, with American Home
Products which provided for the swap of shares of Brunswick acquired
pursuant to American Home Products' negotiated tender offer for
Brunswick's Sherwood Division, its "crown jewel." However, in Whit-
taker Corp. v. Edgar,7 ' Judge Flaum distinguished Marathon because
Whittaker did not, in his view, involve an option (even with broad
"outs" in controlling documents, some of which arguably had already
been triggered) and because the proposed sale of the "crown jewel" had
not created an artificial ceiling in the tender offer market for
Brunswick. Finally, Judge Flaum held that "a sale of the substantial
asset by a corporation in the face of a tender offer standing alone is not
a violation of Section 14(e)." ' 2
The Icahn"73 decision was more directly inconsistent with Marathon.
There, Icahn, an approximately 30% holder (together with a section
13(d)(3) "group") of the subject company, Marshall Field, sued to enjoin a
stock option exercisable at the cash tender offer price (which was in-
creased one day later) of a two-step White Knight agreement with
BATUS and a first-refusal right relating to Marshall Field's Chicago
retail stores (its crown jewel). However, in Marshall Field & Co. v.
Icahn,"4 Judge Leval refused the 30% holder's application for injunctive
relief against the alleged "lock-up" options. While making a pass at
distinguishing the Sixth Circuit's Marathon decision (based principally
upon a failure to prove irreparable harm -viz., that any potential bidder
had been deterred by the options), Judge Leval's decision was grounded
in a fundamental disagreement with the Sixth Circuit's Marathon
analysis:
I doubt that [Marathon] represents the law in this circuit. In my
view the reasoning of that decision could unduly interfere with
the right of company management to combat a takeover attempt
that it believes in good faith to be harmful to its shareholders.
In my view the securities laws do not bar management from tak-
ing action in the best interest of its shareholders even if this will
make more difficult the success of a disfavored offeror. The rule
might be otherwise on a showing that management is acting for
its own interests in violation of its fiduciary duty to its
shareholders. No such showing has been made here.
[1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,483 (N.D. 11. Jan. 25, 1982),
aff'd, No. 82-1305 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982).
172 Id. at 92,832.
"' Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,616 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1982).
174 Id.
15 Id. at 93,061.
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Marathon nonetheless remains the law of the Sixth Circuit and it
therefore provides a basis for challenging both offensive and defensive
actions given the almost limitless jurisdiction and venue provisions ap-
plicable to most nationwide tender offers. The question therefore is one
of plumbing Marathon's outer limits.
Taken to its extreme, virtually any preemptive offensive or defensive
reaction could be said to be "manipulative" under the Sixth Circuit's
Marthon reasoning. However, Brunswick and Icahn suggest thst defen-
sive "lock-ups" can possibly be structured to avoid Marathon, even
within the Sixth Circuit. More particularly,
1. Stock options can be granted at the best price then being
offered (or, better yet, with price escalators); and
2. Asset agreements can be structured as binding contracts
(Brunswick) or first-refusal rights (Icahn) since it appears that a
critical factor in Marathon (presumably inserted only to protect
Marathon's "crown jewel" if the company remained indepen-
dent) was that the asset option was exercisable by U.S. Steel only
if a third party gained control.
To be sure, Marathon has been criticized as a result of the short shrift
given therein to the question of whether non-disclosure or deception are
necessary elements of "manipulation" under the federal securities laws
and the trial court's express holding that the subject company's direc-
tors had satisfied their state law fiduciary obligations in granting the
challenged options.'76 The most far-reaching implications of Marathon
may, however, relate not to its analysis of substantive proscriptions, but
to the questions of what remedies are available for conduct determined
to be manipulative. Based upon the Marathon court's express holding,
disclosure is irrelevant to whether the illegal conduct has been prac-
ticed.'77 Accordingly, as discussed below, 7 ' curative disclosure may no
longer be sufficient to remedy a Williams Act violation; instead, injunc-
tive relief which removes the manipulative device and dissipates its
effect, as was ordered in Marathon itself, will in many instances now be
required.
E. Section 14(f)
Section 14(f) requires the subject company to transmit to the SEC and
to the holders of record of its securities, who would be entitled to vote
for the election of directors, information "substantially equivalent" to
that required by the proxy rules for the election of directors in the
following circumstances:
176 E.g., Nathan, Novel Legal Questions Explored, Nat'l L.J. Mar. 29, 1982, 25,
col. 4, at 30, col. 2-4.
' See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
"I See infra Section 11(C).
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If, pursuant to any arrangement or understanding with the per-
son or persons acquiring securities in a transaction subject to
[sections 13(d) or 14(d)], any persons are to be elected or
designated as directors of the issuer, otherwise than at a
meeting of security holders, and the person so elected or
designated will constitute a majority of the directors of the
issuer.
In Gruss v. Uris Building Corp., 179 National Kinney Corporation purchased
54% of the shares of Uris Building Corporation from six shareholder-
directors. Pursuant to the stock purchase agreement, the sellers agreed
to use their best efforts to increase the number of Uris directors from
thirteen to fourteen and to cause six nominees of Kinney to be elected,
both of which events were accomplished. The selling shareholders also
agreed to resign from the board upon demand from Kinney. Thereafter,
three former directors resigned, one of whom was a seller. Thus, the
board was composed of eleven directors, six of whom were Kinney
nominees, and the remaining five of whom were sellers who had agreed
to resign at Kinney's request. Minority shareholders brought an action
alleging that Uris had violated section 14(f) by not filing the information
required thereunder. The plaintiffs argued that, since Kinney could de-
mand the resignation of five directors, it should be presumed that they
were under Kinney's direct control and, therefore, that Kinney could be
said to have designated eleven of the fourteen seats on the Uris board.
Judge Waytt rejected the claim, holding that the five seller-directors
had not been "elected or designated" by Kinney and that section 14(f)
therefore did not apply. Whether the five directors were "controlled
by" Kinney was held to be irrelevant for purposes of the statute.18
In Monheit v. Carter,"' however, three of thirteen members of the
issuer's board were elected without a shareholders meeting. The three
directors allegedly represented a controlling group of shareholders. In
addition, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, alleged that four of the
remaining directors who were not up for election had agreed to become
the designees of the control group. Judge Tyler held that the plaintiff
had stated a claim under section 14(f) since an actual change in control
would have taken place. In so holding, Judge Tyler specifically rejected
the formalistic requirement of Gruss that the directors be actually
"elected or designated" in favor of an approach that focused upon the
actual balance of control.
While the terms of section 14(f) require that a director be "elected or
designated" otherwise than at a shareholders meeting, the triggering
"election or designation" is one pursuant to any "arrangement or
understanding." It would seem that the approach in Monheit is more
179 [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,154 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
180 Id. at 94,632-33.
181 376 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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consistent with the apparent intent of section 14(f) than Gruss, since
Monheit takes a substantive and realistic approach to the problem. On
the other hand, the Gruss rule has the virtue of providing a sure
guideline as to when the statutory provisions become applicable and
avoids an inquiry into each director's primary allegiance.
II. CERTAIN BASIC LITIGATION ISSUES
As indicated at the outset, the principal avenues for Williams Act
litigation involve questions of whether a particular filing was required
in a given setting and, if made, whether the filing was timely and the
disclosures therein were adequate. However, a number of other basic
litigation questions, the resolution of which may be crucial in a par-
ticular takeover contest, must also be considered. The most significant
of these are considered in this Section.
A. Standing
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, a party seeking to attack
a tender offer was forced to attempt to assert standing under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Although the sub-
ject company and tendering shareholders were generally given standing
to seek relief against a non-disclosing bidder,"s2 questions of standing
and proper parties were often dependent upon such subtle distinctions
as the type of relief sought. 3 Since the enactment of the Williams Act,
however, questions of standing have generally been framed only in the
terms of the role played by the party in a particular tender offer.'84
1. Bidder Standing
Except in competitive bidding situations, the instances in which bid-
ders commence Williams Act litigation are, on a relative basis, few
because the bidder's principal object in most tender offers is the prompt
consummation of the bid, so as to preclude competing bids, defensive
actions and similar events. Nonetheless, any examination of standing to
sue under the Williams Act should begin with bidder standing since the
developments in this context form the foundation for analysis in other
contexts.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,'85 the Supreme Court held that
182 See, e.g., Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
183 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd in part, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
184 E.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.
S. 910 (1972); Nicholson File Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972).
See generally Butler Aviation Int'l Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc. 425
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
185 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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a defeated bidder lacks standing to sue for damages under section 14(e).
Although cognizant of Congress express refusal to enact tender offer
legislation which would tip the balance toward one side or another in
takeover contests, the Court, as discussed in the preceeding Section,
concluded that this policy "scarcely suggests an intent to confer highly
important, new rights upon the class of participants whose activities
prompted the legislation in the first instance.""18 Instead, bidders were
deemed to be "outside the scope of the concerns articulated in the evolu-
tion of the legislation." '87
As briefly discussed in the preceding Section, in reaching this deci-
sion the Supreme Court applied the four-pronged test articulated in
Cort v. Ash, 8' to determine whether the inference of a damage remedy
would be appropriate. First, bidders were found not to be of the class of
persons for whose special benefit the Williams Act was passed. "To the
contrary, [the bidder] is a member of the class whose activities Congress
intended to regulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely
distinct class, shareholder-offerees."'89 Second, the Piper Court deter-
mined there was no explicit or implicit indication that Congress intended
to create a remedy in favor of the loser in a contest for control. 9 ' Third,
the Court noted that it would be inconsistent with the underlying
scheme of the Williams Act to infer a damage remedy, "particularly
[because] the award would not redound to the direct benefit of the pro-
tected class. '19 Finally, the cause of action at issue was deemed to be
one which has been traditionally relegated to state law:
Although Congress is, of course, free to create a remedial
scheme in favor of contestants in tender offers, we conclude, as
we did in Cort v. Ash, that "it is entirely appropriate in this in-
stance to relegate the [offeror-bidder] and others in [that] situa-
tion to whatever remedy is created by state law."'92
Not suprisingly, the significance of Piper extends well beyond the
narrow question at issue. For example, the reasoning of Piper has been
applied to bar actions for damages by defeated contestants for control
186 Id. at 30.
1 Id. at 33.
189 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort involved, narrowly speaking, the question of
whether an implied civil remedy existed for alleged violations of federal election
laws. Since Piper, whether the question is phrased as one of standing or the in-
ference of a private remedy is only semantical. (An implied right of action for
damages presumably exists in favor of a subject company shareholder under Sec-
tion 14(e); however, a defeated bidder can not assert that right.)
189 430 U.S. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
192 Id. at 41.
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purportedly brought under sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act. 19 3
However, the Piper Court was not faced with the task of determining
whether an offeree has standing to sue a competing bidder or the sub-
ject company for injunctive relief or damages under section 14(e), yet its
analysis suggests that such standing would be recognized in appropriate
circumstances.'94 More importantly, in the context of contested or com-
petitive takeover bids, the Piper Court expressly declined to consider
whether a bidder would have standing to seek injunctive relief under
section 14(e). 9 '
Piper has not been read as justifying the denial of bidder standing to
sue for injunctive relief under the Williams Act. Unlike the situation in
Piper, in many situations the granting of such relief would not injure
the very class of participants sought to be protected by Congress in
enacting the Williams Act.'96 Instead, allowing bidders to bring actions
for injunctive relief arguably furthers the congressional purpose of en-
suring that both sides are fairly presented in tender offer battles.
Accordingly, several courts, based upon similar analyses, have held
since Piper that a bidder does have standing to sue for injunctive
relief.'97
The most recent of these cases is the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.9 ' Marathon in-
volved an action alleging violations of section 14(e) and state law
fiduciary duties brought by Mobil Corporation against Marathon Oil
Company, certain of Marathon's directors and a subsidiary of United
States Steel Corporation, a competing bidder. The action challenged a
stock option and an asset option granted by Marathon to U.S. Steel to
induce U.S. Steel to make a bid which was about 50% higher than
Mobil's bid.'99 Like most courts in this context, the Marathon court
"' E.g., Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
14 See 430 U.S. at 36-37.
430 U.S. at 42 n.28, 48.
196 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 1981). In Piper,
the damage award approved by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would have
significantly diminished the value of the target shareholders' investments.
17 E.g., Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981); Weeks
Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc.,
445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"1' 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis of
this question is dictum since the parties did not raise this issue on appeal. The
issue was raised in the trial court, which held that a competing bidder had stan-
ding, both as a shareholder of the subject company and a competing bidder, to
sue for alleged violations of Section 14(e) and state law fiduciary duties. [1981-82
Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
"' At the time that it commenced this action, Mobil was restrained from con-
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sought to distinguish Piper by contrasting actions for damages with
actions for injunctive relief (the latter normally will not injure the one
class of participants which Congress sought to protect in enacting the
Williams Act).00 The Marathon court also observed:
In a tender offer battle, events occur with explosive speed and
require immediate response by a party seeking to enjoin the
unlawful conduct. Issues such as incomplete disclosure and
manipulative practices can only be effectively spotted and
argued by the parties with complete knowledge of the target, its
business, and others in the industry.0 1
That reasoning equally justifies subject company standing under the
Williams Act.
2. Subject Company Standing
a. Section 13(d)
Under early Williams Act cases, the subject company was uniformly
held to have standing to enforce the filing requirements of section
13(d)."' In Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc.,2"3 however, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed doubt as to whether a sub-
ject company has standing to assert violations of section 13(d) by the
bidder. The issue was, at best, "unclear" to the Corenco court,0 4 but it
did not resolve it since it found no violations of the statute.
summating its own offer pursuant to antitrust litigation brought against it by
Marathon under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., No. 2193
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 8), affd, No. 3704 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1981), cert. denied, No. 81-1213
(Feb. 22, 1982). While the pendancy of the antitrust appeal was perhaps not legally
relevant to the securities and state law issues before the Sixth Circuit, the former
presumably had some practical effect on the disposition of the latter in light of
the fact that, after initiating the latter case, Mobil increased its tender offer price
to $1 per share above that offered by U.S. Steel. The appellate court's desire to
foster additional cometitive bidding was manifest in its mandate to the trial court
to fashion a remedy which would require U.S. Steel's offer to remain open for a
period of time resonably sufficient to allow other companies to enter the auction.
U.S. Steel purchased a majority of Marathon's equity securities on January 7,
1982. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
Ironically, on the very facts at issue, Marathon's shareholders were in fact
injured by the temporary restraining order obtained by Mobil (losing more than
$1 million per day in interest opportunities). See, e.g., Memorandum of Marathon
Oil Company in Opposition to Mobil's Emergency Application at 18, Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co. (U.S. Jan 5, 1982) (No. 1213).
201 669 F.2d at 371.
E.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972).
488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 218.
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Most recent Williams Act cases have continued to recognize subject
company standing to sue under section 13(d).0 5 However, given Piper
and a number of other securities law developments, 6 several courts
have recently held against subject company standing under section
13(d). For example, in Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc.,2"' the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that
the decisions recognizing an implied private right of action were based
on J.L Case Co. v. Borak,"' from which the Supreme Court has turned in
recent cases involving alleged violations of implied rights of action."9
Upon considering the governing principles of implied rights of action
and the language and legislative history of the Williams Act, the
Gateway court decided that an issuer had no right of action under sec-
tion 13(d) either in its own right or on behalf of its shareholders.
The trend of cases like Gateway is perhaps best evidenced by the
decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in
First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder.21 ° In First Alabama, the trial
court held that a subject company has no standing to sue for either
damages or injunctive relief under section 13(d) or section 14(d).21 '
To be sure, the Supreme Court has recently given strong indications
of an intent to cut back significantly with respect to the inference of
private rights of action under federal securities laws.1 2 However, until
Piper is overturned by the Supreme Court, it would appear that an
issuer should be considered to have the right to sue at least for injunc-
tive relief under section 13(d) based upon the same analysis that the
20 See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Camelot Indus. v. Vista Resources, Inc., [1981-82 Decs.]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,611 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1982); Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301 (D.Mass. Sept.
21, 1981); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,894 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, [1981 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,893 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Saunders Leasing Sys. v. Societe
Holding Gray D'Albion, 507 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Kirsch v. Bliss &
Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980). See also Dan River, Inc. v.
Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
26 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Supreme
Court held that there is no implied right of action for damages under section
17(a) of the Exchange Act. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Supreme Court held that there is no implied right of action
for damages under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
207 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
208 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
209 See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 24-27.
21' 495 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
211 Id. at 101. Accord American Bakeries Co. v. Pro-Met Trading Co., 11981
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,925 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Sta-Rite Indus. v. Nortek,
Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
21' See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 26-28.
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courts have used to allow bidders to sue for injunctive relief under sec-
tion 14(e).
b. Sections 14(d) and 14(e)
A subject company should have standing under both section 14(d) and
section 14(e) to obtain injunctive relief against an unlawful tender offer.
Likewise, it would appear that an issuer which is a potential target of a
future tender offer should be held to have standing to assert violations
of section 14(e) committed by the potential offeror in the course of
preparing for its offer.
A compelling justification for allowing injunctive actions by subject
companies under sections 14(d) and 14(e) is that the period prior to con-
summation of a tender offer is the time when relief can best be given.
After that point, the eggs may be difficult to unscramble. The District
Court for the Southen District of New York held in Wellman v. Dickin-
son,"3 that a subject company should also be able to obtain equitable
relief after the fact. The Wellman court pointed out that "[wihile the
Court's reasoning [in Piper] forecloses a damage suit by [a subject com-
pany], and supports an equitable remedy before the takeover or partial
takeover has been effectuated, [Piper] does not deny standing to the
[subject] corporation to seek equitable relief after the transaction has
been consummated." ' Accordingly, the Wellman court concluded that
the subject company had standing to maintain the action, pointing out
that the bidder had specifically designed its acquisition to avoid a pre-
offer legal battle. However, there is nothing in the opinion that suggests
that the Wellman court meant to limit its holding to situations in which
the target had no opportunity to bring an action prior to consummation
of the tender offer.1 5
c. The Margin Rules
A division of authority exists as to whether a subject company has
213 [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
21 Id. at 95,835.
21 Counsel for target companies have sometimes sought to head off defenses
based upon standing in litigation brought under section 13(d) or other provisions
of the Williams Act by having officers or shareholders of the issuer join as named
plaintiffs. Provided that a willing person in one of these categories can be iden-
tified, this tactic probably does solve any technical standing problem. See, e.g.,
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982). It should be noted, however, that in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in dictum
that a bidder which was also a shareholder of the subject company lacked stand-
ing to sue in its capacity as a shareholder because it could not realistically claim
to be advancing the interests of typical subject company shareholders. Similar
arguments could conceivably be used to attack the standing of an officer or
shareholder affiliated with the issuer.
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standing to enforce the margin and credit requirements of sections 8,
7(c), and 7(f) of the Exchange Act and the Federal Reserve Board's im-
plementing regulations."' While the later decisions tend to allow such
standing, the court in D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway,1 7 emphatically
denied it, stating: "Management [of the subject company] is simply try-
ing to protect its entrenched position and, while its attackers must obey
the securities laws, enforcement of those laws is, with rare exceptions,
best left to the SEC or to the stockholders [of the target]."2 '8 The D-Z In-
vestment court did, however, grudgingly concede that the target had
standing under sections 14(d) and 14(e).
3. Shareholder Standing
Former shareholders of a subject company acquired in an exchange
offer have been held to have standing to sue for damages and/or rescis-
sion under section 10(b) and section 14(e). 19 For example, in Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,2 ' the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the question whether the shareholders involved
in a tender offer have standing to seek relief from illegal acts by the
contestants. The Electronic Specialty court held that shareholders who
do not tender their shares still have independent standing. That is, their
claim need not be derivative and, therefore, they need not comply with
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rationale for granting standing to nontendering shareholders is
that the inadequacy of a tender offer is likely to depress the market for
the shares they retain. Further, if the bidder had evil designs with
regard to the subject company, the nontendering shareholders could
suffer additional injury."'
216 E.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972),
aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Butler Aviation Int'l v. Comprehensive Designers,
Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F.
Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.
Okla. 1972).
217 [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
218 Id. at 96,562.
21 Compare Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) J 94,455 (N.D. Ill. 1973), and D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-75 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), with Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas
Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), affl'd, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); Alaska In-
terstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
m 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
" E.g., Petersen v. Federated Dev. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
But see Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (tendering stockholders have standing, but a non-tendering stockholder
could not maintain an action for the decrease in value of his stock that resulted
when other shareholders were fraudulently induced to tender their shares).
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One case which denied standing under section 14(e) to shareholders is
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. 212 In Sargent, the defendants mailed a letter
describing a refinancing plan to both common shareholders and deben-
ture holders. The letter allegedly contained material misstatements
regarding the plan. Under the plan, the debentures could be tendered to
a group of underwriters and would then be converted into common
stock. A shareholder brought a class action on behalf of all other
shareholders alleging that the defendants had violated section 14(e). The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the shareholders had no stan-
ding since they were not asked to tender their securities under the
plan. 3 In contrast, in GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 4 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that any shareholder has standing to enforce section
13(d). While the narrow holding of the case was limited to the issuer's
standing, the GAF court stated in a footnote that the shareholders
"clearly" had standing as well.2 5 However, if section 14(e) is extended to
cover conduct which does not involve nondisclosure, as in Marathon, it
may be that particular categories of shareholders (e.g., nontendering
shareholders) will be held to lack standing to attack such conduct as
alleged "lock-up" devices.
B. Proper Parties
Two Williams Act cases have dealt at length with the question of proper
parties in an action for alleged violations of the federal securities laws
relating to tender offers. In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
2 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
Accord Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (non-tendering shareholder could not maintain action for decrease in
value of his stock that resulted when other shareholders were fraudulently induced
to tender their shares).
124 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
22 Id. at 719 n.21. The Milstein court cited Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F.
Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), as support for its conclusion. See also General Aircraft
Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1982);
Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,894
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). Compare id., with Myers v. American Leisure Time Enter., Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (shareholders who
neither buy or sell have no implied right of action for section 13(d) violations).
In Wellman v. Dickinson, 497 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that the class action plaintiffs, non-
tendering shareholders, had no cause of action under § 13(d) against shareholders
who had tendered at a profit. The Wellman court stated that the only cause of ac-
tion for damages under § 13(d) which the shareholders could bring is one that is
actionable under § 18, which provides an explicit damages remedy, and that the
plaintiffs could not qualify under that section.
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Corp.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the dealer-manager
for a contestant in a tender offer could be joined as a party and held liable
as an "aider and abettor" if such dealer-manager failed to estabilish a "due
diligence" defense. In Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft,"' the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a depositary national bank, which
was a subsidiary of a corporation controlled by the principal financier-
defendant, could be joined as a party to a section 14(e) action. The Ronson
court then ruled that the venue provisions of the securities acts took
precedence over those controlling national bank venue. Further, the na-
tional bank's parent company, which had "participated in the conspiracy
to violate the antitrust laws and the securities acts and performed
ministerial functions in furtherance of the overall conspiracy" also was
held to be a proper party to the litigation.228 The bank was later dismissed
because the plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the securities laws.
C. Remedial Issues
1. Standards for a Preliminary Injunction
a. General
Because of the timing problems inherent in the tender offer context, a
contestant is frequently forced to invoke or resist swift judicial aid. In
the federal courts, the most frequently used weapons are the temporary
restraining order and the preliminary injunction.
Under the traditional and more stringent test, an applicant for a
preliminary injunction must show a strong or substantial probability of
success at trial on the merits, a possibility of irreparable harm if the in-
junction were denied, lack of substantial harm to others and that the
public interest favors the injunction.29 Particularly in antitrust and
other actions affected with a public interest, the applicant must show
that the balance of the equities in terms of injury to the public versus
injury to the defendants weighs in his favor."
22 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
227 483 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
' Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin A. G., 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), affd, [1973-74
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,536 (3d Cir. 1974)
2 See, e.g., Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Graphic Sciences,
Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974) (specifically
rejecting the less stringent standard); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-74
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,455 (N.D. Il. 1973); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v.
Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
23 See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Amoco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d
Cir. 1981) (securities and antitrust claims); Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (antitrust and securities claims); Har-
nischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,119
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (antitrust claims); Calumet Indus. v. MacClure, 1978 Decs.] Fed.
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The courts which have applied the more stringent test for the grant-
ing of preliminary injunctive relief have recognized that, by enjoining
allegedly fraudulent and deceptive tender offers ordinarily at the re-
quest of the subject company's management, they could easily become
"tools" of "entrenched management" and thereby upset the "balance"
struck by Congress in the Williams Act, as well as frustrate the desires
of shareholders who wish to tender their shares.13'
Counterbalancing these fears was the perception of many federal
courts that it was far easier to enjoin a proposed tender offer than to
unscramble the eggs after the transaction had been consummated.232
The courts therefore began to relax the requirements for preliminary
injunctions. Thus, in many recent tender offer cases, a disjunctive test
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction has been utilized. Under this
standard, the applicant for an injunction must show either probable suc-
cess on the merits and possible irreparable injury or sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in his favor.23 However, a
few courts have recently adhered to the traditional formulation of the
standard for preliminary injunctive relief.2 4
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,434 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (securities law claims); Weeks Dredg-
ing & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (mixture of antitrust and securities claims); Elco
Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973) (antitrust and securities
violations).
231 See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974); Butler Aviation Int'l Inc. v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. Multi-Amp. Corp., 386 F.
Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974). Cf. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.,
510 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (contrary to policy of allowing shareholders
freedom of choice).
232 E.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969).
233 Representative cases are: Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp.
v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Stark v. New York Stock Exchange,
466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972); Marks v. Lainoff, 466 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y 1979);
MLZ, Inc. v. Fourco Glass Co., 470 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Berkman v.
Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Applied Digital
Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Alaska In-
terstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975); Jewelcor Inc. v.
Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F.
Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ronson
Corp. v. Liquifin A.G., No. 785-73 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 483 F.2d 846 & 853 (3d Cir.
1973); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,771
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
234 E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
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The disjunctive test for the issuance of a preliminary injunction has
been deemed to be consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 235 While analysis of the phrasing of the
disjunctive test suggests that preliminary injunctive relief will be
easier to obtain in the courts that follow it than in courts which follow
the more traditional test, it is doubtful that the outcome of any par-
ticular case has been affected by its application.
b. Rondeau
In Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 23 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed a trial court's denial of permanent injunctive
relief against an offeror who had failed to file a timely Schedule 13D.
The purchaser admitted his violation, but alleged that his failure to file
was the result of ignorance of the law. Moreover, he contended that his
original purchases were for investment and that he had formed an in-
tent to seek control only after learning of the filing requirements from
his attorney. Once informed of the statutory provisions, he did make a
filing which, he argued, cured any ill effects that the target company
might have suffered from his violation. In reversing the district court,
the Seventh Circuit held that a subject company need not show that it
suffered any irreparable harm in order to obtain permanent injunctive
relief from a violation of the filing requirements of section 13(d) because
it is in the best position to protect investors by insuring that the
Williams Act is enforced.23
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Seventh Circuit.238 The
Court first rejected the intermediate appellate court's alternative
holding that sufficient injury had been shown in the case at bar to
justify injunctive relief:
The short of the matter is that none of the evils to which the
Williams Act was directed has occurred or is threatened in this
case. Petitioner has not attempted to obtain control of respon-
dent, either by a cash tender offer or any other device.
Moreover, he has now filed a proper Schedule 13D, and there
has been no suggestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's
requirements of reporting any material changes in the informa-
tion contained therein .... On this record there is no likelihood
that respondent's shareholders will be disadvantaged should
235 422 U.S. 49 (1975). See, e.g., Sea World, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., [1976-77 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,803, at 90,912 (S.D. Cal. 1976) ("Indeed, the balance
of the equities would never tip decidedly in favor of the moving party unless ir-
reparable harm is demonstrated."). See also Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus.,
[1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,138 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
236 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
237 500 F.2d at 1016-17.
" Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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petitioner make a tender offer, or that respondent will be unable
to adequately place [sic] its case before them should a contest for
control develop. Thus, the usual basis for injunctive relief "that
there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation," is
not present here.239
Turning to the intermediate appellate courts principal holding that no
showing of irreparable injury was required under section 13(d) of the
Williams Act, the Rondeau Court concluded:
Respondent urges, however, that the "public interest" must
be taken into account in considering its claim for relief and
relies upon the Court of Appeals' conclusion that it is entitled to
an injunction because "it is in the best position" to insure that
the Williams Act is complied with by purchasers of its stock.
This argument misconceives, we think, the nature of the litiga-
tion. Although neither the availability of a private suit under
the Williams Act nor respondent's standing to bring it has been
questioned here, this cause of action is not expressly authorized
by the statute or its legislative history. Rather, respondent is
asserting a so-called implied private right of action established
by cases such as J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Of
course, we have not hesitated to recognize the power of federal
courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws violations
when to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and
necessary for the protection of investors as a supplement to en-
forcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission ...
However, it by no means follows that the plaintiff in such an ac-
tion is relieved of the burden of establishing the traditional
prerequisites of relief. Indeed, our cases hold that quite the con-
trary is true."'
Rondeau should have equal applicability under all provisions of the
Williams Act. However, its application has given rise to one ambiguity,
which has not been confronted directly in the cases, with respect to ac-
tions commenced by issuers and subject companies-ie., whether the
relevant inquiry as to the likelihood of "irreparable injury" relates to
the issuer or subject company, its shareholders or both. Some courts
have focused exclusively upon the potential for injury to the subject
company,241 while others have looked exclusively to the potential for in-
Id. at 59.
24 Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted).
4E.g., Universal Container Corp. v. Horwitz, [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,161 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying Rondeau). It should be noted, however,
that even after Rondeau no showing of irreparable injury has been required in
SEC enforcement actions. E.g., SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp.
1248 (D.D.C. 1975).
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jury to the shareholders of the subject company."' However, the latter
approach seems unduly restrictive since, as in Rondeau, it will usually
be possible to argue that monetary damages would be sufficient, and in
fact the Supreme Court's focus in Rondeau was upon the likelihood of ir-
reparable injury to either the subject company or its shareholders. Such
an approach seems preferable.243
2. Equitable Defenses, Reversal and Modification
A preliminary injunction is, of course, equitable in nature and, as
such, the moving party is subject to the traditional defenses recognized
by courts of equity. Thus, in Cauble v. White,244 for example, the trial
court refused to grant preliminary injunctive relief in a case where both
the offeror and the subject company had violated the Exchange Act and
thus were in pari delicto.
To be sure, a trial court's application of erroneous legal principles is
cause for reversal. However, as to the application of such principles to
the facts sub judice the federal appellate courts have held, consistent
with general principles, that a trial court should not be reversed unless
the appellant can show a clear abuse of discretion or findings of fact
which are clearly erroneous. In Sargent v. Genesco Inc.,24 for example,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the reasons for this rule:
Our review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court in
refusing preliminary injunctive relief must be closely cir-
cumscribed. It comes to us on an abbreviated development of
facts. It requires a balancing of the probabilities of ultimate suc-
cess on the merits with the consequences of court intervention
at a preliminary stage. The prerogative to weigh the nice
distinctions involved belongs to the district court, not this
court.24
Once a preliminary injunction has been granted, it is also difficult for
the party enjoined to have it modified or reversed. The applicable stan-
dards for modifying an injunction were stated in Elco Corp. v. Microdot,
Inc.247 as follows:
[United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932),] clearly holds,
however, that an injunction "may not be changed in the in-
2 E.g., Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Self, Bee Chem. Co., 529 F.2d 567 (2d
Cir. 1976).
243 E.g., S-G See., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978);
Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
244 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973).
25 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
24 Id. at 770.
247 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973).
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terests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as in-
corporated in the decrees . . have not been fully achieved." ...
By this standard, a modification which will not give complete
assurance that the objectives of the original injunction will be
achieved should not be permitted.
248
This requirement will rarely be met given the normally rapid pace of
Williams Act litigation.
3. Remedies for Violations
a. Section 13(d)
Section 13(d) can be violated either by failing to file a Schedule 13D,
or amendments thereto, within the applicable time periods or by a false
or misleading filing. Either violation is grounds for injunctive relief
against the offending person, but the nature of the relief granted
depends upon which of the two violations is committed.
Most of the decided cases involving a failure to file under section 13(d)
arose out of requests for preliminary injunctive relief. Financial
General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance,"9 and Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot,
250
involved "groups" under section 13(d)(3) which had failed to file a re-
quired Schedule 13D. In each case, the members of the groups were
preliminarily enjoined from voting their shares or attempting to acquire
control over the issuer by other means, such as a tender offer or proxy
contest. In addition, the defendants in Financial General Bankshares
and Bath Industries were prohibited from acquiring any additional
shares. However, the injunction in Bath Industries was to continue only
until the defendants complied with the Williams Act by filing a Schedule
13D, and the defendants in Financial General Bankshares were enjoined
only until they offered rescission to stockholders from whom they had
purchased stock while no Schedule 13D was on file. A similar result ob-
tained, with respect to a management "group," in Jewelcor, Inc. v.
Pearlman,"1 and this type of limited relief was approved in dicta by the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Development Corp.25
2
A case decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, General Air-
craft Corp. v. Lampert,2 53 suggests that Rondeau may have even a
248 Id. at 757.
24 [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978).
250 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
251 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
252 366 F. Supp. 374, 405 n.45 (S.D. Tex. 1973). But see Wellman v. Dickinson,
497 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (settlement agreement requiring stock
divestiture).
253 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977).
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greater impact than simply ensuring that traditional equitable prin-
ciples are applied to requests for permanent injunctive relief under the
Williams Act. On October 30, 1974, the three individual defendants in
Lampert purchased an aggregate of 12% of the outstanding shares of
common stock of General Aircraft Corporation (GAC). They did not,
however, file a Schedule 13D. On December 31, 1974, two of the defen-
dants purchased additional shares (less than 1%). However, it was not
until January 31, 1975 that a Schedule 13D was filed on behalf of the
group. The defendants clashed with existing GAC management during
the next year and a half by demanding seats on GAC's board, threaten-
ing a proxy fight and proposing drastic changes in GAC's business and
corporate structure. GAC commenced an action alleging, among other
things, that the defendants had violated section 13(d) by failing to file a
timely Schedule 13D and thereafter filing a false one as to the purpose
of the acquisition. The district court entered a preliminary injunction,
enjoining defendants from 1) further violations of section 13(d); 2) failing
to amend the inaccurate Schedule 13D filed on January 1, 1975; 3) ac-
quiring additional GAC shares or soliciting proxies until the Schedule
13D was amended; and 4) voting any GAC stock or proxies at the 1976
annual meeting of shareholders.
The Lampert court, after affirming the findings that the individual
defendants were a "group" under section 13(d)(3) and that their
Schedule.13D was misleading with respect to their purpose in acquiring
GAC shares, held that they were properly required to amend the
Schedule 13D prior to obtaining more shares:
As the very raison d'etre of Section 13(d) was thwarted by ap-
pellants' continued failure to disclose the statutorily required in-
formation, we discover no error in the decision that irreparable
injury would occur to shareholders and the investing public if
appellants were allowed to continue their activities without cor-
recting and amplifying their Schedule 13D. We therefore affirm
the order granting the preliminary injunction insofar as it en-
joined appellants from further violations of Section 13(d), from
failing to amend their inaccurate Schedule 13D, and from acquir-
ing further shares of GAC common stock or soliciting proxies or
consents from GAC stockholders until the Schedule 13D is
amended to reflect accurately their intentions.254
However, the Lampert court held that the defendants should not have
been enjoined from voting at, or soliciting proxies for, the upcoming an-
nual meeting of shareholders:
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished equity prac-
tice over the years, and "[tihe historic injunctive process was
25, Id. at 96-97.
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designed to deter, not to punish." . . . Appellants' stock was ac-
quired legally more than a year prior to the filing of the present
action. Investors are entitled to the legitimate fruits of their in-
vestment. . . . In the circumstances disclosed by this record,
sterilization of appellant's legally acquired shares would be
punishment, not deterrence, since it would deprive appellants of
previously acquired voting rights without sound reason. While it
may be appropriate for the courts to enjoin the voting of shares
rapidly acquired just before a contest for control following a
Section 13(d) violation ... absent a clear showing of irreparable
injury, disenfranchisement should not extend to prior holdings
legally acquired.255
Under Lampert, sterilization may not be available even if the person or
group violating the Williams Act utilizes (presumably effectively) the
shares obtained to take steps toward effecting a change in corporate
control.
A number of cases after Lampert have disallowed sterilization and
similar remedies in the absence of extraordinary, ongoing harm to the
target company or its shareholders such as a pending election or an im-
mediate takeover bid. In Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe
Holding Gray d'Albion,256 for example, the District Court for the Nor-
thern District of Alabama granted an injunction prohibiting the defen-
dants from making further purchases of stock until they had cured their
section 13(d) violations by amending their Schedule 13D to state their in-
tent to acquire control of the target company. The Saunders Leasing
court, however, did not find any harm to the target or its shareholders
that would not be remedied by the amended filing and so refused to
order a subsequent "cooling-off' period during which the defendants
would have to forgo further acquisitions. In addition, the Saunders Leas-
ing court refused to order rescission or divestiture of previously ac-
quired shares, reasoning that there was no per se illegality in the ac-
quisition of those shares, in contrast with illegal tender offers or
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
256 507 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ala. 1981). See also Schnall v. Schnall, [1981 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,927 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying disgorgement of profits
in shareholders action); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (additional purchases enjoined until filing of accurate Schedule
13D; no prohibition against voting or order to divest); Lane Bryant, Inc. v.
Hatleigh Corp., [1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(purchases enjoined until disclosure sufficient to make potential sellers aware of
the antifraud allegations is made, voting not enjoined). But see generally Tread-
way Cos. v. Care Corp., [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,188 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (target enjoined from selling new stock to "white knight" merger candidate
which would have given it extra votes in upcoming proxy battle), rev'd, 638 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the sale of stock to preserve the possibility of a
merger was done in the exercise of good faith judgment).
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fraudulent acquisitions effected through violations of Rule 10b-5, for
which rescission and divestiture are not unusual remedies.
In Scott v. Multi-Amp. Corp.,257 an attempt to enjoin a sale of an
issuer's assets to another corporation (MUL) was denied even though it
had been established that the owners of MUL had violated section 13(d)
in the acquisition of shares some four and one-half years earlier.
However, Scott appears to be more limited than Lampert. In refusing to
grant the relief requested, the Scott court emphasized the following
four factors: 1) the defendants had not stealthily crept up and dethroned
the issuer's management (the purchases were publicly disclosed); 2) the
failure to file a Schedule 13D was inadvertent; 3) there was little
evidence of injury to anyone; and 4) the plaintiffs had been lax in seek-
ing relief." Adumbrating the Supreme Court's decision in Rondeau, the
Scott court viewed the technical failure under section 13(d) as not rising
to a level where it could be said that the "irreparable injury requisite to
the drastic remedy of . . . injunctive relief' had been shown.5 9
A similar result was reached in Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v.
Lance,"'0 a case in which the District Court for the District of Columbia
refused to sterilize the defendants' stock after it was established that
the defendants did not plan to acquire additional shares. The Lance
court reasoned that plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm since the
defendants had already agreed not to acquire any additional stock. In
SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc.,2 61 however, the same court sterilized the
defendant's stock in an SEC enforcement action on the ground that the
defendant's past conduct indicated a reasonable likelihood of future
violations of the securities laws. In support of its decision, the Savoy In-
dustries court cited the defendant's knowledge that his conduct had
been wrongful and his repeated prior violations of the law.
Perhaps surprisingly, the penalties imposed upon a defendant who
does not make adequate disclosures in his Schedule 13D have generally
been less severe than those imposed upon persons who fail to file at all.
In Matter of Susquehanna Corp.,26 for example, the SEC found that the
respondent had failed to disclose its intent to use assets of the target
for future acquisitions, thereby violating section 13(d). The SEC ordered
it to make a curative amendment. This relatively mild penalty was pro-
bably influenced by two factors. First, section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange
Act only empowers the SEC to order respondents to comply with sec-
tions 12, 13 and 15(d) upon such terms and conditions as the SEC may
specify. Thus, the SEC's remedial powers under statute are probably
257 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
258 Id. at 55.
259 Id. at 57.
260 [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,511 (D.D.C. 1978).
211 [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,497 (D.D.C. 1978).
2 SEC Rel. No. 34-8933 (SEC Admin. Proc. July 17, 1970).
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not as broad as those of a federal court. Second, the Fifth Circuit had
already held that the respondent had not violated the disclosure provi-
sions of section 13(d)." 3 The SEC was undoubtedly reluctant to impose a
more severe penalty.
More stringent preliminary injunctive relief was imposed by the
district court in Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines
Ltd.,2 4 where the defendant was found to have failed to disclose its in-
tent to acquire control of the target. Pending trial on the merits, the
defendant was enjoined from soliciting proxies from or making a tender
offer to other shareholders in the corporation. The Graphic Sciences
court did, however, permit the defendant to vote its shares or dispose of
them in an appropriate manner, stating that the objective of its
preliminary injunction was not to punish but to preserve the status quo
by protecting the target from any takeover bid based upon inadequate
disclosure.
Thus, in most garden variety section 13(d) cases, injunctive relief will
normally be limited to an order prohibiting future purchases or a tender
offer pending the filing of an accurate Schedule 13D."' There are,
however, exceptions to the normal rule, particularly where the defen-
dant's conduct was intentional or gave it a significant advantage over
the target or competing bidders. For example, in General Steel In-
dustries, Inc. v. Walco National Corp.,266 a case which involved the
accumulation of a large block of shares for the purpose of obtaining con-
trol notwithstanding a Schedule 13D which reported a passive "invest-
ment" intent, the bidder was enjoined from continuing with its tender
offer until it divested itself of target stock previously purchased in
market transactions:
Unless an injunction is issued, GSI [the subject company] and
its shareholders, both those who presently own shares and those
who sold during Walco's [the bidder] non-compliance with the re-
quirements of Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act, will be irreparably
harmed in that:
(i) Walco's illegally obtained blocking position has
placed it in a position to inhibit competing offers and has
made it extremely difficult for GSI to arrange for a
merger, business combination or to pursue other possi-
ble business opportunities which would be favorable to
all GSI shareholders (as opposed to the 19 percent which
Walco seeks). Once Walco controls GSI, it will have lit-
263 See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.
1970).
264 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974).
25 See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980);
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir. 1979).
266 [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,402 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 1981).
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tie, if any, incentive to pay a premium to the remaining
GSI shareholders in a subsequent merger of GSI and
Walco. In addition, Walco's acquisition of over 51% of
GSI will reduce the liquidity of GSI stock held by the re-
maining GSI shareholders.
(ii) The knowledge that Walco's ultimate purpose was
to seek control of GSI may have led many shareholders
who sold in the open market to hold onto such shares in
anticipation of a higher price or to stay with the new en-
tity. The stockholders that sold could not be compen-
sated for the irretrievable loss of the opportunity to con-
sider whether they wished to sell their shares at a time
when a takeover was intended or whether they wished
to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the acquisition by
Walco of GSI.
(iii) Shareholders who sold to Walco irretrievably lost
their ability to obtain a control premium for their
shares-a loss not compensable by a monetary award-
and unwittingly sacrificed their right to knowingly deter-
mine who should be in a position to control GSI.267
Walco appealed the trial court's ruling to the Eighth Circuit, but the
case was settled prior to decision by the appellate court. While the ap-
peal was pending, the SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae, the contents of
which were described as follows:
The district court found that the true purpose of the defen-
dant's purchases was to obtain control of the plaintiff and that
the defendant misrepresented its purpose for purchasing the
shares as part of a scheme to obtain a sufficiently large position
in the plaintiff's stock to block any competing offer or merger.
To remedy this violation of the statute, the court enjoined the
tender offer pending rescission of all the purchases made by the
defendant after May 1, 1981, and divestiture of any of those
shares still held by the defendant after completion of the recis-
sion offer. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit arguing that the lower court had no authority
to enjoin the tender offer or to order rescission or divestiture
after the defendant had disclosed its true intentions.
The Commission urged in its brief that the district court's
equitable jurisdiction to remedy Section 13(d) violations includes
the authority to order any relief appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. The Commission expressed the view that equitable
remedies in addition to corrective disclosure, such as rescission
" Id. at 92,418.
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and divestiture, may be necessary or appropriate to remedy
violations of the Williams Act, particularly in cases where the
defendant deliberately violated Section 13(d) and the illegal con-
duct had permitted the defendant to obtain a sufficient number
of shares to inhibit competing tender offers or merger pro-
posals. In such cases, absent rescission or divestiture or other
remedy removing the wrongfully obtained blocking position,
shareholders could be irreparably harmed and the defendant
would be permitted to benefit from its wrongful conduct."'
Thus, if the acquiring person's section 13(d) violation was intentional
or gave it a competitive advantage over other bidders or the subject
company, divestiture of shares, even shares purchased before the filing
of an inaccurate Schedule 13D, may be ordered."'
b. Section 14(d)
Section 14(d)(1) and the rules promulgated thereunder require a bid-
der to file a Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC and the target as soon as prac-
ticable on the day that copies of the offer to purchase are first publish-
ed, sent or given to stockholders. In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v.
Fears, " the subject company brought an action against an offeror who
had violated this provision of the Williams Act. After finding that the
defendant had engaged in activity that constituted a "tender offer"
under the Williams Act, the Fears court issued a preliminary injunction
which restrained him from voting any of the shares acquired during the
period of violation. Further relief was postponed until trial on the
merits.
A more stringent injunction was entered in S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fu-
qua Investment Co., 1 a case which arose out of facts similar to those at
issue in Fears. In Fuqua the Massachusetts District Court found that
the defendant's open market and privately negotiated purchases con-
stituted a tender offer and therefore, since no Schedule 14D-1 had been
filed, a violation of section 14(d). However, the Fuqua court refused to
enter an injunction prohibiting the defendant from permanently acquir-
ing additional shares or voting the shares already held. Instead, the Fu-
qua court ordered the defendant to cease its open market and private
.. General Steel Indus. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,387, at 92,344 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 1982) (emphasis added). The SEC took
the same position as amicus curiae in Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy
Resources Ltd., No. 3386 (6th Cir. June 28, 1982), which appeal was dismissed on
July 8, 1982.
"' Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio
June 11, 1982). But compare id., with Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Charter Co.,
[Jan.-June 19821 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 796 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
2" 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
21 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
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purchase activities until further notice, and to offer rescission to certain
shareholders who would not otherwise have a remedy for the section
14(d) violation. The defendant was prohibited from acquiring or voting
any shares until such time as it offered to rescind the specified transac-
tions. This remedy would protect the shareholders of the target com-
pany from suffering irreparable harm without unnecessarily punishing
the defendant.
Finally, in SEC v. Texas International Co.,"72 the SEC brought an en-
forcement action against Texas International Company (TI) for alleged
section 14(d) violations. TI had offered to buy the "reorganization
claims" held by creditors and shareholders of a bankrupt corporation.
The Texas International court found this conduct to be a "tender offer"
since the reorganization claims were soon to be exchanged for stock in
the reorganized company and thus constituted, in substance if not in
form, registered equity securities. However, the Texas International
court excused TI's failure to file under section 14(d) due to the novel cir-
cumstances and the court's finding that TI's illegal conduct was neither
willful nor in bad faith. Therefore, the Texas International court refused
to order rescission, holding that rescission for noncompliance with
statutory filing requirements, in the absence of fraudulent misrepresen-
tations or omissions, is a disproportionately severe remedy which does
not effectuate the statutory purposes.
c. Section 14(e)
In certain cases where the bidder had been found to have violated sec-
tion 14(e), the courts should be willing to grant unconditional
preliminary injunctions against consummation of the tender offer itself.
However, absent complicating factors beyond mere nondisclosure, such
as serious antitrust problems, inadequate time to make curative
disclosures before expiration of the offer, possible adverse effects of
foreign law on the target or a finding that the challenged conduct was
manipulative, such relief may not be justified. Still, even where the
takeover is a fait accompli, a trial court seemingly has the power to en-
join tender offerors who have obtained control via an unlawful tender
offer from enjoying the fruits of their wrongs.
Violations of the disclosure provisions of section 14(e) can be cured in
the usual case by further disclosure. Thus, a typical remedy in this con-
text is to enjoin further tender offer activity until such time as the of-
feror makes an adequate disclosure."' Some courts have added the
qualification that shareholders be given a reasonable time in which to
272 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
1 E.g., Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N.V., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981); Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Inv., Inc.,
No. 1046 (D. Ore. Nov. 28, 1981).
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withdraw their stock if they so wish."4 Upon finding a violation of the
disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, it also appears that federal
courts hAve the equitable power to order the extension of a tender
offer.27 The periods of any such provision of withdrawal rights or exten-
sion presumably depend upon the perceived gravity of the nondisclosure
or other violation, and in recent cases have run twenty,7 ' fifteen277 and
ten78 days. In Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons,27 the Second Circuit
added the caveat that, where material information was intentionally
misstated or omitted, it might require a "cooling-off" period before per-
mitting the offer to resume in order to allow the effects of the violation to
dissipate. While it seems likely that a scienter standard would be deemed
implicit in section 14(e),28' the ruling in Corenco is questionable since the
state of mind of the bidder or subject company is irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether full disclosure to offerees has been or will be made-the
ultimate purpose of the Williams Act.28
Where the challenged conduct is held to be "manipulative" under sec-
tion 14(e), curative disclosure will be irrelevant, and a proper remedy will
have to be fashioned to remove the manipulative device and restore in-
tegrity to the market.282 Under these circumstances divestiture of
previously acquired shares may be required, 83 as well as the extension of
withdrawal rights, 84 and other relief.
274 E.g., General Steel Indus. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,402 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 1981).
"' See id.
276 Id.
17 Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N.V., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981).
2178 Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Inv., Inc., No. 1046 (D. Ore. Nov. 28, 1981).
17" 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
280 E.g., In re Commonwealth Oil Co./Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467
F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
28' See Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., [1978
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (refusing to enjoin tender
offer but requiring defendant to file curative amendment to its state securities
filings). It should be noted in passing that an offeror may be liable for breach of
contract to those who tender their shares, under the theory that a unilateral con-
tract was thereby created, even when the tender offer was suspended or
withdrawn because of an injunction. Lowenschuss v. Kane, [1974-75 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,104 (2d Cir. 1975). At least this is so where, as in
Lowenschuss, the injunction was obtained because of the offeror's violations of
the Williams Act and the offer itself is unqualified. Id. at 97,921-22. However, the
doctrine of impossibility of performance may ultimately excuse the offeror, at
least if it is determined not to have been legally responsible for the injunction
(ie., if no permanent injunction could be granted). Id. at 97,922-23.
282 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
283 Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio
June 11, 1982).
284 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Where violations of section 14(e) have caused injury that cannot be
remedied by injunctive relief, a number of courts have held that the in-
jured party may seek damages from the violator.8 5 While the re-
quirements of standing to bring actions for damages under sections 14(e)
and 10(b) may differ (in that the former has no purchaser-seller require-
ment), the materiality and scienter standards thereunder appear to be
parallel. 86 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in H.K. Porter Co.28
did caution that damages received from either the subject company or
the bidder should be limited: "The statute, in other words, may not be
diverted from one designed to assist the investor to one operated prin-
cipally to benefit one or another of the rival management or control
groups jockeying for power." '88 This limitation will not, however, apply to
actions brought by the subject company's shareholders.
III. DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS (PRIMARILY FOR THE DEFENSE)
A. Disclosure as a Show-Stopper
Litigation challenging a bidder's tender offer disclosures does not nor-
mally present the possibility of blocking the offer because disclosure
deficiencies normally can be cured by subsequent disclosures.288 Thus in
the usual situation the only defensive benefit of litigation based upon
alleged disclosure deficiencies is the possibility of delay.8 °
There is, however, one area of disclosure litigation which sometimes
has show-stopping potential, ie., cases in which legitimate questions are
raised about sensitive disclosure issues which, because they bear upon
the integrity of the bidder's management or financial condition, the bid-
der simply refuses to disclose. Areas which are frequently cited for con-
sideration in this regard include, among others, questionable
28 E.g., Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); H.K. Porter Co. v.
Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir.
1973).
286 E.g., Heine v. The Signal Cos., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,898, at 91,318 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see generally Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v.
Minneapolis Shareholders Comm., 425 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1977) (leaving open
the question whether the standards for the imposition of liability are substantially
identical under sections 10(b) and 14(e)).
287 H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
288 Id. at 424-25.
.89 See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341
(E.D. Mo. 1979).
" Of course, delay can be important, particularly where White Knight or
other discussions are ongoing. See generally AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F.
Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (60-day review period under the Ohio takeover statute
provided subject company opportunity not only successfully to challenge proposed
disclosures in tender offer materials but also to find a White Knight offering
almost $100 million more than initial bid).
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payments,"' corporate prerequisites 2 and environmental problems."9
An example of this avenue for defensive attack is Anderson, Clayton
& Co.'s 1977 tender offer for Gerber Products Company. In May, 1976
Anderson, Clayton publicly disclosed questionable payments to foreign
governmental officials aggregating approximately $2,100,000 and an off-
record account utilized to pay a state lobbyist's lawful expenses.294 In
February, 1977, Anderson, Clayton disclosed that its completed in-
vestigation of these matters had revealed an additional $1,000,000 in
overbillings in connection with export sales transactions. The sales
related to the overbillings aggregated approximately $35,000,000, and,
as a result of terminating its overbilling practices, most of the
customers for whom overbillings had been effected apparently expressed
the intention to cease doing business with Anderson, Clayton.
In April, 1977, Anderson, Clayton announced its intention to make a
tender offer for all of the equity securities of Gerber. The company did
not include a description of the questionable payments in the proposed
offer to purchase. Gerber sued to block the proposed offer, alleging,
among other things, that the failure to disclose the questionable
payments violated section 14(e):
The omission to disclose [sic] Anderson, Clayton's practice of
making illegal or questionable payments and improper overbill-
ings and the knowledge of its directors and officers of such prac-
tices is material in that, inter alia, it failed to disclose conduct
21 See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (W.D.
Mich. 1978); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., No. 124A (N.D.
Ohio. Apr. 25, 1977). See generally S. BANK., HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS COMM.
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 74 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SEC REPORT].
292 E.g., General Steel Indus. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,402 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 1981). See generally Profusek, Non-
monetary Forms of Remuneration Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1979).
" E.g., Matter of Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 041-15 (0. Div. of Secs. Oct.
9, 1978). But see Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116
(E.D. Mo. 1980).
14 Anderson, Clayton also disclosed:
It appears that one director who is a member of management was
aware of these transactions, that certain directors and officers were
generally aware of the practice of making small payments and that of-
ficers and directors were aware of one payment ... which in effect was
extorted by threats against certain employees.
The foreign sales and operations involved are material in the ag-
gregate to the business of the Company in that their contribution to the
consolidated net income of the Company has been material- averaging
approximately 10% per year for the years under review.
Anderson, Clayton & Co. Form 8-K, at 2 (Mar., 1976).
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that would obviously affect Anderson, Clayton's ability to obtain
the approval of the Superintendent of Insurance of New York,
necessary to its purchase of shares on the tender offer con-
templated by the Proposed Offer. Under the New York In-
surance Law, for example, the Superintendent is specifically re-
quired to consider, in determining whether or not to approve
the transaction, "the trustworthiness of the acquiring person or
any of its officers or directors."
Such omission is also material in that a fundamental purpose of
Congress in enacting the "Williams Act" . .. was to ensure that
the shareholder whose shares were being sought would receive
all pertinent information relating to the competence and integrity
of the management of a company seeking their shares.295
Like the bidder in Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies
Corp., 6 Anderson, Clayton initially resisted the subject company's
discovery requests relating to its questionable payments. However,
unlike the situation in United Technologies, Judge Fox effectively297
refused the request for a protective order in Anderson, Clayton:
With reference to when the information [relating to Anderson,
Clayton's questionable payments] should be disclosed, if it is to
be disclosed, after trial or presently, if the information goes to
anything that would be relevant to or have an effect upon the
decision of the stockholders of Gerber, it should be disclosed
now and not at the time of trial. This is discovery, and the
Gerber stockholders are entitled to the information, which may
affect their judgment.
Anyone who reads the Wall Street Journal or any of the trade
financial papers knows there is an upsurge in vital concern for
corporate conduct .... There is sensitivity in stockholders as to
what kind of companies they have, and that sensitivity could af-
fect the judgment of a stockholder.
The kind of information which was in the confidential docu-
ment which you submitted to me shouldn't be withheld from the
" Complaint 39-40, Gerber Prods. Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., No. 188
(W.D. Mich. 1977).
' No. 124A (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 1977) (Contie, J.) (defensive litigation based
upon, among other things, alleged failure to disclose adequate information
regarding voluntarily disclosed questionable payments).
" The district court in Anderson, Clayton did make allowance for the protec-
tion of information where public disclosure thereof "may affect the life of a
human being," and included protective provisions in its order requiring Gerber to
submit to the court information which it proposed to disclose which might en-
danger foreign nationals forty-eight hours prior to disclosure (so that Anderson,
Clayton would have the opportunity to object thereto). Id.; see Order of June 2,
1977, Gerber Prods. Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., Civ. No. 188 (W.D. Mich.
1977).
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Gerber stockholders. It goes to what the characteristics of the
officers of the pursuing corporation is, or has been [sic]; and that
is vital to the judgment of a stockholder in making a decision in
this kind of case. It should be disclosed now.
If Anderson, Clayton wants to venture to take over Gerber, it
has to suffer the consequences, if there are any, of public
disclosure."
Anderson, Clayton may be of limited precedential weight, since the
net income related to the questionable payments was apparently
material under traditional principles and the bidder failed to make any
reference to questionable payments in its tender offer materials (when
this general topic was in vogue, relatively detailed descriptions of osten-
sively immaterial payments were frequently included in tender offer
materials). However, the Anderson, Clayton court obviously was more
concerned with information that allegedly bore upon the integrity of the
bidder's management than the amounts at issue. More importantly, by
effectively inviting the public dissemination of the details underlying
Anderson, Clayton's questionable payments, the court seemingly took a
step beyond what had normally been required in this area by the SEC. 99
Gerber sought discovery of the facts underlying Anderson, Clayton's
questionable payments for the express purpose of utilizing such facts in
its tender offer defense. Anderson, Clayton argued before Judge Fox
that a "decision cannot be made until discovery is complete and until
this case is before the Court on its full merits," and asserted that prema-
ture disclosure of the underlying facts could result in physical injury to
its employees in certain foreign countries."' 0 However, Gerber expressly
stated that it wished access to the information to utilize it (if relevant
and after giving Anderson, Clayton notice thereof) in proceedings
' Id. (bench ruling) (emphasis added).
The SEC has stated that, as a general matter, the following items ought to
be included in a disclosure statement relating to questionable payments:
1. The existence, amount of, duration and purpose for the ques-
tionable payments;
2. The role of senior management in such payments;
3. The tax consequences, if any, of the payments;
4. Information about the line of business, or class of products or ser-
vices in connection with which the payments have been made;
5. The company's intention with respect to the continuation or ter-
mination of the payments;
6. The impact that cessation of the payments referred to in Items 1
through 4 above may have on the company's consolidated revenues, net
income or assets; and
7. The method of effecting the payments, including possible falsifica-
tions or inadequate corporate books and records. SEC REPORT, supra
note 291, at 32-33.
300 Transcript, at 8-9, Gerber Prods. Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., No. 188
(W.D. Mich. May 31, 1977).
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before the Michigan Securities Bureau and the New York Insurance
Bureau arising out of state administrative review of the proposed
tender offer and, possibly, to communicate with its shareholders: "Again,
if stockholders have an interest in being fully informed, and if the infor-
mation is information which stockholders should have, it simply does
not make sense to delay the availability of that information to them un-
til this entire lawsuit is tried on the merits." 1 Judge Fox's order, effec-
tively provided protection for the underlying information only upon a
concrete showing of potential physical harm to Anderson, Clayton's
employees, and as such presented Gerber with a potent weapon in its
struggle with Anderson, Clayton.
On June 7, 1977, Anderson, Clayton sought expedited review in the
Sixth Circuit of Judge Fox's ruling pertaining to questionable
payments. However, Anderson, Clayton and Gerber then entered into a
stipulation pursuant to which Anderson, Clayton agreed to full
discovery with respect to questionable payments and agreed not to com-
mence its tender offer until ten days after the conclusion of the trial on
the merits. In return, Gerber pledged to maintain in confidence informa-
tion so obtained, pending the outcome of the trial. A few months later,
citing the delay caused by the litigation in the federal district court,
Anderson, Clayton withdrew its proposed tender offer.
Cases such as Anderson, Clayton are rare. In most instances,
disclosure litigation revolves around somewhat more technical issues as
to which some bidders are willing to make disclosure even if they
disagree that disclosure is required. The touchstones for disclosure in
this regard are, of course, the materiality concept generally and the
SEC's specific disclosure requirements relating to tender offers.
B. Materiality
In order for the plaintiff to obtain relief, any alleged misstatement or
omission must be found to have been in derrogation of the SEC's ex-
plicit disclosure requirements or otherwise "material." Section 14(e)
generally incorporates the disclosure standards applicable in Rule 10b-5
cases. Although the Rule 10b-5 cases contain numerous and sometimes
conflicting definitions of "material" information, a Second Circuit deci-
sion involving the Williams Act delineates a test for materiality which
seems to distill most of the prior Rule 10b-5 law on the subject:
The concept of materiality focuses on the weightiness of the
misstated or omitted fact in a reasonable investor's decision to
buy or sell. We articulated the materiality standard in List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965), to be "whether 'a reasonable man would attach
importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his
30 Id. at 11.
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choice of action in the transaction in question.' " [footnote omit-
ted.] The materiality test is concerned only with whether a pro-
totype reasonable investor would have relied. See Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 912-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S
903 (1969). Account must be taken of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances to determine whether the fact under consideration is
of such significance that a reasonable investor would weigh it in
his decision whether or not to invest. °2
Although the following cases may have been undercut by the Supreme
Court's decision under section 14(a) in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.,3"' a number of cases decided after the Second Circuit's decision in
Chris-Craft used very expansive definitions of the concept of "material-
ity." However, the ostensive willingness of even these courts to expand
greatly the concept of materiality may be merely a result of the re-
quirements of the particular cases.3 4 For example, in Corenco Corp. v.
Schiavone & Sons, Inc.,"'0 the District Court for the Southern District of
New'York held that a bidder must disclose at least two year's financial
statements about its operations but only because: 1) no financial informa-
tion was otherwise publicly available; 2) the bidder sought control; 3) a
merger was contemplated; and 4) less than all shares were sought. The
bidder was enjoined from further activity in connection with the offer
until such time as it had made the required disclosures, despite the fact
that financial information concerning the bidder was not then a man-
datory disclosure item on any of the SEC forms and had not previously
been held to be required. However, absent any of the factors
enumerated above, it seems likely that a contrary result would have ob-
tained.
Similarly, Cauble v. White,3"' indicates that misrepresentations and
omissions may be more critical when made to the shareholders of a
small bank who are primarily local people.0 7 The Cauble court also held
302 Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-64 (2d Cir.
1973).
303 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (discussed infra).
14 See, e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 421 (S.D.
Tex. 1973) ("whether a reasonable 'prototype' investor might have considered such
information important in the making of his decision to tender or not"); Elco Corp.
v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 752 (D. Del. 1973), quoting, Butler Aviation
Int'l., Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970) ("inac-
curate statements [or omissions] ... which may have had some tendency to affect
the decision of the [target company's] stockholders with respect to the ... offer").
"' 362 F. Supp. 939, modified, [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,108
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973). See
infra Section III(C)(5) with respect to disclosure of financial information regar-
ding the bidder.
360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973).
' See also Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,483 (7th Cir. 1978).
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that "[tihe culpability of officers or directors of a corporation for
misstatements is greater than that of other persons" due to the
fiduciary duties which they owe to the shareholders. °8 Moreover, where
the bidder has intentionally impeded the ability of the subject company
to respond by limiting the duration of its offer, at least one court has
held that a more relaxed standard of materiality should be applied to
alleged misstatements and omissions." 9 Interestingly, the SEC has in-
dicated that it may apply an even broader standard of materiality in its
own administrative proceedings. For example, in Matter of Susquehan-
na Corp.,31 1 the SEC held that the bidder-respondent had violated sec-
tion 13(d) by failing to disclose its intent to make future acquisitions
with the liquid assets of the subject company. In so holding, the SEC re-
jected a prior determination by the Fifth Circuit that the offeror had
not violated the Williams Act."'
Described in the abstract, materiality is a concept that can bear vir-
tually any burden. However, the concept has two overlapping but
distinguishable components-the qualitative and quantitative com-
ponents-which, when properly analyzed, provide bounds beyond which
the federal disclosure system should not be pushed.
1. The Qualitative Component
The first element is qualitative, i.e., attention must be directed to the
nature of a particular fact vis-a-vis the interests of the investing public
or shareholder. As a general proposition, the courts and the SEC re-
quire disclosure of a particular item of information "not because it is of
interest to the general public but because it might affect profitability
and hence be of concern to investors."3 '2 That is, the concept of
materiality is premised upon an economic model-emphasis is to be
placed upon the effect of an item of information "on the [corporation's]
profit and loss account and on the earnings trends which determine
modern ratios.."31 3 Indeed, this limiting aspect of the concept of
materiality is seemingly mandated by the general legislative history of
... 360 F. Supp. at 1029.
309 Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Co., 394 F. Supp. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
310 SEC Rel. No. 34-8933 (SEC Admin. Proc. July 17, 1970).
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
312 Stevenson, Corporations and Social Responsibility in Search of the Cor-
porate Soul 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 709, 726 n.30 (1974) (emphasis added). But see
generally Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on
Management Integrity and Competancy, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555 (1981).
313 Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and Material Facts, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1061,
1071 (1971). See, e.g., Matter of Investors Management Co., SEC Rel. No. 34-9267
(1971) (A fact is material "where it is of such significance that it could be expected
to affect [the] judgment of investors as to a security's merit and, if generally
known, to affect its market price.").
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the Exchange Act. 14 However, as indicated above, other topics not
moored to traditional economic concepts, e.g., so-called questionable
payments, may sometimes be required to be disclosed, particularly if
they bear significantly upon the integrity of the bidder's management.
2. The Quantitative Component
In addition to its qualitative aspect, the concept of materiality also
has a quantitative component, i.e., the relative importance of a par-
ticular fact or group of facts must be assessed to determine if it is
significant enough to be disclosed publicly. Were this not the case,
stockholders and the investing public would be repeatedly bombarded
with information which would be of little benefit to them and could be
produced only at an unnecessary public and private expense. 1 It was
principally this perception that led the Supreme Court in TSC In-
dustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. to reject the previously prevailing
"might" standard of materiality under the federal securities laws, as
"too suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely.""3 6
Instead, the TSC Industries Court defined a "material" fact, for pur-
poses of the proxy rules, as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
in deciding how to vote. . . . [This standard] does not require
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change
his vote, but contemplates a showing of a substantial like-
lihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the reasonable share-
holder's deliberations."'
In short, for a fact to be material under the federal securities laws there
must be a substantial likelihood that the "disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."3 8
314 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934) ("The bill provides
that . .. a condition of... registration shall be the furnishing of complete infor-
mation relative to the financial condition of the issuer.").
E.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
316 426 U.S. 438, 446 (1976), citing, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973).
317 426 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
318 Id. The materiality standard enunciated in TSC Industries had been ex-
pressly applied to alleged § 14(e) violations. See, e.g., Staffin v. Greenberg,
509 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1981); SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D.
Il. 1980); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., [1978
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v. Gerber Prods.
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The TSC Industries standard was also
19821
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It is the quantitative aspect of materiality which has led to the conclu-
sion in a few cases that even when it is determined that certain facts
relevant to a particular transaction or series of transactions might be
deemed material, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the
same must be disclosed." 9 The decision as to what information must be
disclosed necessarily involves a balancing of the costs involved, such as
the direct expense of disclosure and the possibility that the disclosure
itself might be misleading or unduly damaging, against the benefits
sought to be obtained. Thus, in a particular case it may be that the
direct and indirect costs of disclosure could be deemed to outweigh the
putative benefits therefrom.
In Berman v. Gerber Products Co.,32 the trial court distinguished
relevance from materiality: "[A] target company's duty under Section
14(e) is not one of absolute disclosure of all potentially relevant facts
about its management, finances, and operations. Rather, the duty is one
of disclosure of material facts that are necessary to prevent an investor
from being misled.""'' The Berman court suggested that voluntary
disclosure of certain relevant facts might make other facts material and
thereby trigger further disclosure.2 2 Thus, the Berman court held that a
subject company ordinarily had no obligation to disclose its past earn-
ings in responding to a tender offer. If the subject company characterized
the offer as "inadequate," however, the company's past earnings might
become material to an investor's decision, and disclosure might
therefore be required.
A number of other decisions indicate that more stringent limitations
may be imposed upon the "materiality" concept in the tender offer con-
text. In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,"' for example, the
bidder alleged that the subject company had violated section 14(e) by in-
forming its shareholders that they would lose a 25% stock dividend if
applied to alleged § 13(d) violations in SEC v. Savoy Indus., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,497 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Blanchette v. Provident & Worcester Co.,
428 F. Supp. 347 (D. Del. 1977). See also Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (holding that matters involving com-
pliance with environmental and occupational health and safety laws are im-
material, as they are not mentioned by the SEC rules and regulations regarding
required disclosure, and need not be disclosed on an acquirer's Schedule 13D);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,840
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (bidder not required to disclose the possibility of it being subject
to environmental proceedings due to the operation of its facility, as they were not
yet pending).
319 SEC Rel. No. 34-11733 (1975), [1975-76 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310,
at 85,712. See, e.g., Ash v. Baker, 392 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (expense of
resolicitation of proxies held to outweigh potential benefits).
454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
32 Id. at 1327.
322 Id.
323 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974).
[Vol. 31:175
76https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/3
WILLIAMS A CT DECISIONS
they tendered their shares. The subject company did not disclose that
the true value of the stock dividend lay in the payment of the usual divi-
dend on an increased number of shares or that the market price would
reflect this increase. However, no violation of section 14(e) was found:
"[The subject company's] statement was literally true and here again we
are not disposed to require parties to a tender fight to conform to stan-
dards of sterilization that might be appropriate in other contexts."3"' It
should be noted that, as discussed below, 25 the court that decided
Missouri Portland Cement reached questionable results on at least some
of the other issues presented, and the precedential value which other
courts will attach to the case remains to be seen.
A few courts have manifested an unwillingness to give full girth to
the "total mix" concept suggested by the Supreme Court in TSC In-
dustries, e.g., they have refused to allow the availability of curative in-
formation to be utilized as a defense to allegedly material
misstatements or omissions. 26 However, most courts have been eager to
point to the "total mix" of information available to offerees, even if it is
presented by third parties.2 7 For example, in Spielman v. General Host
Corp.,3"8 the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment denying liability for
allegedly material omissions in an offeror's prospectus in an exchange
offer concerning the method of election of directors of the subject com-
pany, i e., that the target had a staggered board and cumulative voting.
Noting that the shareholders presumably were aware of the organic
structure of their own corporation and had been reminded thereof dur-
ing the course of the offer and a recent proxy solicitation, the Spielman
court held that this was a "situation where the 'total mix' of communica-
tions to, and knowledge of, shareholders of the target company renders
harmless a potentially misleading omission in the prospectus circulated
by the tender offeror.""8 In short, given the realization that one cannot
expect the type of purity in takeover battles that might exist in other
contexts,33 the threshold for materiality under the Williams Act may, as
3"4 Id. at 874.
323 See infra Section III(C)(1)(a).
36 See, e.g., Blanchette v. Providence & Worchester Co., 428 F. Supp. 347 (D.
Del. 1977) (exchange offeror could not cure material misstatements as to offerees'
voting rights by a supplemental letter).
" See, e.g., Davis v. Emerson Ins. Agency, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 561 (D. Neb.
1976) (offerees told by the target company that deregistration may occur as a
result of tender offer). See also Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Minneapolis Share-
holders Comm., 425 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1977) (where offer is not likely to be
consummated quickly, the information made available through the give and take
of a tender offer battle deemed superior to that which could be judicially man-
dated).
328 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 39-40.
See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 456 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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a practical matter, be relatively high so long as the offer is contested
and there is an adequate opportunity for both sides to respond.
Another limitation on the amount of disclosure required under section
14(e) was imposed in Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp.a"1
There, the subject company alleged that the bidder had violated section
14(e) by failing to disclose that a takeover could result in the loss of the
subject company's right to manage certain Australian mining joint ven-
tures. This information could only have been obtained by going to
Australia and examining the relevant contracts. Thus, although it held
that the omitted information was "material," '332 the Texasgulf court
refused to impose liability on the bidder:
However, [the bidder] could not reasonably have been expected,
to disclose this information because it was not available to them
and could not have been discovered with reasonable effort since
there was nothing in any of the public filings to inform [the bid-
der] of the possible problem. [The subject company] suggests
[the bidder] should have inquired of [it] about the projects, but
this suggestion is unrealistic as it would have encouraged
speculation that [the bidder] was contemplating an offer.33
The Texasgulf "reasonable effort" rule seems sensible.334 Under a more
stringent rule, section 14(e) arguably could become an unintended
obstacle to any tender offer.
One additional limitation on the scope of the materiality concept
should be noted at the outset-i.e., the concept "must accommodate a
concern that information containing conclusions which on their face
would, if disclosed, risk misleading the shareholder because the basis
for the conclusions are speculative and unreliable." '335 Thus, in Radol v.
Thomas,"33 the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that
asset valuations prepared by a target company and its investment ad-
331 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
... Id. at 426. Even though the Texasgulf court found no violation by the-bidder in
failing to disclose the information, it did require that the amended offer to pur-
chase, which the bidder had volunteered to publish, contain a description of the
Australian mining venture.
333 Id.
" Cf. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 685-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (The extent of an individual director's duty to investigate under § 11 of the
Securities Act is contingent upon his or her relative access to information in a
particular setting and the nature of the duties which he or she is performing.).
3' Radol v. Thomas, No. 13, Slip op. at 7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1982). See also
Staffin v. Greenberg, [1981-82] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,465 (3d Cir. Feb. 19,
1982); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978); Arber v.
Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 1974); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972).
336 No. 82-13 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1982).
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visors were not required to be disclosed because they "contained facts
and conclusions that were based on speculations, assumptions and
calculations that were imprecise and inaccurate." '337
A novel attempt to restrict the duty to disclose material information
was made in Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs. 3 8
There, the defendant-bidder contended that the subject company had
distributed communications to its shareholders in which it could have,
but failed to disclose any material facts which the bidder had omitted.
Moreover, the bidder argued that its offer was so generous that it
mitigated the effects of any misrepresentations or omissions that had
been made. In rejecting both contentions, the Second Circuit stated:
While the failure of a target company to seize an opportunity to
rectify claimed omissions may have some bearing on their
materiality, General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403
F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969),
and while it would have been in the interests of disclosure for
Sonesta itself to have drawn its stockholders' attention to the
possible consequences of their tendering Sonesta shares, which
Wellington had omitted, it would emasculate the purposes of the
Williams Act to allow the offeror to look to the target company
to remedy the offeror's own material deficiencies in disclosure.
The obligation is placed squarely on those making the offer in
the first instance to disclose all material factors necessary to
make their offer not misleading. That duty cannot be shifted to
the shoulders of others. As for the suggestion that the generosi-
ty of the offer should reduce Wellington's obligation to inform
the shareholders of all relevant circumstances, we must reject
any such nullification of the disclosure requirements of the Act,
as did the Supreme Court in a similar situation with respect to
proxy violations in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, [396 U.S. 375,
381-85 (1970)]. 339
That is, a party upon whom a disclosure obligation is imposed may not
shift that obligation to a contestant simply because of the contestant's
resistance.340
117 Id. at 8.
... 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
" Id at 255. See also Memorandum of Mobil Corp. in Opposition to Request
for a Hearing at 10-12, No. 041-22 (Ohio Div. of Secs. Nov. 17, 1981).
30 In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that Liggett & Myers' failure to correct a financial analyst's projected earn-
ings reports did not constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 even though the analyst
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However, as suggested in Sonesta, in Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v.
Tiger International, Inc.,341 the Second Circuit held that a failure to cor-
rect another's error may be some evidence that the error is not
material. In that case, the subject company sued to enjoin a tender of-
fer, alleging that the bidder had misrepresented the true value of the
subject company's stock. The Seaboard World Airlines court found that
there had been no section 14(e) violation:
As we have indicated, as early as March, [the subject com-
pany] stated that its $20 asking price was based on the liquida-
tion value of its aircraft.... [The subject company] had ample
opportunity to make its position clear to the stockholders whom
it now alleges were misled by [the bidder's] statement. But the
record does not reveal, and [the subject company] does not claim
to have made, any effort to rebut [the bidder's] characterization
of its $20 asking price by apprising its stockholders of the value
of its aircraft if the corporation were liquidated and these assets
sold. Cum tacent claimant.
Under these circumstances we believe our comments in
General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., supra, 403 F.2d at
162 to be particularly appropriate. "Failure of the other side to
correct alleged misstatements or rectify omissions is some
evidence that it did not regard them as material.
3 42
Thus, tender offer contestants have legal as well as business reasons for
challenging statements made by the other side in a takeover battle.
C. Particular Disclosure Issues
1. Compliance with Law
Item 10 of Schedule 14I-1 requires that, if material, a bidder make
disclosure of, among other things, 1) applicable regulatory requirements
and approvals, 2) the applicability of antitrust laws, 3) the applicability
of margin requirements, and 4) pending legal proceedings relating to
the tender offer. Subject companies frequently assert in defensive
litigation that the bidder's disclosures regarding legal obstacles to and
consequences of a tender offer were inadequate. Such claims are
especially predictable where a colorable antitrust argument can be
made.
had submitted the reports to Liggett & Myers for review before their release.
The Elkind court concluded that there was simply no duty under the federal
securities laws to correct another's erroneous statements, even if, as was the
situation in Elkind, it would have been customary so to do.
" [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,877 (2d Cir. 1979).
342 Id. at 95,590-91 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
[Vol. 31:175
80https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/3
WILLIAMS A CT DECISIONS
a. Antitrust Laws
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,"' involved a
tender offer for MGM by Tracy Investment Company. The financing for
Tracy's offer was to be provided by a subsidiary of Transamerica.
Transamerica owned 99.6% of United Artists, which, of course, is a ma-
jor competitor of MGM. MGM sought a preliminary injunction against
the tender offer on the grounds that Tracy had violated sections 14(d)
and 14(e) by failing to disclose the potential antitrust problems in either
its Schedule 13D (then required for tender offers) or the offer to pur-
chase itself. The trial court used the following test for "materiality":
Whether or not any of the stockholders who tendered their shares
would not have done so if they had known of the disclosed facts. " '
Under this overly stringent test, the trial court was not persuaded that
the information was material. 5 At any rate, the trial court's order
delineating the conditions under which the offer was to proceed re-
quired disclosure of these facts to the shareholders. Thus, any harm
would be remedied. A further factor in MGM may well have been that
the trial court was not firmly convinced that any real substantive an-
titrust problems existed, especially given the provisions of its order re-
quiring amendment of the loan agreement so as to preclude the lender
from exercising control over MGM. 46
In Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.,a47 the substantive antitrust problems were clearer than those in
MGM. Bluhdorn, the chief executive officer of the offeror, Gulf &
Western, was also the largest shareholder and a director of Bohack, the
chief competitor of the subject company, A&P, in the New York City
area. Gulf & Western also controlled a number of A&P suppliers, rais-
ing problems, at least at that time, of vertical foreclosure and reciproci-
ty. A&P sought injunctive relief against the tender offer on the ground
that Gulf & Western had violated sections 14(d) and 14(e) by not disclos-
ing Bluhdorn's relationship with Bohack, or Gulf & Western's control of
certain A&P suppliers.
Using the test for a preliminary injunction discussed above,348 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that A&P had demonstrated a probability of success on
the merits with respect to its section 14(e) claim. The Gulf & Western
court stated that A&P was only required to show that the omitted infor-
mation was material, and that any of the shareholders who tendered
their shares would probably not have done so if they had known all of
303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 1353.
345 Id.
u3 Id. at 1354.
14 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
348 See supra Section II(C)(1).
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the facts. Gulf & Western argued that, at the time of its offer, no anti-
trust action had been commenced against it and, therefore, that its
liability was uncertain. However, the Gulf & Western court rejected
this defense, holding that the potential antitrust problems were "basic
facts" of "obvious concern" to all A&P shareholders.49
Gulf & Western was followed in Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc.,a"°
wherein the Delaware District Court found that consummation of the
tender offer would probably violate section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
Elco court rejected the offeror's denials that the antitrust laws would
have been violated by the acquisition and asserted that it would have
been false and misleading for it to so state:
At a minimum, the present record makes it appear that the
facts regarding the . ..market [at issue] raised serious and
substantial questions about the legality of the transaction. If so,
they held the potential of effecting [sic] the judgment of .. .
shareholders on whether and how much to tender. These basic
facts could have been stated without speculation on future
events. They were not stated.351
The thrust of the opinions in Gulf & Western and Elco would appear to
have seriously weakened the earlier MGM decision. MGM can be
distinguished from both Gulf & Western and Elco on the basis of the
relative certainty of the substantive antitrust violations in each case.
However, in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill Inc.,352 the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the contention that the bidder had violated section
14(e) by failing to disclose that potential antitrust problems were in-
volved in its offer. The Cargill court found no likely antitrust obstacles
in the transaction and approved the district court's holding that an-
titrust obstacles need not be disclosed unless the probability of violation
is clearly apparent at the time of the offer. The Cargill court went fur-
ther than was necessary to decide the issues before it, stating:
Courts should tread lightly in imposing a duty of self-
flagellation on offerors with respect to matters that are known
as well, or almost as well, to the target company; [footnote omit-
ted] some issues concerning a contested tender offer can safely
be left for the latter's riposte. Of course, if the FTC should issue
a complaint with respect to Cargill's acquisition of MP, as we
are told its staff has recommended, a renewed tender offer
should disclose that fact, with whatever reasonable comments
Cargill may choose to make about it.3"'
'"9 476 F.2d at 697.
0 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973).
31 Id. at 752-53 (footnote omitted).
352 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974).
113 Id. at 873.
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The FTC did, in fact, issue a complaint against the bidder after it had
acquired 18% of the target's stock. This development indicates that the
approach taken in Cargill may not have much lasting vitality, particular-
ly the comment that:
It is also worth noting that here Cargill's offer was for all of
MP's stock whereas Gulf & Western's was for only 15% of
A&P's. It is hard to see the materiality of a possible antitrust
violation to an MP stockholder who had tendered and been paid
for all his stock.
3 54
It would seem that the fact of a forthcoming FTC complaint would be
most relevant to the holders of 82% of the target's stock who did not
tender their shares. Cargill can perhaps best be explained as a
somewhat aberrational development resulting from the particular
panel's (Judges Waterman, Mulligan and Friendly) thinly disguised an-
noyance with suits by target companies.
The basis of the Cargill holding, that disclosure of antitrust problems
will be necessary only when the circumstances are such as to make the
probability of antitrust violations apparent at the time of the offer, does
have continuing viability, however. 35 5 This approach appears to be sensi-
ble. If no antitrust problem conceivably could be presented by consum-
mation of a tender offer, no disclosure should be required. The nature
and extent of the disclosures required in other situations will be depen-
dent upon the seriousness of the antitrust problems posed in a particular
situation.
Under Gulf & Western3 56 and Cargill,3 51 the bidder is obliged only to
disclose the "basic facts" giving rise to the alleged illegality so that
shareholders are able to reach their own conclusions. The bidder is not
required to characterize the facts at issue with "pejorative nouns or ad-
jectives or ... to draw adverse inferences from the facts disclosed. 35 8 A
contrary rule would enable subject company management to use the
disclosure requirements of the Williams Act in derogation of Congress
apparent intent in enacting that Act.
b. Regulatory Approvals
Depending upon the nature of the business of the subject company,
regulatory approval of a tender offer for control of a subject company
3" Id at 873 n.45.
... Accord Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1981). See also
Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,319
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1981).
" 476 F.2d at 697-98.
317 498 F.2d at 873.
' Issen v. GSC Enter., 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1290 (N.D. Il1. 1981). See also Golub
v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978); Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Prods., Inc.,
1982)
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may be required. 59 The cases involving potential antitrust violations do
not necessarily justify an injunction against a bidder seeking to obtain
control of a corporation which is subject to regulatory approvals. In the
former cases the illegality of the tender offer inheres in the possible
ownership of the subject company by the bidder-i.e., without respect
to the means employed, the end itself would be illegal as a matter of
substantive law. Contrarily, where the illegality of the offer is divorced
from the end sought to be obtained (viz., control of a subject company
which, for example, holds a broadcasting license), but only results from
a requirement of administrative approval prior to the transfer of con-
trol, the courts have refused to enjoin tender offers until such approval
is obtained.
In Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft,3 "' for example, the
Third Circuit adopted the conclusion of the trial court that the defen-
dants were not required to secure administrative approvals prior to con-
summation of a tender offer."' Moreover, in Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada
Development Corp.,362 a case involving a tender offer for shares of a cor-
poration which controlled several subsidiaries that were licensed to
operate radio broadcasting stations, the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas expressly stated that "[c]learances from ad-
ministrative agencies need not be secured prior to a final tender offer
provided disclosure is made of the potential loss and its value."
' 363
Strong policy arguments support the conclusion of the Ronson and
Texasgulf courts. A contrary result would, in effect, institute a form of
pre-offer registration. Pre-offer filing was rejected when the Williams
Act was enacted because of the adamant opposition thereto by the
securities industry,3" based upon the argument that pre-offer filing
would eliminate the critical tactical element of surprise from the
597 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1979); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 72-73 (2d
Cir. 1979); Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978); Bucher v.
Shumway, [1979-80 Dees.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,142, at 96,303 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
35' E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2234 (Atomic Energy Act); 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835, 883 (Ship-
ping Act of 1916); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (Federal Communications Act); 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1378, 1381 (Federal Aviation Act).
Civ. No. 785 (D.N.J. July 3, 1973), aff'd, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
361 At issue in Ronson was 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(5), which prohibits any person
from acquiring control of an air carrier without prior approval by the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
362 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
Id. at 429, citing, Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846
(3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974). See also Orbanco,
Inc. v. Security Bk., [1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,559, at 95,956 (D.
Ore. 1974) (FDIC filing).
'" See, e.g., Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S.
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-89 (1967).
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bidder's arsenal. A similar concept underlies commencement and
dissemination provisions of the SEC's new tender offer rules."5 Finally,
section 14(a)(5) of the Williams Act makes all tenders revocable after six-
ty days in order to preserve the shareholder's freedom to deal in his
stock. As such, a requirement of prior administrative approval would be
inconsistent with the SEC's, and arguably Congress, apparent desire to
stimulate quick consummation of tender offers. In sum, it is not likely
that any hostile tender offer would be enjoined on the ground that the
requested administrative approval had not been obtained prior to the of-
fer absent truly extraordinary facts. 6
c. Litigation
In SEC v. Texas International Co.,367 the District Court for the Nor-
thern District of Illinois held that the bidder should have disclosed the
existence of pending litigation which might affect the tender offer and
the issues involved but that the bidder did not have to speculate on the
potential outcome of the litigation itself. In contrast, in Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. InterNorth, Inc.," the District Court for the Northern District of
New York held that the bidder was not required to disclose the
possibility of its being subject to environmental proceedings due to the
operation of its petrochemical facility, as no such action was then pen-
ding. The differing results can be explained by the fact that the litiga-
tion in Texas International affected the offer itself whereas that in
Crouse-Hinds did not.
d. Adverse Tax Implications
Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co.," 9 is probably the
first case to consider the problem of non-disclosure of possible adverse
tax implications. ITT made an exchange offer for the shares of Hartford
Insurance Company and, in connection therewith, issued a prospectus
which represented that the transaction would be tax-free. ITT did not
disclose, however, that it had obtained a tax ruling from IRS on the
basis of inaccurate information. When the IRS later withdrew its ruling,
the Second Circuit held that former Hartford shareholders could main-
365 See SEC Rel. No. 34-16623, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,2841 (Mar. 5,
1980).
In a particular case, it could be said that the consequences of a failure to ob-
tain a particular administrative approval (e.g., pursuant to Canada's Foreign In-
vestment Review Act) might be so significant that they could not be adequately
disclosed in the bidder's tender offer materials. However, these circumstances
are likely to be rare.
367 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
[1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,840 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
19 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
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tain a class action for damages or rescission under sections 10(b) and
14(e).
An analogous case, but involving disclosure of the effect of a takeover
on the issuer, is Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum
Corp.,70 wherein the District Court for the Southern District of New
York indicated that a (later-cured) failure to disclose the precise dollar
amounts resulting from a possible loss of the issuer's tax exemption
under Puerto Rican law and various benefits under the Federal Energy
Administration's crude oil cost equalization program constituted a viola-
tion of section 14(e).371
2. Conflicts of Interests
Disclosure of possible conflicts of interests between the bidder and
the subject company is not specifically required by either the statute or
the SEC's implementing regulations. However, the decided cases have
generally held such information to be material within the meaning of
section 14(e) on the ground that this type of information is patently rele-
vant to the investor's decision whether to tender his shares since, if he
does not tender, he may be injured by future actions by the bidder.
In Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs.,72 the
Second Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion against consummation of a tender offer. Wellington, the bidder, was
involved in litigation with the subject company, Sonesta, over the terms
of a lease. Sonesta had obtained a $1.8 million judgment against Well-
ington in a New York court, from which Wellington had appealed. In ad-
dition, there was an undisputed debt of $500,000 owed to Sonesta by
Wellington. The bidder had disclosed the existence of the dispute and
stated that a successful takeover might mean that Sonesta would
receive less than the amount due. However, the amount of the judgment
was not revealed, so the Sonesta court held this violated sections 14(d)
and 14(e). Since the exact figure was "material," its omission entitled
the plaintiff to injunctive relief. 73
During the period of Wellington's tender offer, there were two pend-
ing shareholder resolutions regarding liquidation of certain Sonesta
assets. Subject to IRS approval and the vote of two-thirds of all shares
at the annual meeting, the liquidation of these assets could have
resulted in a two dollar per share cash distribution to stockholders. In
its offer to purchase, Wellington stated its intention to abstain from
370 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
371 But cf. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
372 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
371 See also Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F.
Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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voting on these proposals. Wellington failed to disclose that, if its
tender offer were successful, it would acquire enough shares to defeat
the resolutions by its abstention. The trial court held that such a
disclosure would have been "purely hypothetical" since it was impossi-
ble to predict the ultimate success of the offer. Therefore, it denied in-
junctive relief. The appellate court reversed, stating:
The test of materiality is not whether a possible consequence of
the offer was contingent or hypothetical ... but whether it was
a factor that might be considered of some importance by a
Sonesta stockholder in making his decision. We believe that it
was. It is true that Wellington's offer has not been as successful
as it had hoped . . . and that the two proposals have since been
approved by a small margin at Sonesta's Annual Meeting. But
this post-offer occurrence does not render the offer any the less
misleading . . . "in light of the circumstances under which they
are made." ' 4
Another potential conflict of interest situation was considered in
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp."' The offeror in Texasgulf
was a corporation established by the Canadian government for the pur-
pose of fostering Canadian development. Its corporate charter also pro-
vided that the corporation should make a profit, if possible. The subject
company alleged that there was an inherent conflict between the objec-
tives of the bidder and the interests of the subject company's non-
Canadian shareholders. The trial court held, however, that the potential
conflicts of interest were no greater than those faced by the directors of
many multinational corporations, especially in view of the provision re-
quiring the directors to make a profit. Thus, the problem was not
serious enough to require disclosure. In view of the extensive publicity
which the case had received, however, the bidder volunteered to amend
its purchase offer to disclose the problem, and the trial court agreed
that it should so do.
Finally, in Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp.,"' the Delaware District Court
ruled that a bidder's failure to disclose its receipt of certain "inside" in-
formation of contested but doubtful confidentiality and its hiring an at-
torney who was formerly counsel to the subject company was not in
violation of sections 14(d) or 14(e). The court stated that "[t]he use to
which a reasonable stockholder is to put this information remains en-
tirely unclear to the Court. Thus, this . . . cannot be regarded as
material.""3
... 483 F.2d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omitted).
17' 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
376 509 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1981).
177 Id. at 122. See infra Section III(C)(7)(d) (discussing disclosure of "inside" in-
formation).
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3. Plans and Purpose Disclosure
Item 5 of Schedule 14D-1 requires the bidder to state the purpose
for the purchase of securities and plans or proposals to make any
material changes in the business, management or structure of the sub-
ject company. Item 4 of Schedule 13D has similar requirements appli-
cable to beneficial owners of more than 5% of a class of equity securities
of a reporting company. Thereunder, the bidder or holder must disclose
not only his intent to acquire control, if any, but also what it plans to do
once control is acquired.
a. Intent to Control
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.,3 8 is perhaps the leading case on the question of when a bidder must
declare its intent to control the subject company. Gulf & Western, the
bidder, claimed that it was acquiring A&P shares for investment pur-
poses only and, therefore, that its failure to declare an intent to
dominate the subject company was proper. However, the Second Circuit
disagreed, holding that A&P had demonstrated a substantial likelihood
that it would prove a violation of section 14(e) at trial and was therefore
entitled to preliminary injunctive relief against the offer.
The Gulf & Western court recognized that proof of corporate "intent"
is extremely difficult, especially in the context of a preliminary injunc-
tion where the opportunity for discovery is limited. The decision that
A&P had shown a likelihood of proving that Gulf & Western intended to
obtain control by its tender offer was based upon three factors. The
Gulf & Western court first noted that the bidder had a well established
history of eventually dominating firms in which it initially acquired a
small interest. Second, the bidder's president had characterized A&P as
"overpriced" and "run down" in his deposition."' Further, he remarked
that his "Bohack management team" had the skill necessary to turn
A&P around. 8 ° These elements, together with the fact that this tender
offer represented the largest single monetary commitment ever made
by the bidder, a conglomerate, indicated a likelihood that it had violated
sections 14(d) and \14(e) by not declaring its intent to dominate A&P.38" '
The district court in Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul
Mines, Ltd.," was also willing to infer that the defendant had an undis-
378 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
... Id. at 697.
380 Id.
"' Id. See also Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981) (opinion states in dicta that disclosure of possi-
ble intent to control is required whenever the purchaser has a perceptible desire
to influence substantially the issuer's operations); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen
Energy Resources Ltd., No. 959 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
38 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974).
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closed intent to control the target at the time it filed a Schedule 13D.
The defendants were a Canadian group of related corporations which
had made major purchases of the plaintiff corporation's stock. The two
key executives of the principal defendant had openly expressed their
disagreement with the policies of the plaintiff's management in several
meetings and had requested significant changes in the composition of
the plaintiff's board and in the business policies of the corporation. The
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to accept the defend-
ant's characterization of its meetings with several of plaintiff's large
shareholders and non-management directors as mere gripe sessions. Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff was deemed to have at least raised serious ques-
tions regarding the defendant's failure to disclose its intent to con-
trol and was entitled to a preliminary injunction restraining the defend-
ant from acquiring any more shares or soliciting proxies.383
In contrast, in Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman,4 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York distinguished cases such as Gulf &
Western on the grounds that 1) Jewelcor had no established history of
swallowing up other enterprises (this was its first overture toward a
publicly held corporation); 2) there was evidence that the purchaser con-
sidered the issuer to be a good investment; and 3) Jewelcor had disclosed
that it was considering various types of business combinations with the
issuer. 8
The willingness of the courts in both Gulf & Western and Graphic
Sciences to infer an intent to control the target companies and, conse-
quently, violations of the securities laws through non-disclosure, may
have been prompted in large measure by the fact that the plaintiffs had
little opportunity to undertake discovery before requesting preliminary
injunctive relief. Nonetheless, these decisions suggest that a potential
bidder which is required to file a Schedule 13D would be well advised to
disclose at least the possibility of an intent to seek control of the proposed
target. If such a bidder really does not intend to acquire control, but
nonetheless anticipates resistance by the target company, it should be
prepared to document very carefully (pursuant to an identified docu-
ment generation and retention program) and to present substantial
evidence of its actual intent in order to resist the target's motion for a
preliminary injunction.
Notably, the general approach, ie., willingness to infer intent from
prior behavior, taken in Gulf & Western and Graphic Sciences was
seemingly rejected by the District Court for the Southern District of
California in Sea World, Inc. v. MCA, Inc. 38 Sea World, the subject com-
pany, alleged that MCA failed to disclose its intention to merge Sea
World with it or another entity:
See supra Section II(c)(3) (discussing remedial issues).
397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 238.
[1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,803 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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The "facts" urged as support Sea World's position take the
following general form: (1) that MCA has a "track record" of ac-
quiring a 100% interest in its subsidiaries, 37 of 38 of which are
wholly owned; (2) that MCA has for the last few years had an in-
terest in acquiring Sea World; (3) that informal offers have been
made to Sea World's management; (4) that MCA has conducted
various financial investigations of Sea World; and (5) that MCA
has explored the effect of its acquisition of Sea World on the lat-
ter's permits held under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.38
However, the Sea World court rejected the subject company's claim on
the ground that it had "not demonstrated any specific merger plans, or
even any possible proposed terms, or that a decision to pursue a merger
[had] actually been made." ' It may be difficult indeed for a subject com-
pany to make such a showing with respect to a well-advised bidder.
In Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.,389 the Fifth Cir-
cuit also considered the sufficiency of a bidder's declaration of intent to
control. The trial court had granted a preliminary injunction which pre-
vented Susquehanna from voting the Pan American stock it had ac-
quired through a tender offer. The grounds for granting the injunction
were that Susquehanna had not complied with section 14(e), in that the
following paragraphs from its Schedule 13D failed adequately to dis-
close its intent to acquire control of the target:
Pan American had 4,751,342 shares of common stock issued
and outstanding as of October 31, 1968. Susquehanna through its
offer intends to purchase 1,800,000 shares at $40 per share,
which, if acquired, should in the opinion of Susquehanna's Man-
agement, give Susquehanna working control of Pan American. If
control is achieved, it is contemplated that the business of Pan
American will be conducted as a subsidiary of Susquehanna
serving as its natural resources arm.
Neither Susquehanna, nor its officers or directors, or any of
their associates has any contracts, arrangements or understand-
ings with respect to the securities of Pan American. However,
Pan American's Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for
cumulative voting, and accordingly ownership of 1,800,000
shares will not insure any representation on the Board of Direc-
tors of Pan American. If, however, Susquehanna acquires
1,800,000 shares pursuant to this Offer, it expects to request
Pan American's Board of Directors to fill the two vacancies now
existing on its Board of Directors with persons designated by
Susquehanna. The designees of Susquehanna will be selected
87 Id. at 90,912.
Id. (emphasis added).
"9 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
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from its directors and officers listed herein. It is possible that
representatives of Pan American will be invited to occupy any
vacant seats on Susquehanna's Board. 9
The Fifth Circuit reversed the granting of a preliminary injunction,
holding that Susquehanna's disclosures with respect to its intent to con-
trol were entirely adequate.91 Nonetheless, the case does illustrate the
difficulties that a bidder can experience. Had the district court in Sus-
quehanna enjoined the consummation of a proposed tender offer, the
results might have been problematic, given the legitimate timing con-
siderations involved in most tender offers from the bidder's perspective.
Thus, it is important that the language in a Schedule 13D or 14D-1 and
tender offer materials be as clear as possible, although it is indeed dif-
ficult to envision what more Susquehanna could have done to forestall
the district court's improvident granting of an injunction.
Cauble v. White... involved a clearer case of inadequate disclosure. In
his newspaper advertisements for the tender offer, the bidder stated:
"The purpose of the transaction is to acquire 150,000 of the 315,000 out-
standing shares of the bank. This is less than control. '393 In a revised
tender offer, which also appeared in the press, the bidder stated: "If Mr.
Cauble purchases 150,000 shares of the Bank's stock pursuant to this Of-
fer, he will not have acquired pursuant hereto a majority of the out-
standing shares of the Bank's stock, but such acquisition may result in
Mr. Cauble being able to effectively control the Bank." '394 The Cauble
court held that the disclosures in both advertisements were inadequate:
It was clear from the testimony of Mr. Cauble that, while he
knew at the time of both newspaper notices that 150,000 shares
was not numerical control, he was virtually certain that a suc-
cessful purchase of that number of shares would allow him effec-
tive control, and he intended that result. Neither notice made it
clear that plaintiff's intention was to assume control of the
bank.15
Moreover, the Cauble court rejected the defendant's contention that
390 Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
391 See also Vaughn v. Teledyne Corp., 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980) (corporate
officials have no duty to disclose the precise motive for a series of acquisitions
and an issuer tender offer because the reasons, increasing percentage of control
and earnings, are obvious); Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Corp., 510 F. Supp. 554
(D.D.C. 1981) (acquirer's statement that its present purpose was to acquire a
significant minority interest, and separate statement that it was prepared to ex-
plore the possibility of acquisition, was sufficient disclosure to satisfy section
13(d)).
360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973).
Id. at 1025.
394 Id.
395 Id.
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his use of the word "may" was proper because achievement of control
was not absolutely certain at the time of the offer. What is required is
disclosure of the bidder's own intent. The Cauble court may have been
especially stringent in its disclosure requirements because of its con-
cern for the shareholders of the target bank, who were primarily "local"
people to whom a change in control of the bank would have been
especially relevant.9
b. Changes in the Target's Business
The bidder's intention to make large-scale changes in the business of
the target is closely related to the intent to control and must be disclosed.
However, the courts have, in general, been somewhat circumspect in ap-
plication of this requirement of Schedule 14D-1. The management of
almost every acquiring company engages in tentative planning for the
post-acquisition operation of the target. Since this planning is often
reflected in computer printouts or other written materials, the subject
company has a ready source of non-disclosed information with which to
block tender offers if the disclosure requirements as to this issue were
expansively construed. The courts have, therefore, repeatedly held that
tentative plans for the target need not be disclosed. 97 Indeed, as the
Second Circuit has noted, it "would be as serious an infringement of
these regulations to overstate the definiteness of the plans as to
understate them. 396
However, in Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,99 the
bidder, United, disclosed that it "has not formulated any plan or pro-
396 Of course, if substantial obstacles to the exercise of control exist (e.g., ex-
change restrictions or joint venture agreements) such matters are required to be
disclosed if the stated purpose of the offer is to gain control. E.g., Alaska In-
terstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
31' E.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., 503 F. Supp. 1122
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (acquirer not required to state how it would vote on an upcoming
merger proposal, nor that it would have the determinative votes if the tender of-
fer succeeded); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,255 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (bidder's failure to disclose intent to replace sub-
ject company's current management and liquidate certain properties was merely
a "technical" violation), aff'd, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Susquehanna Corp. v.
Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) (tentative negotiations for the
merger of subject company into third corporation); Alaska Interstate Co. v.
McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975) (merger proposals submitted to
lenders); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(tentative discussions as to disposition of certain assets and dismissal of certain
officers of the subject company).
... Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948
(2d Cir. 1969). See also Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., [1981 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,993 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbritton,
[1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,899 (D.D.C. 1981).
405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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posal to merge the [subject company, Otis] with United."' In September,
1975 United had approached management of Otis to propose a friendly
merger. Otis rebuffed this overture, but the trial court found that this
did not result in the cancellation of United's ultimate merger plans. The
initial plan contemplated a cash tender offer for approximately 40% of
Otis' common stock (the offer was for up to 5 5%) to be followed by an
exchange offer. Finding that "a merger plan, if present, is per se
material under the Williams Act," the Otis Elevator court held:
There can be no doubt that the plan at issue here is the type
of plan which, though prospective, is material under Sonesta and
thus must be disclosed. The documents discussed by the Court
above clearly indicate that the [initial merger] plan was highly
developed and was ready for execution. While evidence which
negates is so often difficult to produce, the Court must neverthe-
less note that there is little or no documentary evidence that
United intended to pursue solely the cash tender offer."1
Since there existed an intent on the part of the senior executive officers
of United to go forward with the initial merger plan, such intent could
be imputed to United, even though its board of directors, while put on
notice of such plan, had not formally approved it."0 2 Therefore, the
district court granted Otis' motion for a preliminary injunction. 1
By comparison, in Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American
Dredging Co.,4 °4 the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held that the bidder had not violated section 14(e) when it
stated that it "may propose a possible merger or combination.""4 The
bidder was able to refute the subject company's contentions to the con-
trary by proving that it, somewhat surprisingly, did not know the sub-
ject company's corporate requirements for a merger and that any con-
solidation was contingent on future economic developments.
Although no court has so stated expressly, the decided cases indicate
that, when the bidder's plans are likely to have an adverse impact on
the target, more extensive disclosure of less definite plans seems to be
required. Thus, for example, in General Host Corp. v. Triumph
American, Inc., 6 the bidder was alleged to have failed to disclose its
plans to liquidate certain assets of the subject company upon successful
completion of the tender offer. The plaintiff introduced memoranda
which had been circulated among Triumph American executives. These
40 Id. at 963.
401 Id. at 970.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 974.
404 [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
... Id. at 93,494.
40 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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memoranda discussed various alternative plans involving the liquidation
of assets. The General Host court stated that, without more, there
would have been no duty on the bidder to divulge the contingent plan-
ning which had occurred. '0
The General Host court held, however, that the past history of
Triumph American acquisitions dictated a different result. In a prior
transaction, Triumph had purchased Resolute Insurance Company and
immediately declared a large cash dividend. The General Host court
agreed with the target's contention that the combination of the memo-
randa and the bidder's history made it likely that the bidder would liqui-
date certain assets of the target to pay for the cost of the acquisition. 8
The contents of the memoranda and the history of the Resolute acquisi-
tion were held to be material facts which should have been disclosed to
the target's shareholders under section 14(e).40 9
An even more stringent standard of disclosure was applied in
Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc. 410 In a meeting with the target's manage-
ment, the president of the prospective bidder stated that he would pay
"anything" for the shares held by the subject company's directors and
threatened to institute proceedings to dissolve the subject company if
he failed to get control. The subject company later obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction against acquisition of shares by the bidder on the
ground that the bidder should have filed an amended Schedule 13D in
which its plans to dissolve the target were disclosed. The result in the
case can perhaps be explained as an over-reaction by the court to the de-
fendant's heavy-handed tactics. The bidder's plans for dissolution ap-
pear to have been a contingent threat designed to bluff the target's
management into capitulating.1 '
As indicated above, limitations on the scope of disclosures required in
the "change in business" requirements do, of course, exist. In Coreno
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons,"2 for example, the Second Circuit disagreed
with the subject company's contention that the bidder was likely to con-
vert the subject company's assets into cash in order to repay bank loans
and should have disclosed that possibility. The combined income of the
407 But see Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
408 359 F. Supp. 749, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"' See also Matter of Susquehanna Corp., SEC Rel. No. 34-8933 (1971) (plans to
use cash assets of the target to finance the tender offer inferred from the conduct
of the bidders' president). But see Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc.,
[1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
4"0 [1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,455 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
411 Counsel for major beneficial owners with possible desires to effect an en-
tire acquisition now carefully coach representatives of such beneficial owners as
to communications with issuers based upon the likelihood that even casual
remarks will be used against the owner in defensive litigation.
4,2 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
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two firms would have more than sufficed to repay the loans. The Coreno
court did state, however: "[E]ven if such a conversion were likely, we
would only require a disclosure of the circumstances rather than a
specific statement that a conversion was likely to occur .... This the
district court had already done by requiring [the offeror] to disclose
financial information about itself ....
In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,"4 the Second Circuit
held that plans to expand the existing business of the subject company
need not be disclosed, no matter how definite those plans might be,
since an expansion does not constitute a "change" in the business.
However, this result is questionable because a decision significantly to
expand the subject company's business would appear to be quite rele-
vant to a decision whether to tender.
A pre-Williams Act case involving Rule 10b-5 might further serve to
limit the scope of the duty to disclose possible "change" in the subject
company's business. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. 415 was an ac-
tion brought by a purchaser of securities against a bidder. The plaintiff
purchased shares of S.H. Kress during the pendency of a tender offer
made by Genesco, the defendant-bidder. The complaint alleged that the
defendant had failed to disclose in the tender offer that Kress's real
estate was undervalued in its financial statements and that Genesco in-
tended to sell these undervalued assets to the Genesco pension fund in
order to finance the acquisition. The plaintiff further alleged that, had
the true facts been known, it would not have purchased the Kress
shares. The Second Circuit ruled against the claim for several reasons.
First, the implication of the plaintiff's case was that, merely by making
a tender offer, the defendants impliedly represented to the world at
large that they would not change the business of the target through
mismanagement (i.e., "looting"). Second, Rule 10b-5 as imposing an affir-
mative duty of disclosure to outsiders was, to the Genesco court, much
too expansive.
In sum, the trend in the cases seems to be at least toward requiring a
bidder to reveal any planned changes in the subject company's business
which would adversely affect the existing shareholders. General Host
and Susquehanna even suggest, at least from a planning perspective,
that a bidder must disclose its history of dealing with acquired firms
where any meaningful thought has been given to similar treatment of
the subject company.
4. Source of Funds
A 5% beneficial owner or bidder is required to disclose the source of
413 Id. at 217.
414 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974).
411 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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funds used or to be used for its purchase or offer unless the lender is a
United States bank acting in the ordinary course of its business, in
which case confidential treatment of the identity of the lender may be
requested pursuant to Item 3 of Schedule 13D or Item 4 of Schedule
14D-1. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 6 the sub-
ject company claimed that the bidder had violated section 14(e) by fail-
ing to disclose that its principal lender, Transamerica, owned virtually
all of the outstanding shares of one of the subject company's com-
petitors. The Transamerica court ordered the bidder to implement cer-
tain prophylactic measures and held that, unless its order was violated,
there was no possibility that the lender would exercise control over
either the bidder or the subject company. Therefore, no disclosure of
the relationship between the lender and the competitor was found to be
necessary. The Transamerica court also ruled that, where the bidder
discloses that it may accept more shares than stated in the offer, it need
not disclose the potential source of funding for the additional purchases
where the source of such funds had not yet been determined.
The second analysis of the source-of-funding disclosure requirement is
contained in Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft."7 In Ronson
the offeror, Liquifin, stated in its original SEC filing that the source of
funding for the cash tender offer would be out of the general working
capital of its parent, Liquigas. In an amended filing, Liquigas disclosed
that the funds would not be Liquigas' working capital, but would come
in part from the proceeds of the sale of an affiliated subsidiary. At an
unspecified date, Liquifin began investing in a Brazilian holding com-
pany, Liquipar. By 1973, Liquifin owned almost 83% of Liquipar. In
March and April 1973, Liquifin sold its Liquipar holdings to another of
Liquigas' wholly owned subsidiaries, Liquimportex Aktiengesellschaft.
Thereafter Liquimportex sold 49% of Liquipar shares to Capitalfin In-
ternational Limited. The proceeds from the sale, twenty million dollars,
were deposited for the tender offer, to the account of Liquifin to pay
part of the Ronson shares. The trial court held that the steps taken in
obtaining the twenty million dollars should have been disclosed on the
ground that the Ronson shareholders had the "right to know" the man-
ner in which such funds were acquired.
The Ronson court subsequently found that curative amendments had
adequately disclosed the sources of funding. Permanent injunctive relief
was therefore denied.41 In so ruling, the Ronson court rejected several
theories advanced by the plaintiff as alleged reasons for Liquifin's com-
plicated financings and held that a bidder must disclose only the facts
416 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
4,7 No. 785 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
[1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,536 (3d Cir. 1974).
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regarding those transactions directly related to the funding of its
tender offer.4"9
The subject company in Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc.420
sought to enjoin an offer on the grounds that the dealer-manager and
lender had supplied the bidder with confidential information regarding
the target's business. With respect to the dealer-manager, the Humana
court was satisfied with the offeror's disclosure that the dealer-manager
possessed certain confidential information regarding the target but had
never revealed it. Although the offeror made no comparable disclosure
regarding the lender, the Humana court was convinced by the testi-
mony of bank officials that they had not considered information supplied
by the target in a prior loan application in approving the tender offer
loan. The Humana court generally observed, however, that "a special
relationship which may be designated fiduciary or confidential, does ex-
ist between a prospective borrower and its bank which should preclude
the bank from disseminating or using [confidential] information for im-
proper purposes."42'
In Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman,42 the trial court refused to dismiss a
claim that Jewelcor's statement that its purchases were to be internally
financed was misleading. The issuer alleged that the purchaser was
already heavily in debt and that business reverses had completely
depleted its operating profits for the relevant fiscal year. Thus, it was
impossible to say that at least some of the purchaser's borrowings may
not have been for the purpose of financing the acquisition. Still, the
Jewelcor court declined to enjoin further purchases since the issuer had
not shown "that it will be unduly harmed by a denial of injunctive
relief."2" Any additional purchases would require an amendment to the
purchaser's Williams Act filing.4"4
In Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg,'' the District Court for the
Southern District of New York strictly construed Item 7 of Schedule
13D, which requires the filing of copies of all written agreements and
contracts relating to the borrowing of funds used to finance acquisitions,
holding that the purchasers failure to file actual copies of its loan agree-
ment violated section 13(d). On another point, the Belzberg court held
that the purchaser did not have to disclose the possible effect that a sale
419 370 F. Supp. at 602-04.
420 [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
421 Id. at 92,829. See infra Section III(C)(7)(d) regarding disclosure of "inside"
information generally.
" 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
4123 Id. at 241.
4.4 See also Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., 503 F. Supp. 1122
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (failure to disclose the possibility of financing purchase via new
loan rather than the disclosed revolving credit line was immaterial).
" 522 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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of the acquired stock might have on the stock's price, stating: "There is
no allegation that such sales are contemplated, and ... [m]oreover, con-
jecture by defendants as to the market consequences of remotely possi-
ble sales would appear to be precisely the type of speculation not prop-
erly included in a factual disclosure document such as Schedule 13D."'426
Two decisions to the effect that an acquirer's Schedule 13D filing
need not disclose every creditor but only the borrowings undertaken for
the purpose of acquiring stock are Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Internationa4
Inc., '27 and Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomling."' In Riggs National Bank
v. Allbritton,4" however, the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that a natural person making a tender offer for a national bank's
stock had to disclose considerably more financial information.4"' In addi-
tion to the "usual" financial information concerning indebtedness incur-
red in financing the acquisition, specifically including the default provi-
sion in the loan agreement, the Allbritton court held that the bidder
was required to disclose his estimated net worth, the value of his major
assets, the schedule of interest payments and the anticipated source of
their payments and other alternatives for repayment of the principal
amount of the loan. 31
5. The Bidder's Financial Condition
One of the most interesting developments in the area of tender offer
disclosure occurred in Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons. 32 In Corenco,
the trial court and the Second Circuit each held that section 14(e) re-
42 Id. at 43.
427 510 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981).
428 [1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,606 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
[1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,899 (D.D.C. 1981).
430 Id. at 90,557.
431 Item 4(b)(2) of Schedule 14D-1 now requires the offeror to:
Briefly describe any plans or arrangement to finance or repay [any
tender offer borrowings], or if no such plans or arrangements have been
made, make a statement to that effect.
It has been held that a bidder's statement of intent to repay borrowings from
future financings, together with the disclosure that it had made no arrangements
or understandings with respect to any refinancing, was sufficient disclosure
under Item 4(b)(2), at least where the subject company had not shown any un-
disclosed facts indicating an inability to refinance the debt. Dymo Indus. v.
Esselte AB, No. 2276 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1978). In Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v.
Hi-Shear Indus., 503 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the offeror's disclosure pur-
suant to Item 4 concerning the loan agreements into which it had entered in order
to finance its tender offer, and its statement that it intended to finance the offer
from a revolving line of credit when it may actually have intended to float a dif-
ferent loan for this purpose, were held not materially misleading.
432 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,220 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.), on
remand, [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,220 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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quired a bidder to disclose its own financial statements, notwithstand-
ing that the SEC's rules were silent on the topic at the time, because 1)
the bidder was not subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act and its financial reports were not otherwise available to
the public; 2) the bidder sought to control the subject company; 3) a
merger of the two firms was contemplated; and 4) the bidder sought less
than all of the subject company's outstanding shares. The bidder did
subsequently disclose financial statements for two years which was held
to be sufficient.
Perhaps taking its cue from Corenco, the SEC modified its re-
quirements to require the inclusion of financial statements "if material"
in Schedule 14D-1 filings.433 If the bidder is a reporting company it can
satisfy these requirements by cross reference; and it will, of course, be
rare that a bidder in a contested tender offer will be exempt from the
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. However, it appears that
a mere cross reference would not be deemed to constitute adequate
disclosure in tender offer materials actually disseminated to stock-
holders of the subject company.434
The SEC has provided no meaningful guidance as to when a failure to
include financial statements would be a "material" omission. However,
Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian.5 may be helpful in this regard. In
Alaska Interstate the subject company claimed that the bidder should
have specifically disclosed its financial condition because 1) the offer
was made for less than all of the subject company's outstanding equity
securities, 2) the offer contemplated a "second step" acquisition, and 3)
the bidder was in a precarious financial position. The trial court found,
however, that the subject company had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to support the latter claim:
Accordingly, this is not a situation where the general statement
of the offeror's business operations is misleading because it im-
pliedly represents, contrary to the fact, that the offeror is a via-
ble business organization and is not beset by any problem which
casts in doubt its ability to consummate its offer. Accordingly,
so far as the present record discloses, Apco and Energy have no
substantial prospect of success on this issue unless it can be said
that the Williams Act is violated whenever one who tenders for
less than all of the stock and proposes an acquisition of the tar-
, See Item 9 of Schedule 14D-1.
'' The SEC's rules are somewhat unclear as to whether a cross-reference
would suffice. Instruction 2 to Item 9 of Schedule 14D-1 permits incorporation by
reference "solely for the purposes of this Schedule." Rule 14d-6(e)(1)(viii) expressly
permits the use of summary financial statements in tender offer materials fur-
nished to security holders. It is seemingly implicit therein that incorporation by
reference is not adequate by itself.
... 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
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get corporation for its own securities fails to provide its finan-
cials in the tender materials.438
With respect to this question, the Alaska Interstate court held:
Given (1) the judgment of the [SEC] and the apparent ration-
ale for its distinction between cash and exchange offers, (2) the
fact that financial information about Alaska sufficient for the
purpose of general evaluation is readily available to Apco
stockholders, (3) the fact that nothing has been shown about
Alaska's recent history which would make the publicly available
financials materially misleading, and (4) the fact that no affirma-
tive representations were made with respect to Alaska's finan-
cial history or prospects (other than an opinion with respect to
debt service), I find no legal basis for implying a duty to include
financials in Alaska's tender materials."'7
However, subsequent decisions have not viewed the bidder's dis-
closure obligations so narrowly. In Prudent Real Estate Trust v.
Johncamp Realty, Inc., a  the Second Circuit preliminarily enjoined a
tender offer pending corrected and supplemented disclosure, including
disclosure of financial statements of all controlling persons of the of-
feror. The Johncamp court reasoned:
[I]t is necessary to appreciate the problem faced by a stock-
holder of the target company in deciding whether to tender, to
sell or to hold part or all of his securities. It is true that, in the
case of an "any and all" offer such as that here at issue, a stock-
holder who has firmly decided to tender has no interest in the
financial position of the offeror other than its ability to pay-a
point not here at issue-since he will have severed all financial
connections with the target. It is also true that in the case of
such an offer, there is less reason for him to seek to eliminate
the risk of being partly in and partly out by selling to arbi-
trageurs, usually at a price somewhere between the previous
market and the offered price, than where the offer is for a
stated number or percentage of the shares (with or without the
right to accept additional shares) or is conditioned on a minimum
number being obtained. Still, the shareholder of the target com-
pany faces a hard problem in determining the most advantage-
ous course of action, a problem whose difficulty is enhanced by
his usual ignorance of the course other shareholders are adop-
ting. If the bidder is in a flourishing financial condition, the
stockholder might decide to hold his shares in the hope that, if
the offer was only partially successful, the bidder might raise its
43 Id. at 547-48.
,.. Id. at 548.
43 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979).
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bid after termination of the offer or infuse new capital into the
enterprise. Per contra, a poor financial condition of the bidder
might cause the shareholder to accept for fear that control of
the company would pass into irresponsible hands."9
A similar result obtained in Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding,
N. V. "' In Life Investors, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that, contrary to Johncamp, if the bidder "was purchasing all the stock,
a stockholder would have relatively little concern for the bidder's finan-
cial condition." '41 However, the Life Investors court held that financial
statement disclosures were required because the bid at issue was only
partial and would, if successful, give the bidder operating control over
the subject company.4 After Life Investors and Johncamp, a plausible
argument can be made in almost any situation that financial statements
must be disclosed.
6. Control Persons
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft,43 is the only decision
that has discussed in detail the requirement of disclosing persons in con-
trol of the bidder. The bidder and its alleged controlling shareholder,
Ursini, were enmeshed in a complex tangle of stock and credit relation-
ships with a variety of persons and entities. The subject company's con-
tention that these relationships should have been disclosed was accepted
by the district court and provided one basis for its granting of a pre-
liminary injunction against the offeror. The Ronson court accepted the
plaintiff's argument that numerous persons or groups can be deemed to
be in control of an entity and that all such persons or groups should be
disclosed. The Ronson court went further, concluding that the identity
of large lenders and others closely related to the controlling persons
should be disclosed, even if they could not be deemed to be strictly in
"control." Such disclosures were, in the Ronson court's opinion,
necessary for the shareholders' understanding of the degree of control
exercised by Ursini. Liquifin's amended offer to purchase was later
found to have adequately disclosed its controlling person's interrelation-
ships, and the Ronson court ultimately held that Ronson had failed to
prove that anyone but Ursini was in actual control of Liquifin. 4"
... Id. at 1147.
440 [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981).
441 Id. at 92,195.
442 Id. at 92,195-96.
44' No. 785 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 483 F.2d 846 & 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
44 Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin, A.G., 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), aff'd, [1973-74
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,536 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (control was open
question despite ownership of 30% of offeror's stock because the offeror and
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Bidders have not been required to disclose the degree of control
possessed by controlling persons in absolute terms. For example, in
Gray Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simmons, "5 the District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio held adequate a disclosure that a particular individ-
ual "may be deemed to control" the nominal bidder notwithstanding
that the true controlling person's own prior public statements had flatly
stated that that individual was in actual control as a result of stock
ownership, positions as the principal executive officer in each of the con-
trolled entities and family relationships among officers and directors in
the control group. The result in Gray Drug may be questionable in view
of those prior statements.
7. Miscellaneous Disclosure Issues
a. Misleading Publicity
The Wall Street Journal's "Heard On the Street" column published a
report in 1969 of a possible tender offer for Electronic Specialty Com-
pany by International Controls Corporation. The column exaggerated
both International Controls' holdings in Electronic Specialty and the
proposed offering price. International Controls believed that the infor-
mation in the column had been planted by Electronic Specialty in an ef-
fort to force a curative disclosure and thereby obtain advance disclo-
sure. In Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.," the
Second Circuit held that there is no obligation on a company to correct
misstatements in the press which were not attributable to it, particu-
larly when the information relates to its plans for another company."7
In Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs.,"' the
Second Circuit held that the offeror, Wellington, was not required to
disclose that it had been named by the New York Post and other papers
as the owner of properties which were used by pornographers and pros-
titutes. Sonesta claimed that Wellington's "bad reputation" could
adversely reflect upon its own reputation and thereby damage its busi-
ness. However, Wellington denied the allegations and had instituted a
libel action against the newspaper. Under the circumstances, the Second
Circuit held that there was no duty to repeat statements which Well-
ington considered false. 4'9
target had no common directors); SEC v. Zimmerman, 407 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C.
1976) (failure to disclose prime actor in Section 13(d)(3) group held an omission of
a material fact).
,.. [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,305 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 1981).
"1 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
,4 See also Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
,4' 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
"4 The sensational, but seemingly immaterial nature of the allegations in
Sonesta very likely affected the outcome.
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b. Foreign Offerors
In Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft,5" a preliminary in-
junction was granted against a proposed tender offer because of alleged
violations of sections 14(d) and 14(e). The alleged violations consisted in
part of non-disclosures by the bidder of adverse legal ramifications
which could result from the success of the proposed offer. The plaintiff
subject company alleged that foreign tax laws applicable to the bidder
would adversely affect the subject company's operations. The trial court
reserved a detailed exploration of that issue for trial, but held that the
plaintiff had made a sufficient showing to justify granting a preliminary
injunction. The possible presence of foreign control over the subject
company was perceived as raising "substantial questions of administra-
tive law" which could result in the loss of licenses from the FCC and
CAB, as well as several important defense contracts.45 The Ronson
court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the defendants
had made arrangements through voting trusts and the like, which were
adequate to forestall the adverse consequences. Rather, the defendants'
characterization of these problems as "routine" in their offer to pur-
chase was found sufficiently misleading to justify the entire tender of-
fer. In affirming the trial court on this issue, the Third Circuit stated:
Although the district court was justified in commenting that the
tender offer presented to federal authorities "very substantial
questions of administrative law", which the tender offer, as mod-
ified prior to the July 5 injunction, misleadingly treated as if
probably subject to resolution without divestiture of the heli-
copter and defense business, we agree with defendants that
clearance from the several administrative agencies involved
need not be secured prior to a final tender offer, provided that
the approximate gross amounts, type, profits, etc., of Ronson's
business affected, which may be permissibly revealed in the
light of the security needs of the defense business as determined
by the district court, are disclosed."2
Thus, the Ronson court established a rather specific list of requirements
for disclosure of possible adverse effect upon the target's business. In
fact, the list was sufficiently precise that the injunction was later dis-
solved upon a finding that Liquifin's amended tender offer had brought
it into compliance with the statutory requirements.
General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc. "' is another case involv-
... No. 785 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 483 F.2d 846 & 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
451 See supra Section III(C)(2) (discussing the effect of regulatory approval re-
quirements).
452 Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin A.G., 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), aff'd, [1973-74
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,536 (3d Cir. 1974).
... 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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ing non-disclosure of the possible adverse impact of foreign investment.
Triumph American, the bidder, was a British holding company subject
to British statutes which conferred power on the United Kingdom
Treasury to compel parent corporations to declare or withhold divi-
dends from their subsidiaries. The existence of these statutes was not
revealed in the tender offer. Triumph American asserted that the laws
were, in effect, "dead letters" and, therefore, that it was highly unlikely
that they would have an adverse impact on the target. However, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
shareholders are entitled to know that these laws exist and could be en-
forced in a manner which might adversely affect General Host. Since
the "reasonable investor" is unlikely to be familiar with foreign law, a
tender offer by a foreign corporation should call such laws to the inves-
tor's attention.?
Finally, in Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., ' the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas rejected the subject com-
pany's contention that the federal courts should protect American busi-
ness from the threat of foreign takeovers by holding them "illegal per
se" because of the allegedly inherent conflicts between the bidder's in-
terests and those of the American shareholders and the'nation as a
whole. In the trial court's opinion, such policy questions were incapable
of judicial resolution. The trial court also held that a Texas statute re-
quiring "international trading companies" to be controlled by United
States citizens did not apply to the target. The court noted that such
statutes are of dubious constitutional validity.
c. Delisting from a Stock Exchange
In Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs.,45 the
Second Circuit held that the defendant bidder's failure to disclose the
possibility that a successful tender offer could result in the subject com-
pany's common stock being delisted from the NYSE was a material
... The facts that the financial statements of a foreign bidder are prepared
using foreign accounting concepts and amounts are stated in foreign currency
have been used as the basis for an argument that such statements are required to
be disclosed. E.g., Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N.V., [1981-82 Decs.] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981). However, these facts should
have nothing to do with the question of whether disclosure is required in the first
instance. Moreover, it is not likely that a foreign bidder would be required to
restate its financial statements in United States dollars or under United States
accounting principles provided that adequate information on exchange rates and
the differences between United States and foreign accounting principles is pro-
vided. Id.
366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
456 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). Since Sonesta, rather detailed disclosures
relating to the possibility of delisting and, in any event, the effect of a tender
offer on the market for the subject company's shares have become customary.
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omission. If Wellington, the bidder, had achieved the stated goal of its
tender offer, the publicly held Sonesta stock would be reduced below
NYSE standards in both number of shareholders and aggregate value.
The trial court had ruled that the possibility of delisting was too specu-
lative, relying on the fact that the ultimate success of the offer was
uncertain. The appellate court, however, held that the possibility should
have been disclosed in view of the importance which Sonesta share-
holders would attach to the listing privilege. The fact that Wellington's
offer was not as successful as anticipated did not render an injunction
meaningless, inasmuch as future offers would again subject Sonesta to
possible delisting.457 Conversely, where delisting might reasonably be
said to be a possible result of a successful tender offer, a statement to
that effect should not be deemed to be misleading. Still, the argument
could be made to the effect that such a statement, where the likelihood
of delisting is remote, unfairly coerces shareholders into tendering.
d. Inside Information
Since the decision of the Second Circuit in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co.,4  target companies have frequently brought litigation
alleging that a bidder could not proceed without disclosing nonpublic in-
formation in its possession. '59 While "specifically quantifiable
information relating to contingent events" may require disclosure,
forecasts or projections involving "subjective judgments" have been
held not to be required disclosures where the information appears to be
soft and unreliable."' Thus, it may be that valuations and other informa-
tion based upon estimates and judgments should not be required to be dis-
closed in most cases for the same reasons that companies are not required
to publish projections and other "soft" information in registration
statements and reports. However, the courts have been inconsistent in
this area. In Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc.,"1 for example, mo-
... In addition, Wellington certainly did not expect its offer to be unsuccessful
at the time that the offer was initiated.
"' 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (Rule
10b-5).
,' Indeed, one defensive tactic has been for potential target companies
deliberately to provide inside information to potential suitors in order to create
disclosure problems for them in the event that they were to initiate hostile bids.
Confidentiality agreements have also been used in this regard. E.g., General
Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S.A., No. 1060 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981). But
see Conoco, Inc. v. Seagrams Co., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,234
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1981). Persons obtaining information with respect to a planned
but unannounced takeover bid are now prohibited from trading on the basis of
that information under Rule 14e-3.
"® E.g., Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
46 456 F. Supp. 484, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also Radol v. Thomas, No. 13
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1982); General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S.A., No.
1060 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981).
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tions for summary judgment by both sides were denied on claims that a
bidder which was also the majority shareholder of the subject company
failed to disclose a third party's estimates of the target company's
worth. Yet in Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N V, 4 62 the Iowa
District Court held that a bidder which had access to nonpublic informa-
tion via representation but not control of the subject company's board of
directors was only required to disclose the nature of its relationship to
the subject company, not the fact of such access.4' Thus, the re-
quirements in this context are as yet unclear.6 4
IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. Public Statements
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 14e-2, the Williams Act had been
construed not to impose any obligation on the subject company to re-
spond to a tender offer."' Subject companies did, of course, frequently
issue advertisements and press releases in resisting unsolicited take-
over bids and thus were subject to the filing requirements of Rule 14d-9
(except with respect to so-called stop-look-and-listen communications)46
482 [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,343 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,356 (8th Cir.
Oct. 21, 1981).
.63 The use of confidential information obtained by banks from subject com-
panies in loan applications has also not been deemed to preclude a bank from also
financing a tender offer for a client company's stock provided that such informa-
tion is not disclosed to the bidder. See, e.g., Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp.,
602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., [1977-78
Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); American Medicorp, Inc.
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
'" See generally Hi-Shear Corp. v. Klaus, No. 434 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1974)
(purchase of shares pursuant to a tender offer enjoined on ground that offer to
purchase contained confidential material about the target in hands of a
defendant-director of target company), vacated per order, No. 74-2665 (9th Cir.
Oct. 1, 1974) (target had not proven money damages were insufficient). Cf. Sun-
shine Mining Co. v. Great W. United Corp., [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,049, at 91,721 (D. Idaho 1977).
"4 E.g., A & K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636,
644 (E.D. Wis. 1977); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 79-80 (1977). Rule 13e-2 does not actually
require that the target company take a position either for or against a tender of-
fer (neutrality is explicitly permitted).
"' Rule 14d-9(e) provides:
This section shall not apply to the subject company with respect to a
communication by the subject company to its security holders which on-
ly:
(1) Identifies the tender offer by the bidder;
(2) States that such tender offer is under consideration by the subject
company's board of directors and/or management;
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and the general antifraud prohibitions of section 14(e). 4"7 In fact, subject
company management has been held to a stricter standard of disclosure
than the bidder because of state law fiduciary obligations and, at least
with respect to some issues, greater access to information than the
bidder." 8
Accordingly, if the subject company makes material misstatements or
omits material information in its SEC filings or shareholder communi-
cations, the bidder can seek injunctive relief.4 9 In this regard it has
been held that the filing requirements of section 14(d)(4) may apply even
if a tender offer has not formally been published; all that is necessary is
the announcement of an intent to commence a tender offer. 7 °
(3) States that on or before a specified date (which shall be no later
than 10 business days from the date of commencement of such
tender offer) the subject company will advise such security holders
of (i) whether the subject company recommends acceptance or rejec-
tion of such tender offer; expresses no opinion and remains neutral
toward such tender offer; or is unable to take a position with
respect to such tender offer and (ii) the reason(s) for the position
taken by the subject company with respect to the tender offer (in-
cluding the inability to take a position); and
(4) Requests such security holders to defer making a determination
whether to accept or reject such tender offer until they have been
advised of the subject company's position with respect thereto pur-
suant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section.
41 See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F.
Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d
851, 874-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); SEC v. Royal Indus.,
[1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,773 (D.D.C. 1976) (consent decree).
4" E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1328-29 (W.D. Mich.
1978). See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 456 F. Supp. 484, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See
generally Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364-65 (2d
Cir.) ("Corporate insiders .. . have a special responsibility to be meticulous and
precise in their representations to shareholders."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973).
469 See supra Section I(B)(5)(b) (discussing the "commencement" concept under
Rule 14d-2). See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851
(2d Cir)., cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974) (injunction granted on grounds of the
subject company's failure to disclose that all shareholders would benefit from any
increase in the offering price under section 14(d)(7)); Petersen v. Federated Dev.
Co., 387 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp.
125 (D. Ore. 1974) (injunctive relief granted against officer who falsely repre-
sented that he had received an offer for his shares at a price which was double
that of the offeror); Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973) (officer
who asserted that target's shares were worth $100 without any factual basis re-
quired to make a curative disclosure). See generally Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman,
397 F. Supp. 221, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Rule 10b-5); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom; an Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lynch
& Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics In Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 901 (1979).
470 Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). But see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (no
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The subject company's management may, of course, make critical
comments about the terms of the offer or the bidder, so long as some
reasonable factual basis exists therefor. Thus, in Graphic Sciences, Inc.
v. International Mogul Mines Ltd.,47' the subject company's annual
report characterized the statements in the bidder's Schedule 13D as
misleading and inaccurate. The trial court, in an action brought by the
issuer as to which the purchaser asserted the equitable defense of "un-
clean hands," found such statements to be proper under the circum-
stances:
The Court has reviewed these statements carefully. It finds that
these statements constitute no more than the views of Graphic
management as expressed in this case. Those views are not ex-
pressed in an inflammatory or misleading way. Management cer-
tainly may express its views and do so in a restrained manner,
as here. Such conduct does not constitute "unclean hands."47
In this regard, it should be noted that the opinion of an outside invest-
ment banker who evaluates the merits of a particular offer will not be
considered a misrepresentation unless the subject company intentional-
ly caused a false statement to be issued, or unless the information on
which the opinion was based either was false or was omitted from the
materials distributed to shareholders."7
However, a subject company, or a competing bidder, may not state
section 14(e) liability where tender offer not actually commenced). Of course, cer-
tain public announcements now constitute the "commencement" of a tender offer
under Rule 14d-2(b). See supra Section I(B)(5)(b).
"' 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974).
472 Id. at 127. See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d
851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974) (where the terms of the offer were
confusing as to withdrawal rights, the bidder cannot complain of the subject com-
pany's warning that the shareholders would be "locked in" by the offer); Berman
v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (alleged antitrust and
securities problems were held to justify the subject company's statement that
the tender offer was not in the shareholders' best interests); Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (statement that offer raised antitrust problems held not false and
misleading). But see generally Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,139-43 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (finding statements
by the subject company on the following topics violative of sections 14(d) and
14(e): 1) the possibility that bidder would utilize the target's earnings to finance
its "tremendously heavy debt structure"; 2) the size of the bidder-i.e., that it
was "smaller" -because only one factor, net sales, was used; 3) the action of the
board upon the advice of an investment banker-because there was not sufficient
time for careful analysis; 4) the subject company's unwarranted projections as to
earnings; 5) the subject company's failure to disclose the personal interests of its
officers and directors in resisting the bid; 6) the subject company's statement
that soliciting brokers will receive "double commissions"; and 7) the subject com-
pany's statement as to the purpose of a proposed defensive acquisition).
... E.g., Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,606, at 94,591 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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mere opinions in absolute terms.74 Several cases have considered the
question whether the subject company may lawfully term the offeror's
price "inadequate." A negative answer was given by the Second Circuit
in Chris-Craft.75 The management of the subject company, Piper Air-
craft, opposed Chris-Craft's tender offer and characterized its offering
price as "inadequate." At the time this communication was sent to the
shareholders, Piper shares were trading a price substantially below that
offered by'Chris-Craft. Piper's own expert advisors had opined that the
price was "fair and equitable," and Piper management was seriously
considering selling its own shares for the same price to another com-
pany. The latter facts serve to distinguish Chris-Craft from most other
cases in which target companies term an offer "inadequate."
For example, in Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons Inc.,' the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the subject com-
pany's characterization of the offer as "inadequate" was permissible
since the bidder's dealer-manager had recommended a higher price and
the price was below book value. The Corenco court characterized the
term "inadequate" as "highly subjective" and, hence, permissible to use
so long as some supporting grounds existed therefor.'"
B. Other Defensive Tactics
Many of the classic defensive tactics have been considered in
Williams Act litigation.'78 The Cargill court, for example, held that a
subject company could permissibly enter into long-term employment
contracts with its officers and directors within a few hours after learn-
ing of a forthcoming tender offer.7 ' Moreover, that court held that infor-
474 E.g., Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
... Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
476 362 F. Supp. 939, 951 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1973).
471 Id. at 951. See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.
1981) (subject company's press release describing the offer price as inadequate
was not deceptive in light of evidence that a higher price could have been obtain-
ed). But see Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,863, at 91,144 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("Where management and directors of a
target company, in fighting a tender offer, describe an item such as the price of
the offer as 'inadequate' or 'not in the best interests of shareholders' without
disclosing that they have no reasonable basis for such a statement, a violation of
the 1934 Act occurs."); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (subject company must at least
furnish shareholders with information it has received if it terms an offer "inade-
quate").
478 See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc, v. American Dredging Co.,
[1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,414 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
... Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
1982]
109Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
mation regarding such contracts is not "material" to an offeree's deci-
sion and, therefore, need not be disclosed.O Similar results obtained in
Altman v. Knight48' and Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul
Mines Ltd. 482 In the latter case, the subject company entered into long-
term contracts with its key executives, replaced a nonaffiliated director
with an officer, and entered into finder's fee arrangements whereby its
remaining nonaffiliated directors would be compensated for arranging a
friendly merger. These facts were disclosed in the annual report. The
Graphic Sciences court held that none of the target's activities
amounted to the type of "unclean hands" activity that would preclude it
from obtaining injunctive relief."3
A subject company may also increase dividends in the face of a tender
offer, even though the increase may represent a departure from prior
policies, provided that a reasonable business reason exists for the ac-
tion.4u Finally, the facts that a bidder engaged in industrial espionage or
had "cornered the market" in proxy-solicitation firms so as allegedly to
deprive a subject company of an effective opportunity to respond were
held not to be actionable in Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp.485 Presumably, the same result would obtain as to
similar conduct by subject companies.
Stock repurchases have also generally been upheld, absent fraud or
manipulation.8 ' However, such transactions are now subject to section
13(e) and Rule 13e-1.487 Given that the rule only prescribes certain dis-
closures relating to such transactions, it would appear that nothing in
the Williams Act should be said to prohibit them provided that such
disclosures are made.
" If "material," Item 3(b) of Schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure of contracts be-
tween the subject company and, among others, executive officers of the company.
Rule 14d-9(c) requires that such disclosure (or a "fair and adequate summary") be
furnished to shareholders (although a cross-reference to a disclosure in a proxy
statement furnished to shareholders within the prior year will suffice). Most sub-
ject companies decide to disclose executive employment contracts in Schedule
14D-9 filings notwithstanding the Cargill court's analysis.
481 [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,040, amended, 431 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
482 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974).
Id. at 127.
' See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Decs.] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
485 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank,
371 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1974).
4 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). But see Or-
banco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1974).
487 Rule 13e-1 literally applies only to the "issuer" (defined in section 3(a)(8) of
the Exchange Act as the person issuing subject securities). Accordingly, it would
appear that entities other than the statutorily defined "issuer" could engage in
repurchase transactions without respect to the requirements of the Rule. But see
SEC v. Grumman Corp., No. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1981) (complaint alleging
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As was discussed in Section I above,88 prior to the decision of the Cir-
cuit Court in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,489 the prevailing view had
been that, absent fraud or deception or "manipulation" within the mean-
ing of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,4 90 charges of corporate un-
fairness were actionable only under state law49' and that federal law was
not implicated so long as all material facts were disclosed and subject
company shareholders were not deceived.49 ' While the discussion of the
scope of section 14(e) and cases such as Marathon need not be repeated
in this Section, a few issues of particular relevance to defensive actions
will be analyzed here.
Before Marathon, a number of federal courts had begun to borrow
certain state fiduciary principles in analyzing claims brought against de-
violations of sections 13(e), 14(d) and 14(e), and Rules 13e-1 and 14d-9 arising out
of, among other things, repurchases of subject company common stock by its
principal pension plan, the trustees for which were all executive officers of such
company, after commencement of a hostile tender offer).
" See supra Section I(D)(2).
,89 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
4- 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
491 From early beginnings, e.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F.
Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the law has evolved to the point that it is now clear that
subject company directors not only have the right but the duty to oppose a
takeover bid which would harm the corporate enterprise or is inadequate from a
financial point of view. E.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977).
A necessary corollary of this duty is that actions taken in response to a
takeover bid will be presumed to be valid, even if it can be shown that one of the
motives therefore was retention in office. E.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 1980); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del.
Ch. 1977). But see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,375 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981). But see generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981).
Based upon this legal formulation, defensive manuevers, including tactics that
could be referred to as "lock-ups," have survived judicial scrutiny under state
law. E.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 4787 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1981); GM
Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1981). A similar
analysis was recently adopted by Judge Kinneary (although he imposed the
burden of proof upon the defendant directors) in the highly publicized battle for
control of Marathon Oil Company. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-82 Decs.]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd on other grounds, 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
... E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1981);
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 1979);
Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Sunshine Mining Co.
Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods., 454 F.
Supp. 1310, 1318, 1321 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). See Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764
(8th Cir. 1978); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 954 (1976) (a pre-Santa Fe Rule 10b-5 decision). See also E. ARANOW, H.
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fensive actions under section 14(e). In Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co. , for
example, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that defensive maneuvers would violate section 14(e) if their "sole
reason" was to defeat a tender offer. 9' In a subsequent opinion the
Crane court refused to decide whether the same result would obtain if
the "primary" purpose was tender offer defense, since the claim failed
under either test.'95 In Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., a proposed
exchange offer between a subject company and a White Knight was up-
held where it was undertaken to facilitate a prior merger proposal and
to thwart a hostile tender offer conditioned upon the abandonment of
the merger.
The question of whether a breach of state law fiduciary duties can be
turned into a disclosure violation, based upon a failure to disclose the
alleged breach, has yet to be resolved under the federal securities
laws. '97 The overall relationship between state and federal concepts is
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 205, nn.41 & 46 (1977); McIntyre, Shareholders' Recourse Under
Federal Securities Law Against Management for Opposing Advantageous
Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAW. 1283, 1293-94 (1979). But see, e.g., Applied Digital
Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (issuance of
stock designed to thwart a tender offer was deemed violative of § 14(e)); Royal In-
dus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
"1 411 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
... Id. at 1210.
"I Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
196 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
... In Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,142
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a breach of fi-
duciary duty by the subject company (in this case, an acquisition undertaken
solely to block a tender offer) without any deception, misrepresentation or non-
disclosure did not violate § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 or § 14(e). Additionally, the Bucher
court stated that common law breaches of fiduciary duty cannot be transformed
into § 10(b) or 14(e) violations merely by alleging the failure to disclose them. See
also In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig. [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,217 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1981), adds another element. In addition to holding that the subject com-
pany is under no federally imposed duty to disclose its motive for opposing a
tender offer, and that, absent manipulation or deception, the failure to disclose a
policy of resistance to acquisition is not actionable under Rule 10b-5, the Panter
court held the subject company shareholder's claim that fraudulent acts by the
subject company's management caused withdrawal of a tender offer was not ac-
tionable under § 14(e) due to the lack of reliance (the threatened tender offer was
not actually commenced).
Other courts have attempted to determine when and under what circumstances
a state law breach of fiduciary duty becomes a violation of sections 10(b) or 14(e)
as well. See, e.g., Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 510 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (minority subject company shareholder stated a Rule 10b-5 cause of action
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also evolving; for example, in State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor
Corp.,49 the District Court for the Southern District of New York ex-
pressly held that the business judgment rule that developed under
general corporation law governs decisions as to the timing of disclo-
sures of material facts to the investment community generally. Other
courts have reached similar results in actions purportedly brought
under Rule 10b-5. 99
In the context of section 14(e) litigation, if it is determined that an ac-
tion by a subject company (e.g., granting of lock-up options to ensure a
competing tender offer at a fair price) was in furtherance of state-im-
posed fiduciary obligations (ie., the duty to resist an inadequate offer),
it could well be argued that, absent a failure to disclose all material
facts, any claim based upon an alleged "manipulation" of the market
should fail. If target directors satisfy their state law fiduciary obliga-
tions in authorizing such transactions, the only valid federal interest is
satisfied provided that disclosure of all material facts has been made.
However, similar reasoning was ignored by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Marathon,"o' and it remains unclear as to whether other
courts will follow that decision.
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Proxy Rules
In any situation involving a struggle for corporate control and solici-
tations of support from shareholders, the proxy rules promulgated
under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act may become applicable. A dis-
cussion of the substantive provisions of those rules, however, is beyond
the scope of this Article. It may be useful, nonetheless, to note those sit-
uations in tender offer cases where the proxy rules were at issue.
by alleging that the subject company's management and acquirers acted together
to eliminate cash and stock dividends in an effort to depress its price). Cf. Credit
& Fin. Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,826 (2d Cir. 1981) (claim that target's press release failed to disclose predeter-
mination to reject a tender offer coupled with factual allegations of extensive
prior dealings between the parties does state a claim under Rule 10b-5); Merritt
v. Colonial Foods, Inc., [1980 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,689 (D.C. Del.
1980) (failure to disclose alleged self-serving purpose of a tender offer).
,.. [1979-80 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, [1981 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,005
(2d Cir. 1981).
' See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514,
518 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
' Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). The trial court
had explicitly held in that case that the subject company directors had satisfied
their fiduciary duties in approving the grant of the challenged "lock-up" options.
[1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981). That
holding was not disturbed by the appellate court.
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In Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.," 1 the defendant officers agreed upon a
"refinancing plan" for their corporation. One of the alleged purposes of
this plan was to protect the defendants from exposure to liability from
earlier securities law violations. A letter describing this plan was sent
to stockholders. The letter did not, however, solicit any proxies from
these shareholders, since no vote on the matter was required. The trial
court dismissed a shareholders' class action that alleged, in part, that
the letter was a "proxy solicitation" that was subject to, but had not
complied with the proxy rules. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
the letter could be, but was not necessarily, a "proxy solicitation" within
the meaning of section 14(a) since it was sent at a time when management
was engaged in self-dealing and could have been intended to mollify the
shareholders and thereby prevent them from taking any action against
the plan."2 The case was remanded for trial on this issue.
In another case decided at about the same time, the Fifth Circuit
found that a letter describing a proposed merger did not constitute a
"proxy solicitation" since the letter was not reasonably calculated to
result in either the procurement of proxies or any other action by the
shareholders. The letter in question did not request proxies, and the
time for soliciting them was not near. 3
Target management may violate section 14(a) if it forms a section
13(d)(3) group in an effort to resist a takeover attempt but fails ade-
quately to disclose this fact in its annual proxy solicitation., On the
other hand, an issuer need not disclose its entire battle plan under sec-
tion 14(a), e.g., planned organic changes in the corporate structure or a
possible effort to go private. 5
Rule 14a-2 exempts solicitations of the proxies of ten or fewer "per-
sons" from the filing requirements of section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act.0 ' In Water & Wall Assocs. v. American Consumer Industries,
501 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 766-68.
5 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 601 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
See Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
505 Id.
The rule provides, in relevant part:
[The rules contained in the regulation] apply to every solicitation of a
proxy with respect to securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Act, whether or not trading in such securities has been suspended, ex-
cept that:
(b) Sections 240.14a-3 to 240.14a-8 and 240.14a-10 to
240.14a-12 do not apply to the following:
(1) Any solicitation made otherwise than on behalf of
the issuer where the total number of persons solicited
is not more than 10 ....
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Inc., "7 the plaintiff contended that where one person who controls
several blocks of stock in various capacities is solicited, each interest or
block he represents should be counted as one "person" toward the limit
of ten. However, the Water & Wall court held that this construction
would be predicated on the contention that the SEC was extremely "in-
articulate" in its draftsmanship of Rule 14a-2 and, therefore, refused to
follow the plaintiff's overly technical reading of the rule.50 8
B. Rule 10b-4
Rule 10b-4 prohibits the practice of "short tendering," i.e., promising
to deliver securities to an offeror which one does not own at the time
the promise is made. The rule contains a rather explicit and lengthy list
of prohibited activities. The first known enforcement action under this
rule was SEC v. Weisberger,"9 in which the defendants were found to
have violated Rule 10b-4(a)(1) by offering to tender 5,000 shares of Mar-
cor, Inc. to Mobil Corporation in connection with the latter's tender of-
fer. Only a few other cases have arisen under this rule," ' presumably
because the prohibitions thereunder are relatively clear.
C. Rule 10b-5
1. General
The utility of the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 as a basis for
relief in the tender offer area is limited by Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.," ' the validity of which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.512 Birnbaum requires that
plaintiffs bringing private actions under Rule 10b-5 be either purchasers
or sellers of the securities in connection with which the alleged fraud
was practiced. The Birnbaum doctrine precludes actions for fraud in
connection with tender offers from being brought under Rule 10b-5 by
the bidder, the subject company, the issuer or nontendering share-
holders, unless those parties happen to have purchased or sold the se-
curities in question. 13
507 [1973 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
Id. at 93,758.
[1974-75 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
5 E.g., SEC v. Roven, Civ. No. 3413 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The SEC has proposed
an amendment to Rule 14d-4 which would proscribe so-called "hedged tendering."
SEC Release No. 34-18050, [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,019 (Aug.
21, 1981).
' 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
512 421 -U.S. 723 (1975).
513 See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (common
stockholders whose equity interests are diluted have no standing under Rule
10b-5); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489
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The rule is, however, subject to exceptions in some cases, notably, a
plaintiff only seeking injunctive relief is not required to be a purchaser
or seller. 14 A plaintiff must, however, have some connection to the
defendant's conduct. In Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.,"' for exam-
ple, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a
subject company had standing to seek an injunction for a bidder's alleged
violation of Rule 10b-5 since the target was in the best position to pro-
tect the interests of its shareholders. Most courts would also agree that
a stockholder has standing to sue for an injunction under Rule 10b-5 .1 6
Of course, if the plaintiff is required to satisfy the purchaser-seller
rule, any purchase or sale must be made in connection with the tender
offer. This point is amply illustrated by Crane Co. v. American Stan-
dard, Inc. 517 In Crane, a bidder brought suit against a rival bidder, alleg-
ing that the rival's violations of the federal securities laws had caused
the tender offer made by the initial bidder to fail. Although the plaintiff
had acquired a large block of shares as part of these transactions, the
trial court dismissed the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims holding that
it could not satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement. The trial court
pointed out that the plaintiff had made a profit of nearly ten million
dollars when it later sold the shares that it had acquired and that the
plaintiff's only grievance was that the rival bidder had prevented it
from gaining control of the target. "In that role, [the initial bidder did]
not present itself . . . as a member of the class intended to be protected
by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-. 5 18
The Crane court's analysis seems sound. The original purpose of the
purchaser-seller requirement was to prevent the recovery of specula-
tive damages under Rule 10b-5, and the only damage suffered by the in-
itial bidder in Crane was the failure of its tender offer, an undertaking
U.S. 873 (1974) (nontendering shareholders); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) (issuer); Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc.
v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) (subject company);
Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,403 (D.D.C. 1978) (subject company); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes
Land Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (issuer); H. K. Porter Co. v.
Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir.
1973) (bidder and subject company).
1,4 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967);
Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see Camelot Indus. v.
Vista Resources, Inc., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,611 (S.D.N.Y. March
29, 1982); Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., [1981-82 Decs.] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,671 (N.D. Ala. April 27, 1982).
515 [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,882, at 95,633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
116 See, e.g., Reserve Mgmt. Corp. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, Inc., [1978
Dees.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
11' [1979 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,823 (2d Cir. 1979).
5" Id. at 95,289.
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that may or may not have succeeded in any event. Since a bidder has no
standing to bring an action under Rule 10b-5 for interference with a
tender offer, the Crane court correctly dismissed the Rule 10b-5 claims.
Still, while the problem of standing under Rule 10b-5 is one that must be
considered by litigants in tender offer cases, it can be circumvented in
most tender offer cases by bringing the action under section 14(e), which
contains no "purchaser-seller" requirement but provides substantially
the same protection.51 9
In Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,52 the Fifth Circuit discussed the elements
that must be pleaded and proved in order to recover monetary and in-
junctive relief under Rule 10b-5:
As recognized by the district court, there are three basic
elements to be pled and proved in 10b-5 actions: (1) conduct by
the defendants proscribed by the rule; (2) a purchase or sale of
securities by the plaintiffs "in connection with" such proscribed
conduct; and (3) resultant damages to the plaintiffs.52'
By implication these elements would also constitute a claim under sec-
tion 14(e), except for the "in connection with" requirement."2
2. Disclosure of a Forthcoming Tender Offer
If a prospective bidder purchases shares of the target over an ex-
change in preparation for its forthcoming offer, it could perhaps be
argued that Rule 10b-5 obligates it to insure that its plans with respect
to the forthcoming tender offer are publicly disclosed in advance of the
purchases. However, under the traditional concept of Rule 10b-5 as a
prohibition of trading on the basis of inside information, the bidder
should be under no obligation to make such disclosure, since its own in-
"' See generally supra Section I(D)(1).
2 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
521 Id. at 759.
52 The Fifth Circuit also discussed the statute of limitations applicable to
claims under Rule 10b-5 in Genesco. The Exchange Act contains no statute of
limitations applicable to claims under Section 10(b) (since such claims are implied
remedies), nor does federal law prescribe any statute of limitations generally ap-
plicable to civil actions. Therefore, the Genesco court held that "the limitation
period which the forum state applies to the state remedy which bears the closest
substantive resemblance to Rule 10b-5 and which best effectuates its purpose is
to be applied." Id. at 758. The date on which the claim accrues and the statute of
limitations begins to run was, however, held in Genesco to be a matter of federal,
rather than state law. Compare id with Stull v. Bayard, 424 F. Supp. 937
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977). Under Genesco, a Rule 10b-5 claim
does not accrue until the plaintiff actually discovers the fraud. The rule may,
however, be different in other circuits. But see SEC v. Glick, [1980 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,535 (D.C. Nev. 1980) (holding that an SEC action under
Rule 10b-5 seeking equitable relief accrues on behalf of the public interest and is
not bound by federal or state statutes of limitations).
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tentions are not "inside information" with respect to the prospective
target company.1.
However, the SEC in the past has attempted to alter the traditional
concepts in this area. These efforts"4 suffered a major setback in the
Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States."5 After
Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 pursuant to section 14(e),
which prohibits tipping or trading where any person has taken a
substantial step or steps to commence a tender offer.52 However, the
rule does not require pre-offer disclosure by such person and therefore
could not be used successfully to attack, for example, pre-offer market
purchases.
D. Rule 10b-6
Rule 10b-6 prohibits bids for or purchases of a security by or on behalf
of the issuer of a security if the security is "the subject of . . . . [a]
distribution."" s In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,528
an exchange offeror purchased shares of the exchange offeree. The latter
company was the target of a pending.tender offer at the time. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the proscriptions of Rule 10b-6 apply to the ac-
quisition of "any right to purchase" a security. Since the target-offeree's
shareholders were to have exchanged their shares in the target for
shares in the exchange offeror, acquisition of shares in the target by the
exchange offeror constituted the purchase of a "right to purchase" its
own shares. In other words, if Corporation A offers to exchange its
shares for shares in Corporation B by means of a distribution, and if A
buys shares of B in the meantime, it has violated Rule 10b-6. In Chris-
Craft, the Second Circuit found the exchange offeror's purchases to be
manipulative in that they artificially stimulated interest in the target-
offeree's securities immediately after the proposed exchange offer was
announced." The competing tender offeror was also held to have stand-
523 E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 23-24
(1973). See also Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-74 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,455 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (approving of market purchases without any public
announcement of a forthcoming tender offer).
524 E.g., SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-77 Decs.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3,
and Dirks: Fairness versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982).
5 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
" Rule 14e-3 was upheld in O'Conner & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1982).
528 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
" See generally Jewelcor, Inc. [1974-75 Dees.] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,014 (SEC Staff Reply, Sept. 11, 1974) (disclosure in a Schedule 13D that future
acquisition of shares by public tender offer as one of several alternatives being
considered was not a "public announcement" under rule 10b-13).
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ing to enforce Rule 10b-6 and to recover damages for the violations
which the Second Circuit found denied the target offeror a fair chance
to compete for control. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit's determination in Chris-Craft on the ground that "at no
time has [the defeated offeror] complained of or even suggested that the
price which it paid for [the target's] shares was influenced by [the vic-
torious offeror's] Rule 10b-6 violations." '
E. Rule 10b-13
A rule which is really an outgrowth of Rule 10b-6 is Rule 10b-13,
which the SEC adopted in 1969. Rule 10b-13 prohibits any "person who
makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer for any equity security"
from purchasing such security other than pursuant to his offer during
the period in which the offer is effective.53 ' However, Rule 10b-13 applies
only after a tender offer is publicly announced or commenced and has
been held inapplicable to privately negotiated purchases prior to the
commencement of the offer." 2 While the SEC's new "commencement"
concept in Rule 14d-2(b) serves further to limit a bidder's flexibility in
the marketplace,533 Rule 10b-13 remains but a trap for the unwary.
CONCLUSION
Tender offers have become an important and permanent part of the
corporate landscape in the United States. An understanding of the deci-
sional law under the Williams Act is therefore important to any cor-
porate law practitioner since defensive litigation almost inevitably ac-
companies unfriendly tender offers. Such an understanding is equally
important with respect to friendly tender offers since the applicable
federal statutes and rules provide guidance only with respect to the
most basic questions. Hopefully, this Article will aid in such understand-
ing.
1 430 U.S. at 45.
531 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1982).
532 E.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United Corp., [1977-78 Decs.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,049 (D. Idaho 1977); Heine v. Signal Cos., [1976-77 Decs.]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
... See supra Section I(B)(5)(b).
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